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Abstract

This dissertation examines the impact of transnational feminism in Iran and Argentina.
Specifically, it focuses on the role of the diaspora and international communities and their
interactions with social movements in these two countries. Although the study of transnational
feminism is not a new phenomenon, very little research has been dedicated towards distinguishing
the effects and differences in outcomes when either the diaspora or the broader international
network is involved. By filling this gap in the literature, this dissertation will shed light on whether
the diaspora community, NGOs, or the international community is necessary for success or
favorable outcomes in the area of women’s rights. To analyze both cases, I draw on the theoretical
literature on social movements, with a focus on modes of contention, access to resources, and the
degree of cohesiveness between movements in each country and their respective diaspora
communities. After discussing the development and heritage of feminism in Iran and Argentina,
I use process-tracing to compare movements in the period of 1976-2018. This research uncovers
that there are key factors to a social movement’s success including: regime stability, elite
divisiveness, domestic awareness, and international awareness; having all four of these factors
present is crucial for the success of a transnational feminism movement. Moreover, I find that in
instances where the diaspora community is involved, there is less cohesion and more contention,
which often bears unfavorable outcomes or results in the dissolution of a movement. In contrast,
this research lends support to the notion that the integration of the international community is
crucial for more favorable outcomes. While the diaspora community has ties and knowledge of the
home country, the NGOs are able to work cohesively and lend resources to organizations within
the home country in an effort to raise public awareness, gain international support, and place
pressure on governments to ensure change.
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Chapter 1:
Introduction

Over the past few decades, migration and emigration have become an ever growing, salient
issue in the politics of the Middle East, North Africa and other developing areas. While the case
of diaspora politics is not a new phenomenon, scholars have often focused predominantly on how
emigrants impact both their host countries and home countries alike. In doing so, they uncover
that in some cases, individuals either assimilate into the host country’s norms or choose to return
to their country of origin.

Even when migrants and emigrants become integrated in their

destination countries, they often partake in sending remittances back to their respective home
countries and in participating in external voting in hopes of maintaining a tie to their home
countries. A growing research literature has examined different facets of external voting and other
forms of transnational engagement among emigrants.1 What is often overlooked by scholars of
diaspora politics, however, is the impact women may have upon transnational political ties.
One of the biggest challenges such women face is integration into their new communities
and disintegration from prior norms and customs while subsequently maintaining cultural pride.
Depending upon country of origin, women from the global south often face a wide array of
challenges that are often perceived as inhumane, such as child marriages, dowry injustices,
domestic violence, honor killings, widow burning, or genital mutilation. In other cases, women
are faced with restricted social freedoms regarding reproductive rights, marriage, custody, and
divorce. Although the experiences of immigrant women vary across countries, some may begin

1

For an overview, see Lafleur 2013; Alonso and Myloans 2017
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to experience new freedoms and norms in their host country, which include new opportunities for
education or employment that were not previously available. In this case, women may choose to
assimilate and adapt to their new environments, leaving behind various stigmas and cultural norms
from their country of origin. Perhaps more important, women in diaspora communities may seek
to transplant their newly adopted norms, ideals, and social roles into their country of origin. In
doing so, they may be met with either admiration or resistance by various groups in their country
of origin. Moreover, governments in emigrants’ countries of origin exhibit variation when it
comes to transnational political engagement. Although transnational feminist movements are
often comprised of diverse individuals and groups, emigrant women may constitute a significant
part of some transnational movements (particularly when the movement is focused on the emigrant
women’s country-of-origin). To date, however, prior scholarship on the transnational politics of
immigrants (e.g., Lafleur 2013; Itzigsohn and Villacres 2008; Naujoks 2017; Schmid 2017;
Schlenker and Blatter 2017) has largely overlooked the influence of women’s involvement, and
the variation in the influence of transnational campaigns organized by women, predominantly
within the realm of Political Science.
In order to address this gap in the research literature, this dissertation examines
transnational feminist campaigns and what prospects they bring for change, if any, in home
countries. This dissertation will attempt to answer the following questions: Why are some forms
of transnational feminist activism more successful than others? Specifically, what factors would
account for the successes or failures of these movements in promoting political or social change
in their country of origin?
In an effort to answer these questions, this research will provide a comparative and
historical analysis of emigrant and migrant women’s movements from two diaspora communities:
2

Iran and Argentina. In addition to this I will look at the transnational feminist efforts embarked on
by NGOs and feminist networks that have no ties to the countries being assisted. To illustrate this
and adequately compare of the effects and impacts of both, I examine the diaspora community
within the case of Iran and examine Argentina through the scope of NGOs and feminist networks
without the influence of the diaspora.
I argue that there are various factors that may yield more successful outcomes. First,
cohesiveness, particularly between the movement on ground and the diaspora community or the
international community, is crucial for success. Essentially, the more division between these
groups, the higher the chance for disintegration and subsequent failure of a movement. Second,
the idea of awareness is critical. By awareness I mean that the international organization or group
that assists a movement is fully informed of the goals on hand and has knowledge of the culture
of the home country. A lack of awareness can result in international organizations deviating from
the goals of the movement which can result in non-desirable outcomes. Third, the ability to aquire
resources in an organized and efficient manner is critical to the success of a movement. Such
resources can include anything ranging from raising money to gaining access to social media
platforms. Symbols are also a resource in some contexts, and they are key to how movements are
framed. In addition, elite division within a regime often yields results where one faction of the
government will lend support (or access) to a movement, which is more likely to bear successful
outcomes. Moreover, elite divisiveness is indicative of a weak government, which often offers
enough vulnerability to where a movement is more likely to succeed. In addition, I argue that
regime type plays a factor in movement outcomes. More democratic institutions are likely to bear
successful outcomes, whereas movements under dictatorial and/or authoritarian regimes are more
likely to face restrictions and will find it more challenging to bear successful outcomes.
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Finally, I argue that the way a movement frames a particular issue has a significant impact
on its outcome. For instance, if a movement frames an issue as a non-gender problem within the
country, it is more likely to garner the support of the female and male population, and therefore
more likely to succeed. Issues that apply to men may also reduce the level of counter-mobilization
to a movement. We will see with the case of the Stop Stoning Forever Campaign in Iran, and the
Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, neither movement isolates a particular gender, but
rather conducts their movement through gender inclusiveness which garners more support and
yields more favorable outcomes. Similarly, movements that are centered on more contentious
issues, such as abortion, often face counter-mobilization which makes the likelihood of success
more challenging.
The salience of diaspora politics within the transnational feminist realm suggests that
women may potentially have the power of changing or maintaining the status quo found within
their respective communities. If the research illustrates that women are able to successfully shift
norms within their home countries, while being abroad, then it would be a pivotal stepping stone
for women’s rights and feminism far reaching the countries illustrated in this paper. Therefore,
change may become more prevalent by way of migration of diaspora communities. Similarly, by
examining the impacts, or the lack thereof, of NGOs and feminist networks who have no direct
ties to the countries being assisted – then one may be able to infer that the diaspora community is
not a necessity or success; similarly, if NGOs and feminist networks prove to make these
movements less successful, then one can infer that the lack of cultural background and connections
may play a factor and that a necessary tool for success is having connections to the countries and/or
having experienced what women in the home country are enduring. While the study of
transnational feminism is not a new phenomenon, and it has been approached by scholars using
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diverse methods, this research will make two contributions to the literature. First, the study will
examine why some cases are more successful than others, and the underlying factors that
contribute to such results. Second, the dissertation will examine the utility of frameworks from the
social movement literature, which has been largely applied only to domestic movements. While
it should be noted that the term “success” is particularly complex and contentious, especially when
referring to movements, as such, for intents and purposes of this study, a success is when a
movement is able to achieve the goal they set forth and they are able to attain the change they
wished to see take fruit. As such, a failure will be defined as a movement that is unable to achieve
their set goal(s) or when a movement dissolves.
The remaining portion of this dissertation proposal is organized in six sections. Chapter 1
will consist of an overview of literature and will define key terms, analyze prior research on
diaspora politics, transnationalism, feminisms, and transnational feminism, and establish a
framework for my research. I will examine the three forms of feminism that are key to this study:
Islamic Feminism, Marxist-Socialist Feminism, and Multicultural Feminism. Given that this study
will examine the case of Iran, it is important to examine Islamic Feminism, which was prevalent
during the Islamic Revolution and after the instatement of the Islamic Republic. Historically, Iran
has also incorporated elements of the other two forms of feminism. Similarly, Argentina has
utilized Marxist-Socialist Feminism and Multicultural Feminism substantially throughout its
history and continues to do so with the latter form.
Following the discussion of the overview of the pertinent literature, I will discuss the
methodology of this research. This study will utilize comparative historical analysis and a detailed
discussion of what it entails will be included. Secondly, this study will utilize process-tracing; as
such, I will discuss why process-tracing is useful for this particular study and what it entails. I will
5

also have a discussion on case selection, specifically why the cases of Iran and Argentina are fit
for this particular study and how I chose them. I also will discuss my data, specifically my
dependent variable along with the unit of analysis and my main inferences as related to the
phenomenon studied within this research.
Additionally I will discuss the theories that will be implemented for this research,
specifically, I will utilize New Social Movement Theory which is an overarching of Resource
Mobilization Theory (RMT) and Political Process Theory (PPT). Because this research is centered
on the criteria for successful movements, I utilize the tenets found within these two theories to
establish what factors are necessary or more likely to present successful outcomes. As will be
discussed in the next chapter, RMT espouses the necessity for access to resources by movements
within the home country. When such resources are inaccessible for movements on ground, they
will likely engage in transnational efforts with members of the diaspora or with NGOs abroad.
PPT discusses how political situations may bear fruit to successful outcomes; for instance, a
divided government is weaker, which makes it more feasible for movements to push their agendas.
For purposes of the scope of this research, I will not utilize the original Social Movement Theory,
but will discuss and give a general overview of it; I elect not to choose this explanation of social
movements because it categorizes individuals as irrational beings that are disruptive, which is an
over-generalized assertion that this study does not advocate. Rather, I choose to focus on why
collective action occurs and why members choose to engage, which is illustrated in NSMT, RMT,
and PPT.
I will also discuss Contentious Politics, which is laid out thoroughly in the works of Tilly
and Tarrow (2015). In doing so, I uncover two different modes of contention, contained and
transgressive, which will be used as another factor of assessing a movement’s success. Theorists
6

and scholars have often advocated that that the latter is more successful; thus, this research will
examine if this claim holds truth for either case, as both Iran and Argentina have had transgressive
based movements. Moreover, Argentina has implemented contained contention during different
regime types, so I will be able to examine if it was more or less successful in that respect. The
chapters following will delve into discussion of the specific case studies: Iran and Argentina.
Chapter 3 will begin with a thorough historical overview of feminist movements and
women’s rights endeavors in Iran from the late 1800s to the 1970s. The chapter provides a
discussion of the emergence of feminist movements in Iran, which lays the groundwork for the
casr studies analyzed in Chapter 4. Specifically, I observe women’s movements within the Qajar
Dynasty, Pahlavi Dynasty (under Reza Shah and Mohammed Reza Pahlavi), and Mossadegh Era.
In doing so I discuss the slow process of attaining basic rights such as suffrage, education, and
employment. I also discuss the transitions of family laws for women in Iran during this period, as
it shifted through each regime type. I will also give historical accounts for the regime transitions
that take place because they are incidentally impactful on women’s movements; this includes
discussion of the overthrow of the Qajar Dynasty and subsequent rule of Reza Shah, the abdication
of the latter and takeover by his son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the emergence of Prime Minister
Mohammed Mossadegh and his consequential overthrow, the re-emergence of Mohammed Reza
Pahlavi until his ultimate overthrow by the Islamic Revolution. Within each of these governments,
I discuss the role of women, but specifically the role of government in promoting or inhibiting
gender rights.
Chapter 4 will discuss the shift in women’s rights endeavors with the emergence of the
Islamic Republic. I give a general overview of the late 1970s to 1990s and how women’s rights
begin to dwindle and become more restrictive. I lay focus on one of the more pertinent events after
7

the Islamic Revolution, the International Women’s Day March in Tehran which sparked mass
protests and violence. In addition to this, I discuss splinter movements that were neither pro-Shah
nor pro-Khomeini, but utilized women in their movements to promote leftist, communist, and
Marxist-Leninist beliefs. From there, I examine three transnational feminist efforts: Iranian
Women’s Studies Foundation, Stop Stoning Forever Campaign, and the One Million Signatures
Movement. Whilst utilizing the tenets set forth in RMT and PPT and examining the modes of
contention, I examine whether each of these movements was successful. I also discuss the impact
of the diaspora community, if any, within each of these movement and whether they had any
contribution to the success or failure of a movement.
Chapter 5 will give a historical account of women’s rights movements in Argentine history
from the 1800s to the 1970s. Similar to the case of Iran, the chapter notes challenges for gender
equality and the slow progression of women’s rights. The discussion provides understanding for
the historical context and the heritage of feminism in Agrnetina that may have influenced the case
studies analyzed in Chapter 6. The chapter will focus on the direct impact of emigration from
Europe and ideals of Socialism that were brought with them. It will also lend heavy discussion to
the role of women during this period; specifically the dichotomy of being a housewife and mother,
while subsequently needing to be integrated into the labor force. The domestic and labor front
motivated women during this period to form feminist movements or gender equal movements, as
they were significantly oppressed in both sectors. The chapter will also discuss the rise of Juan
Perón, and the impact of his wife Eva, who was not a flagbearer of feminism, but was the face of
equality. Most importantly, it will highlight how Perón was able to extend suffrage rights to
women, which was a pivotal step towards gender equality for the country.
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Chapter 6 will give a historical overview of the Dirty War as it will lay the grounds for the
first transnational feminist movements that will be discussed: The Mothers and Grandmothers of
the Plaza de Mayo. This movement, while not entirely feminist in nature, is important within the
history of women’s rights in Argentina, because these women utilized the role that tradition and
society gave them, that of a mother, to fight against political oppression placed on their children
in hopes of creating change. This movement would serve as a motivator for later movements within
Argentina and outside of it. I will also discuss two other movements, the National Campaign or
the Right to Legal, Safe, & Free Abortion and Ni Una Menos (Not one Less). The former discusses
the importance of abortion rights given that numerous deaths have occurred due to the lack of
access to reproductive rights and abortion rights. The latter emerged as a collective unit when a
young girl was murdered because of an unwanted pregnancy. Both of these movements are
ongoing and continuous.
Finally, Chapter 6 will cover concluding remarks and the key findings of my research. I
will discuss which movements were successful and why. In lieu with this, I will discuss what
factors contributed to a movement’s success or failure. I will also discuss if the mode of contention
and regime type played a role in the outcome of a movement. Additionally, a discussion pertaining
to the limitations of this research and what can be contributed in future research will be included.

9

Chapter 2:
Review of the Literature, Theory, and Methods

Over the years there has been a plethora of literature dedicated to the study of transnational
feminism. In order to understand this phenomenon, it is crucial to examine the key elements that
encompass transnational feminism and that are pertinent to the movements discussed in this study.
This chapter will begin by discussing the contested concepts of diaspora, provide an understanding
the idea of cosmopolitanism, and examine the emergence of transnationalism. After this, I will
review the literature on feminism in the Third World and the Middle East, and finally discuss
transnational feminism.

Overview: Key Terms and Concepts

Diaspora
Derived from the Greek word “diacerein,” meaning to disperse, diaspora is one of the most
complex, yet prevalent terms today. In one respect, diaspora can be defined as a “set of social
practices” (Dufoix 2008, xi; Vertevec 1999) and a concept that observes the relationships between
different identities, the contributory factors with respect to politics in the home country, and the
adaptation and settlement in a given host country (Butler 2001). Other scholars have defined the
term as members that have become dispersed from their communities as a result of forced
displacement or expulsion from certain countries or regions (Moghissi 2006). In some cases,
scholars have only attributed the term to certain groups such as Jewish and Armenian communities
(Clifford 1994).

There are also two distinct forms of the term, one with being a capitalized “D”

and one with a lower-case “d”: the former, is in regards to the displacement of Jews predominantly
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under the Assyrian Empire (Galil and Weinfeld 2000) and the latter, is in regard to a community
of people that are dispersed or migrated from one country to another (Melvin, Ember and Skoggard
2004).
Scholars that are interested in the study of the diaspora are often at odds for one of two
reasons: one group believes that diaspora is a relatively new and modern phenomenon, while the
second group believes it is a historical occurrence demonstrated over time (Safran 1999; Dufoix
2008). Arguably, diaspora can be understood through both approaches. The notion of a diaspora
may have stemmed from a historical phenomenon, but has morphed into an ever-growing,
prevalent occurrence. A diaspora should not be nearly limited or reduced to a single group, but
rather understood as a community or sub-group of a larger society. One critical way of defining a
diaspora is as a “religious or national group living outside (an imagined) homeland" (Baubock and
Faist 2010, 9).
One important facet of a diaspora is the connotation and implications the term has for both
the home and host country. A diaspora is seen as a mobilizer for support of ethnic, religious, or
national identity (Baubock and Faist 2010). In some cases, diaspora takes the form of “kin state
protection" wherein members try to protect ethnic minorities living in another country (Baubock
and Faist 2010). In some cases, home countries have used the diaspora in hopes of gaining
economic benefits through remittances and financial investments. Thus, a diaspora is not a simple
term, but rather a complex phenomenon that may be interjected into various arenas. A secondary
important facet of a diaspora, is that it faces threats to its survival if there is a lack of socialization
or no socialization between natives and the host communities (Butler 2001). Essentially, such a
group will find it challenging if not impossible to maintain its diaspora identify if it fails to have
open communication within both the home and host country.
11

An additional component within the discussion of diaspora is that of “diasporic citizenship”
(Grewal 2005, 12). The discussion of “diasporic citizenship” emerged through immigration which
brought with its contentions with regard to loyalty to one’s home country and host country.
Diasporic citizenship highlights “the tension to which multiple loyalties give rise… [resulting in]
a diasporic citizenship to evolve, transnational and moving away from territorially bound and
sedentary versions of citizenship” (Grewal 2005, 12). Another notion of citizenship, coined as
“flexible citizenship”, has examined the idea of diasporic communities encompassing their loyalty
towards both the home and host countries in an effort to promote transnational movements (Grewal
2015).
For purposes of this research, I define diaspora as a group of people (from any given
religion or national group), from within the same territory that migrate from their homeland to a
host country due to unforeseen circumstances. In addition to this, such a group is faced with an
internal struggle of their ethnic ties and adaptation of their newfound environment. With the notion
of a diaspora has transformed a wide array of sub-categories within this framework-most notably,
that of transnationalism.
Transnationalism
In many cases, transnationalism and diaspora are two terms that are often associated.
Transnationalism refers to two facets: the migrants that have connections across countries and “to
capture not only communities, but all sorts of social formations, such as transnationally active
networks, groups and organizations” (Baubock and Faist 210, 9). Transnationalism, similar to the
term diaspora, brings with it a multitude of meanings, interpretations, and connotations.
Originally discussed by Randolph Bourne (1916), but coined by one of his college
schoolmates, transnationalism was created to form a new way of understanding the relationships
12

found between cultures. Though, it is noteworthy to state that while the term itself was coined in
1916, transnationalism began well before that during the late 1800’s/early 1900s (Ferree and Tripp
2006, 55). In most literature, transnationalism refers to the relationship found between the home
country and host country; specifically, the connections immigrants or migrants have between their
country of origin and their new-found host country. In some cases, these connections are
economic, while in others they are more social and political.
Individuals engage in transnationalism by way of patronage and political participation
while residing in their host country (Lafleur 2013). Moreover, such individuals may even choose
to influence their communities abroad. In many cases migrants and immigrants may feel that their
host countries have better functioning political systems and as such, these individuals may
illustrate this to members in their community in hopes of raising awareness which may result in
change or a public outcry. One example of this could be found in individuals who come from
impoverished or corrupted institutions wherein certain opportunities are not present, but become
attainable in host countries. As a result, these individuals want to inform members of their
community back home in hopes that transitions will occur. This phenomenon has emerged by way
of globalization and migration. In other cases, transnationalism may not even include the home
country, but rather is a dynamic found between two distinct countries that the immigrant may
frequently travel to and from (Reidel 2017). This form of transnationalism, forces the individual
to “extend his way of living ‘beyond loyalties that connect to any specific place of origin or ethnic
or national group’” (Reidel 2017, 2).
Perhaps one of the most important definitions of transnationalism may be found in the
works of Glick Schiller and Fouron (1999) wherein transnationalism is defined as “a pattern of
migration in which persons, although they move across international borders, settle and establish
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ongoing social relations in a new state, maintain ongoing social connections within the polity from
which they originated" (344). For purposes of this research, I shall utilize this definition as it
adequately captures the groups and activities examined in the dissertation. From this notion of
transnationalism, stemmed an additional, and critical, sub-branch of transnational feminism.
While this branch is similar, it incorporates a nuanced perspective.
Social Movements
The focus of this dissertation is on transnational feminist movements, which are one branch
of social movements. For this reason, it is important to discuss the concept of social movements.
Social movements have been described in a variety of ways. DeFronzo (2011, 9) defines them as
“…a persistent and organized effort on the part of a relatively large number of people either to
bring about or to resist social change" (9) and as “collective challenges, based on common
purposes and social solidarities in sustained interaction(s) with elites, opponents, and authorities".
Social movements have also been defined as campaigns that pursue a claim through
repeated efforts to raise awareness on the claim “based on organizations, networks, traditions, and
solidarities that sustain these activities" (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, 11). Social movements
Combine (1) sustained campaigns of claim making; (2) an array of public performances
including marches, rallies, demonstrations, creation of specialized associations, public
statements, petitions, letter writing, and lobbying; (3) repeated public displays of
worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment by such means as wearing colors, marching
in disciplined ranks, sporting badges that advertise the cause, displaying signs, chanting
slogans, and picketing public buildings. They draw on (4) the organizations, networks,
traditions, and solidarities that sustain these activities social movement bases (Tilly and
Tarrow 2015, 11).
During the 1950s, theories that tried to explain collective action believed that:
Social movements were a form of collective behavior that emerged when significant social
cultural breakdowns occurred…social movements were considered spontaneous,
unorganized, and unstructured phenomena that were discontinuous with institutional and
organizational behavior (Morris 2000, 445).
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One important caveat is that not all social movements remain intact during protests or upheavals.
For instance, in some cases, social movements may turn radical which might potentially deviate
from the last stage of development. In other words, a movement may go through these stages and
follow them, but failure and dissolution may be inevitable. As De la Porta and Diani (2006) state:
In fact, SMOs rarely get institutionalized. In the first place, few of them actually service
for a significant time spell. Some dissolve because their aims have been
achieved…leadership splits during downturns in mobilization, and the resultant processes
of disintegration and realignment cause others to disappear….their members’ first loyalty
continues to be to the movement and the organization is simply seen as a temporary
instrument for intervention (151)

For purposes of this research, I utilize the definition incorporated in the work of Jacquelien
van et.al. (2009) which states that “social movements are interlocking networks of groups, social
networks and individuals and the connection between them with a shared collective identity who
try to prevent or promote societal change by non-institutionalized tactics” (4). This definition is
best suited for this study, as the social movements examined hereto involve transnational networks
that work seemingly together in an effort to reform current policies or evoke change within their
respective societies.
Feminism(s)
Feminism is a complex and contentious term, and there is no single definition or
explanation for feminism (Thompson 2001). In addition, there is an enormous literature on
feminist theories and movements,2 and a full review of this literature is beyond the scope of this
dissertation. Instead, I focus the discussion on theories and concepts that are applicable to the
cases compared in this dissertation. Of the many varieties and branches of feminist movements,

2

Referred to as “feminisms” hereon.
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three have been influential in the discourse and goals of transitional feminist movements in
Argentina and Iran: Marxist-Socialist Feminism, Post-colonial and Multicultural Feminism, and
Islamic Feminism (Garner 2018, 21-22).
Marxist-Socialist Feminism. In contrast to other feminist groups that attribute gender
inequality to misogyny and patriarchy, Marxist feminists focus on the effects of social class and
property relations. Derived from Marxism, which highlights economic deprivation under
capitalism and class struggle, Marxist feminists (see Eisenstein 2019; Gimenez 2005; Hennessy
1993; Luxton 2014; Vogel 1995) argue that women are not only exploited and oppressed because
of their gender, but due to the effects of economic class as well (Seneviratne 2018, 190). This can
be best viewed in the seminal work of Freidrech Engels entitled Origins of the Family, Private
Property, and the State. There, Engels’ argues that during the emergence of what he calls the “State
of Civilization” wherein capitalism emerges, the framework of the family shifts from a more
polygamist status to a monogamous one3, wherein the man suddenly holds a level of superiority
to that of the woman and consequently a level of patriarchy ensues (Engels 2001). Specifically,
Engels states that “the form of the family corresponding to civilization and under it becoming the
definitively prevailing form is monogamy, the supremacy of the man over the woman, and the
individual family as the economic unit of society” (Engels 2001, 216). Engels highlights that the
level of classes within capitalism sheds light on the level of freedom and equality offered to
women. Here, Engels highlights that there are two forms of family: the bourgeois and the
proletariat. The former places heavy emphasis on upholding property and financial stability; with
that being said they place heavier emphasis on the role of women within the family, specifically
3

During the previous stages, Engels discusses the framework of the family wherein there is an element of polygamy
involved. During the first stage, there is no single “father” or “mother” but a collective of fathers and mothers that
help take care of their children. In this latter stage of Civilization, the mother and father are known to the children
and each have their distinct roles within the family.
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their crucial roles as mothers and wives (Engels 2001). In this case, it is considered problematic
for a woman to seek employment outside of the home as that would require abandoning her duties
as a mother and a wife. The latter, in contrast, places very little importance on property and thus
extends more rights for women including but not limited to the right to seek employment (Engels
2001); specifically, in this respect there could be equity and equality amongst both genders.
According to Engels, in order for female equality to be plausible one has to remove the idea of
property rights which to some extent eludes to fixing the flaws within capitalism (Engels 2001).
In one respect, Marxist-socialist feminists believe that capitalism results in female
oppression (Garner 2018). Specifically, such feminists believe that this capitalism hinders the
progression for women, both in the public sphere and the domestic. As one Marxist feminist, Sylvia
Wably notes “…men’s domination over women is a byproduct of capital’s domination over labor.
Class relations and the economic exploitation of one class by another are the central features of
social structures, and these determine the nature of gender relations” (Wably 1990, 4) Moreover,
with regards to the work force, capitalism promotes lower wages for women (Garner 2018).
Studies have shown that women that work in plantations and factories are predominantly subjected
to exploitation due to their economic class and gender (Seneviratne 2018). Additionally,
“…Marxist-socialist feminists challenge the global capitalist economic order and the socially
constructed public/private boundaries that privilege men and subordinate women in capitalist
societies" (Garner 2018, 21). Marxist feminism further addresses public and private sectors as a
“false dichotomy historically produced by interactions of patriarchy and capitalism” (Seneviratne
2018, 192). While this form of feminism posits some sound concerns, it has come under scrutiny
and criticism for often failing to address gender inequality that was present in pre- and post-
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capitalistic economic systems and for often attributing gender inequality solely to capitalism and
overlooking other dynamics at play (Seneviratne 2018, 192-193).
Post-Colonial and Multicultural Feminism. Perhaps one of the more pertinent forms of
feminism for this study is postcolonial and multicultural feminism. This approach is critical of
claims set forth by western feminists and, in particular, the agendas of “…white, middle-class
Western women" (Garner 2018, 22). Within this form of feminism, members rally against the
exploitation of “women and men of color living in the global South" and ascertain that “women
must challenge gender discrimination and other forms of oppression" without the use of western
feminist methods (Garner 2018, 22).4
Notable scholars within the spectrum of this form of feminism, such as Chandra Talpade
Mohanty and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, have often evoked concerns with western feminism
stating that it often creates an autonomous state for “first world” women and that such women are
somehow more “secular and liberated” in comparison to women from third world countries
(Chambers and Watkins 2012; Mohanty 1984, 353). Further, Mohanty addresses the label of the
“third world woman” often evoked by western feminists (Mohanty 2003). The “third world
woman” in this case refers to one that is oppressed and needs “saving” predominantly by women
of “first world” countries (Mohanty 1984). One prominent example of this can be found in the
practice of sati5 in India, which Spivak stated was nothing short of “white men saving brown

Closely connected to this movement is the idea of “Womanism.” In some countries, the term “feminist" is not openly
used or accepted, and thus certain movements have avoided using it altogether (Moghadam 2005). Instead, different
women from underrepresented have embraced the term womanist when referring to themselves and their
organizations. Originally coined in 1979 by Alice Walker, ‘Womanism’ refers to the branch of feminism exerted by
African American women or women of color. Walker formulated the term Womanism in an effort to “…offer colored
women a space to formulate their policy” by utilizing similar tenets found within different feminisms (Izgarjan and
Markov 2013, 305).
4

5

The practice of a widow throwing herself on top of her deceased husband’s funeral pyre
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women from brown men” and that western feminists and scholars often falsely projected that “the
women wanted to die” thus they required saving (Spivak 1988, 93). This rhetoric often espoused
by western feminists led Mohanty to coin the term “Third World difference” which encompasses
“that stable, ahistorical something that apparently oppresses most if not all the women in these
countries. And it is in the production of this…that Western feminisms appropriate and colonize
the constitutive complexities that characterize the lives of women in these countries” (Mohanty
1984, 335). Moreover, western feminist writings have often over generalized the struggles of the
“third world woman” by highlighting that they are more susceptible to domestic violence,
religious oppression, cultural oppression, sexual oppression, economic dependence and much
more (Mohanty 1984; Mohanty 2003; Hosken 1981; Lindsay 1983; Cutrufelli 1983; Cowie 1978).
As Mohanty highlights these generalizations are not only problematic and highly dangerous, they
pre-subscribe men and women into specific categories: the “powerless” (women) and the
“powerful” (men) (Mohanty 2003, 25). From this, stems the tenets of multicultural feminism
which set out to diminish and destruct these discrepancies and over-generalizations found within
western feminist literature.
Perhaps one of the more notable tenets found within multicultural feminism is that it
encompasses women from all classes, sexual orientations, age groups, races, ethnicities, and
religions (Pearson 2007). Moreover, this form of feminism often embodies the needs of women of
color, which creates a sense of unity among them.

Women within multicultural feminism are

bonded in one of three ways: shared interests, shared cultures, and shared institutions (Pearson
2007; Mohanty 2007). Shared interests include certain movements such as reforming gender
biased laws, creating equal wage opportunities for women, creating equal platforms for men and
women of color, and/or demolishing and demobilizing patriarchal societies. Shared institutions
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“…involves the sets of social relations organized specifically to solve the problems group members
face in achieving their objectives” (Pearson 2007, 89). Lastly, shared cultures encompass members
belonging to certain ethnicities, religions, nationalities, races, and societal cultures which in turn
creates common interests and goals within these groups.
Multicultural feminism “highlights the ‘political intersectionality’ of all the axes of
stratification … [it] takes as its starting point the cultural consequences of worldwide movements
and dislocations of people” (Pearson 2007, 91). Multicultural feminists additionally espouse that
for women of color, race often plays a superseding role to gender both domestically and
internationally. Women of color are often defined first by their race and then by their gender and
class (Pearson 2007). Thus, multicultural feminism offers a thorough analysis of the intersection
found between gender, race, and class and how all three have become focal points for movements
within this form of feminism.
Similarly, postcolonial feminism highlights the vast differences between western feminist
objectives and feminist movements outside of the United States and Europe (Mohanty 2003).
Specifically, postcolonial feminists ascertain that much of the oppression and degradation women
outside of western societies often face is directly related to the legacy of colonialism that has taken
place in their societies. Specifically,
Postcolonial feminisms seek to disrupt the power to name, represent and theorize by
challenging western arrogance and ethnocentrism, and incorporating the voices of
marginalized peoples. Women in the South have been particularly concerned with
contesting the power to name, including the use of terms such as ‘primitive’, ‘native,’,
‘traditional’, and ‘Third World women’…the power of western feminism to speak for
women elsewhere has not changed since colonial times (McEwan 2001, 100).
Postcolonial feminism also ascertains that western feminists, specifically white western feminists,
are hindered by their privileges, because they shield them from understanding the actual issues of
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women from “the third world” and they are incapable of seeing individuality (Spivak 2010). In
other words, these privileges blind and hinder them. Postcolonial feminism breaks down these
stereotypes and allows women from all classes, regions, and religions to speak on an equal
platform about their concerns, rather than have western feminists speak on their behalf and project
their biased, highly ill-informed opinions (Spivak 1990; Amadiume 1997; McEwan 2001).
According this perspective, the variable forms of gender oppression that exist in former
colonies should be traced to the interplay among colonial (and postcolonial) institutions, enduring
pre-capitalist social formations, and the international division of labor. Similar to that of
multicultural feminist thought, post-colonial feminists believe there is a vast difference between
their motives and that of their western counterparts. Moreover, postcolonial feminism is similar to
that multiculturalism because it too views western feminist rhetoric as highly problematic and
often times inaccurate.
Islamic Feminism. Given the growth of women's rights movements in Islamic states in
the Middle East and North Africa, scholars have developed interest in a newer branch of
feminism that is associated with Islamic Feminism. Over the past few decades, women's rights
groups within Islamic states6 have examined various interpretations of religious doctrine in an
effort to better understand and remedy patriarchal and gender biased legislation within these
states (Al-Sharmani 2014). There are contentions found among Islamic feminist scholars. On the
one hand, some scholars suggest that there is “…great epistemic and political value in it [Islamic
feminism], not only for Muslim women but for the reform of religious tradition” (Al-Sharmani
2014, 83). In other words, Islamic feminism has the potential to promote reform, modernity, and

6

States that implement Sharia law
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equality (Abou-Bakr 2012; Barlas 2002; Badran 2002; Mir-Hosseini 2006). On the other hand,
some scholars have stated that Islamic Feminism will not advance the cause of women (Moghissi
1999; Moghadam 2002; Tohidi 2003). Specifically, these scholars state that Islamic feminism is
“unsystematic and heterogeneous body of knowledge, as having weak methodological links to
classical religious sciences and being politically insignificant" (Al-Sharmani 2014, 83). AbouBakr (2001) further expresses concern with the term “Islamic feminism" as it can be very narrow
and “limiting" when addressing the concerns of Muslim women (as cited in Al-Sharmani 2014,
84). Margot Badran claims that Islamic feminism is not really about seeking equality for women,
but rather “seeking rights and justice for women and men in the totality of their existence" (AlSharmani 2014, 85).
Islamic Feminism can be categorized into two groups: the first group has primarily focused
on the Quran (Wadud 1999; 2006; 2009; Barlas 2002; Al-Faruqi 2000; Reda 2013; Abou-Bakr
2013; 2015); the second group consists of scholars that focus on the faqih and jurisprudence (MirHousseini 2000; Ali 2010). A newly emerging category is that within Sufism and “the role as an
ethical and theological corrective to the patriarchal principles and doctrines of Islamic
jurisprudence" (Al-Sharmani 2014, 86). Some scholars such as Sadiyya Shaikh (2012) state that
Sufism offers new insight to gender rights by introducing a more ethical element rather than a legal
one as the study of Islamic doctrines have often undermined the ethical part to Islamic feminism
and women's rights as a whole (Al-Sharmani 2014).
In her seminal piece entitled “Islamic Feminism Revisited," Haideh Moghisi (2011)
ascertains that Islamic feminism is not beneficial for the cause of women's rights movements as
this sect of feminism heavily overlooks strict analyzing and scrutiny of Quran and its doctrines
(Hadiths, Suraas, etc.) with regards to its views on gender roles in society. Moreover, Moghisi
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(2011) highlights that Islamic feminism creates this mindset that overgeneralizes women into the
single category of being part of the same religion, yet overlooks other factors that may differ such
as race, ethnicity, and nationality. Moghisi (2011) highlights that this would be similar to referring
to western feminism as “Christian feminism" which would be inaccurate. Her concerns are in part
due to the fact that within the Middle East there are other religions that are equally impacted by
societal constrictions against women (Moghisi 2011). Moreover, there are women within Islamic
states that are not overtly religious or consider themselves to be more secularized, yet they too are
impacted by gender bias (Moghisi 2011).
To further examine this, some scholars have argued that some variations of Islamic
Feminism are compatible with "contained contention" (Tilly and Tarrow 2015; Barlow 2018). As
previously discussed, contained contention is contention that remains within the institution or
regime. As such, with respect to Islamic feminism it is believed that within contained contention,
activists attempt to advance certain rights and reforms for women within the confines of a regime's
discourse (Barlow 2018). Moreover, these Islamic feminist movements often demobilize upon
reaching success or failure (Barlow 2018).
Transnational Feminist Social Movements
Perhaps one of the more prevalent forms of transnational social movements, which is the
focal point for this study, is that of transnational feminist movements, which not only encompass
different forms of feminisms, but also shows the interconnectedness between regions, countries,
and cultures. These movements bring together two otherwise separate worlds between the values,
customs, and norms of women who are situated in the home country and the host country. As such,
women are potentially “…caught between different systems of values, beliefs, languages,
discourses, and identities” and “emigres who are feminists can develop a distinct capacity to
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translate feminist ideas and practices across cultures” (Heitlinger 1999, 3). Transnational feminist
movements may take place on different scales, including the local level, regional level, or global
level (Moghadam 2015, 53). One critical point found in these movements is that despite embracing
different conceptions of feminism, one of the key goals is to promote international solidarity
between women.
It means that women must engage these challenges in their different locales understanding
that their sociality is not predicated on what comes out of Washington or London, for
example, but by holding their nation states more accountable for the conditions and quality
of life in their countries. This requires creating solidarity across difference and national
boundaries to have an effective transnational impact (Carty and Mohanty 2015, 87).

Transnational feminist movements also seek to foster understanding between women in the
global north and the global south so that they may appreciate each other’s needs and demands and
assist one another. Specifically, these approaches emphasize the agency of women in the global
south; that is, women of the global north must not merely view women of the global south as
incapable, oppressed beings, but rather as equals with specific goals that can be more readily
accomplished through solidarity. Thus, transnational feminism is not just solidarity across borders,
regions, religions, ethnicities, and races but across economic classes (Carty and Mohanty 2015).

In terms of substance, transnational feminist movements have expressed a number of goals.
In a growing mobilized and globalized world, transnational feminists not only wish to challenge
neoliberalism, but the “…masculinized hegemony of business and political elites” (Moghadam
2015, 53). Additionally, transnational feminist groups wish to address a wide array of issues
including but not limited to political and normative components (Moghadam 2015). Having first
emerged in 1868 with the Association Internationale des Femmes, which focused on “suffrage and
secular education” (Ferree and Tripp 2006, 55), transnational feminism calls for “the social,
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political, and economic equality of women across national boundaries" (Moghadam 2005).
Moreover, transnational feminism is defined as the “global networks of women working globally
and locally on multi-site issues including gender and development, women's human rights, peace,
anti-violence, anti-trafficking, health, and democratic transformation" (Ackerly 2007, 47).
Transnational feminism has opened a gateway for women in host countries to manifest
notions of empowerment to women in their country of origin as well as other countries abroad.
Furthermore, this movement has paved the way for open communication between women within
different countries. This is equally pivotal and profound, as it gives the platform for change to
occur in various spectra. The most critical facet of this movement is to promote gender justice
within certain countries (Moghadam 2005). The global south has significantly benefited from
transnational feminism, as under-represented women from third-world countries have been
assisted by their fellow female compatriots while they reside abroad (Ackerly 2007). During the
1900s, parts of Asia began experiencing transnational feminist movements particularly in Japan
and China (Ferree and Tripp 2006). Such movements focused predominantly on suffrage
movements coupled with, demands for political rights (Ferree and Tripp 2006). Moreover, these
movements had differing views from those of within western civilizations, particularly the United
Kingdom and United States.
Later in the 1920s in Japan, suffragists like Ichikawa Fusae saw the struggle for the right
to vote as than just a means of getting legislation passed to benefit women and children, as
women’s suffrage had been framed in the United States. For her and other Japanese
feminists, the women’s vote would allow women to assert themselves on a wide range of
issues affecting society (Ferree and Tripp 2006, 55).
In Chile, similar movements were seen within the Chilean Women’s Civic Party which also was
concerned with women’s suffrage “but saw it in a broader context of obtaining civil, political, and
economic equality with men” (Ferree and Tripp 2006, 55). Perhaps one of most important aspects
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of the movement in Chile is that unlike the feminist movements within western states, Chilean
women believed in achieving equality “with” men, not through isolationism of the other gender.
This is not to say that women in western states isolate their male counterparts, however some forms
of feminist groups have and have chosen to highlight that injustices women endure are to a larger
degree as a result of their male counterparts (Garner 2018).
There are various forms to transnational feminism, as is the case with transnationalism,
wherein women often fall into two groups: the first are women that have ties to their country of
origin wherein they have first-hand experience of grievances and injustices committed against their
respective genders (i.e., domestic violence, gender biased laws, honor killing, genital mutilation
etc.) where they want to create a drastic change in their home country and they try to do so by
informing women in their respective countries that the cultural or religious stigmas placed on them
are unjustified; the second group, are women that have no ties to these countries, but feel the need
to help in promoting change due to the injustices they have heard about from outside sources
(Moghadam 2005); this dissertation will lay focus on both groups, the former being covered in the
case of Iran, while the latter will be discussed with the case of Argentina. As will be discussed
later in this section, underprivileged women are more likely to join “Transnational Feminist
Networks" (Ackerly 2007).

Underprivileged women include “young women, women with

undetermined citizenship, those with language barriers, locally engaged activists, and those who
do not share the feminist consensus" (Ackerly 2007, 48). These women often cannot migrate
freely, thus they choose to engage in transnational feminist networks in hopes that women abroad
can assist them with their needs and demands.
One caveat to the term “transnational feminism" is the misconception that it is closely
aligned with the ideology of feminism (Moghadam 2005; Ackerly 2007). While there are many
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attributes that might be similar, there is a vast array of differences in their target goals. One such
difference can be found with the belief systems surrounding homosexual rights and abortion rights
(Moghadam 2005). In some cases, women from particular countries may not find either of these
issues salient enough to incorporate in their movements, while in other circumstances they do. In
the case of feminism, both cases are highly pertinent drivers within the movement (Moghadam
2005). A secondary difference found is that of terminology and language. Feminism is a term
that is typically associated with North America and has been avoided by female groups in Middle
Eastern, North African, Southeast Asian regions. In many cases, women from these parts of the
world typically fight for struggles with “civil society or democracy" (Moghadam, 2005, 18).

First Phase of Transnational Feminism
One of the more debatable questions is where transnational feminism began and how it
emerged. As previously mentioned, transnational feminism is not a nuanced phenomenon, and
arguably, it first surfaced during the mid-1800s and beginning of the 1900s. During the years 1880
to 1930, international women’s mobilization networks emerged and created a gateway to focus on
important issues that oppressed women or significantly dissolved their rights (Ferree and Tripp
2006). As discussed previously, many of these movements surfaced around the issue of women’s
suffrage, but many were also religiously-based movements as seen in the United Kingdom, India,
Burma, China, and Japan (DuBois 2000). This particular strain of transnational feminism promoted
a wide array of skills among women including organization, leadership, and education which
substantially heightened female engagement not only in western states, but non-western states as
well (Ferree and Tripp 2006, 55).
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In the first phase, several transnational movements also emerged with the hope and intent
of achieving equality for women in civil society and on political platforms. For instance, the InterAmerican Commission of Women (IACW) focused on these very issues within much of Central
and South America (Towns 2011; Meyer and Fry 1998). IACW put forth efforts in observing the
various statuses, most predominantly that of the legal status, of women within the Latin American
region (Towns 2011; Cott 1984; DuBois 2000). These movements were predominantly interested
in not only attaining suffrage rights, but specifically the role of women pertaining to “peace,
democracy, and progress” and strived on attaining worldwide citizenship by way of marriage
(Ferree and Tripp 2006, 58). Thus, while suffrage was a pertinent issue and concern at the time,
these facets were also critical to achieving the former.
Colonization also resulted in transnational engagement of women, particularly in countries
within Asia and Africa (Jayawardena 1995; Tripp 2002; Denzer 2002). While reflecting a
paternalistic view of women in European colonies in Africa and Asian, Western women were
interested in aiding women who lived under colonialism with issues related to politics, health,
education, and legal status (Ferree and Tripp 2006, 58). In many cases though, efforts set forth by
TFNs were often unrecognized as they coincided with other more prominent movements such as
the Colonial Project of Modernization and other local colonial activists. Thus, local movements
that strived to end foot binding in China, and genital mutilation in various African states, were
probably more important in raising awareness on these issues than TFNs (Ferree and Tripp 2006,
58).
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Second Phase of Transnational Feminism
The second phase of TFN occurred somewhere between the mid-1940s to 1970s. There are
two attributes for the heightening of transnational feminism during this period. Some scholars and
feminists would attribute the start of TFNs to the post-World War II dynamic (Ferree and Tripp
2006; Thomas 2000; Etchart 2014; Shibahara 2015). During this time, women sought to assist one
another with overcoming colonialism and gaining freedom within their states (Ferree and Tripp
2006). The UN Commission on the Status of Women was established in 1945 and became “the
focal point of international advocacy and for the promotion of women’s rights in all spheres”
(Ferree and Tripp 2006, 59). These movements predominantly transitioned from the movements
established in Latin America during the first wave. The UNCSW has served as a pivotal platform
for women from the global north to assist women from the global south in attaining equal rights,
coupled with ending gender discrimination and oppression on various platforms. Moreover, today
the UNCSW encompasses members from Africa, Asia, North America, and Europe which is not
only a reflection of the today’s global society, but serves as a useful mechanism in raising
awareness of crucial issues in each of these areas of the world.
In contrast, some scholars have attributed the start of the movement to globalization,
particularly during the 1970s (Moghadam 2012; Moghadam 2005; Naples and Manisha 2002;
Suchland 2015; Deepak 2012). While globalization may not have started transnational feminism
networks, the economic and political changes brought by globalization7 significantly heightened
the involvement and progress of integrated feminist networks (Ferree and Tripp 2006, 10). For
TFNs, this means that groups are able to not only exchange ideas, but strategies and goals as well.

7

Globalization has been defined in various ways, including the greater integration and trade, investment, and
production across borders; increased international migration flows; and changes in communication technology that
has led to “…speedy flows of ideas across great distances” (Ferree 2006, 11).

29

During the second phase of transnational feminism, such strategies came to surface and helped
their respective movements. Specifically, there have been three types of strategies that have
significantly impacted the outlook of these feminist and transnational feminist groups (Ferree and
Tripp 2006). First, TFNs adopted a strategy in which a “…women’s policy machinery within state
institutions” (Ferree and Tripp 2006, 11). Women’s’ policy machinery is essentially a network or
administration whose focal point encompasses issues that are pertinent to reforming or creating a
positive change for women. Such groups may include:
Ministries of women’s affairs, agencies charged with ‘mainstreaming’ gender
perspectives into policy and/or bringing women into administrative positions, and
programs designed to ensure that women receive a certain share of seats in elected
and/or appointed bodies (Ferree and Tripp 2006, 11).
Such machinery is intended to address and tackle issues found within gender inequality and though
it has been found to be useful, it is not always feasible. While these groups do exist in majority of
the countries of the world, gender inequality has not ceased to exist or in some cases diminish.
Second, there has been a strategy to focus on building advocacy networks based outside of
established political institutions (Ferree and Tripp 2006; Sperling, Ferree, and Risman 2001; Keck
and Sikkink 1998; Tarrow 1999). Such organizations have focused on tackling pertinent issues
that target women such as sex trafficking, reproductive rights, and forced sex labor – each and all
of which have proven to be important across regions and borders (Keck and Sikkink 1998;
Sperlink, Ferree, and Risman 2001; Zippel 2004) Unlike prior organizations before globalization
which solely communicated on a national level, this strategy is able to have organizations from
different countries assist and work with one another by utilizing more “fluid” communication.
Essentially, transnational feminist networks have “both a material side in flow of resources and
support for issues they spread globally across national borders and a discursive side in the way that
issues are framed and conflicts organized on a global level” (Ferree and Tripp 2006, 14).
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Third, feminist groups have attempted to develop knowledge-based strategies (Ferree and
Tripp 2006). Perhaps one of the more critical and effective methods implemented by feminist and
transnational feminist groups is that of espousing and attributing key words to key issues such as
rape, patriarchy, and inequality. In addition to this, feminist groups and TFNs from across the
world
fund and conduct studies, disseminate reports, encourage discussion, and train researchers
and policy makers to develop greater awareness of gender inequities and greater
commitment to redressing them…lobbying, monitoring, funding demonstration projects,
assessing best practices, and encouraging new networks are all activities in which feminist
women’s movements are increasingly engaged as they become more institutionalized as
policy relevant actors in their own right (Ferree and Tripp 2006, 15).

By doing this, women can more effectively and strategically spread feminism and feminist ideals
to not only better inform the public about their respective causes, but to also successfully meet
their own goals for such causes. Moreover, this strategy assists with transnational feminist
movements as feminist groups in the global south can gain assistance from lobbying groups and
demonstrations in the global north to more effectively assist their cause in ways they may
otherwise be limited in doing themselves.
Several scholars have suggested that TFNs peaked during the 1980s and 1990s as
movements became more united on grounds of objectives and goals (Moghadam 2005; Bakhsh
and Harcourt 2015; Foran et al. 2007). Moreover, during this period, divisions of race, nationality,
ethnicity, and religion, and especially sexual orientation lost their relevance within TFNs. This is
not to say that there are not divisions among TFNs, but rather that there are problematic differences
pertaining to the importance of abortion rights, lesbian and bi-sexual rights, and sex labor and how
crucial each of these are (Cohn 2008; Bakhsh and Harcourt 2015; Moghadam 2005). While some
feminists in the global north may find these issues to be highly pertinent, feminists of the global
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south may disagree and find other issues such as patriarchal societies, Islamic fundamentalism,
honor killings, genital mutilation etc. to be more pertinent in their respective societies.
Nonetheless, feminist groups and TFNs strived to create gender equality in many domains,
ranging from economic equity rights to gaining reproductive rights – all of which was conducted
through close communications across borders. Furthermore, transnational feminism has not only
opened a pathway for various feminisms to converge and help one another across different regions,
it has raised awareness on global influences that have promoted positive changes for women. A
common misconception is that feminism has stemmed from the western world and that the
majority of successes can and should be attributed to western feminists (Ferree and Tripp 2006);
on the contrary, transnational feminism shows that feminists of the global north and feminists of
the global south have both contributed to successes and taught one another about the importance
of different issues and how to approach them (Shepherd 2014).
Third Phase of Transnational Feminist Movements
During the peak of the nineteenth century movements pertaining to female suffrage,
peace, and socialism transpired into heavier transnational movements with different focal points
than their predecessors. During this time, significant movements such as the Women’s
International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), the International Alliance of Women, the
International Alliance for Women’s Suffrage, and the Inter-American Commission on Women
took hold and made substantial efforts to “advance claims for women’s participation and rights”
within the global arena (Moghadam 2015, 55).
During the 1980s, global feminism took a new turn with the Third World Conference of
the UN which focused on women’s issues ranging from reproductive rights to demands for equality
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both in the social and political spectrum (Moghadam 2015, 58). Three facets contributed to the
shift from domestic feminism to global feminism networks: first, “the transition from Keynesian
economic policies…to the neoliberal economic framework” (Moghadam 2015, 58); second, was
the “slow decline of the welfare state in First World countries and the persistence of poverty and
underdevelopment of Third World countries” (Moghadam 2015, 58); and finally, the
overwhelming “emergence of various forms of fundamentalist and right-wing religious
movements” which substantially threatened the human rights and autonomy of women
(Moghadam 2015, 58).
While there were divides within forms of feminisms, women from both the global north
and global south urged one another to formulate transnational groups that would assist one another
in achieving their respective goals. From this, a wide array of notable, transnational networks
formed including but not limited to DAWN, WEDO, WLUML, MADRE, and the Sisterhood is
Global Institute (SIGI) (Moghadam 2015; Moghadam 2005; Shepherd 2014; Baksh and Harcourt
2015). Some of the more noteworthy tenets found within these organizations included the defeminization of poverty, the creation of women’s rights being human rights, the cessation of
violence against women and patriarchal societies, and gender empowerment. While women in the
global north were predominantly interested in attaining equality within the economic spectrum,
women from the global south were concerned with attaining equality within the political spectrum,
coupled with autonomy and legal status.
Transnational feminists of the 1990s denounced neoliberal ideas and instead placed focus
on raising awareness for gaining “women’s full citizenship, reproductive rights, bodily integrity,
and autonomy for all women worldwide” (Moghadam 2015, 59). During the fourth world
conference at the UN, transnational feminist groups proclaimed that all societal issues are
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interconnected and proclaimed once again that women’s rights should be considered to be a part
of basic human rights. In doing so, such groups laid out and provided tenets that would later be
accepted by nuanced feminist groups and emerging transnational networks, including but not
limited to: “women’s human rights, gender justice, gender equality, ending the feminization of
poverty, and ending violence against women” (Moghadam 2015, 59). These themes still hold a
significant place in women’s rights movements around the world and have served as platforms for
transnational feminist movements in various parts of the world to this day.
Though transnational feminist networks (TFNs) formed in an effort to better unit women’s
rights movements, they vary in their formation and goals. To better understand their objectives,
TFNs can be divided into four distinct groups. The first group is predominantly concerned with
targeting neoliberal policies. The second group takes hold typically in Islamic states and is
predominantly interested in battling against fundamentalist values and ideals that further subject
women to inequality and oppression. Women’s rights networks in countries such as Iran, Pakistan,
and Saudi Arabia have often utilized this framework when organizing their respective groups. The
third group focuses on targeting areas ridden with war and conflict to gain peace. Such groups
believe that it is critical for states to utilize non-violent measures “at every level of society, from
the global, regional, and national arenas to the ordinary locales of everyday life” (Bachetta et
al.2002, 302). This group believes that forced migration and exile that has amounted from war
and conflict is often directly linked to oppressive behavior imposed upon women from these
countries, and “history shows us that women, as primary caretakers of families, suffer enormously
under circumstances of colonization, civil unrest, and coerced migration” (Bachetta et al. 2002,
303). Lastly, the fourth group and arguably the most known is that which engages in international
solidary and feminist humanitarianism. To some extent it may be argued that elements found
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within the last group of TFNs are applicable to the other three groups. These tenets found within
TFNs are crucial to this study, in particular the last three forms, as each case examined hereto
encompasses one or more of the tenets.
Theoretical Approach and Argument

Resource Mobilization Theory and Political Process Theory
During the period of the 1960s to 1980s there was a significant leap in social movements
and a subsequent shift from the “classical model”8 within social movement theory to more
contemporary ones. In the former, scholars (see LeBon 1960; Kornauser 1959; Blumer 1957;
Smelser 1962) espoused that social movements emerge as a result of grievances (economic,
societal, political, etc.) and deprivation (Gurr 1970; Turner and Killian 1972). Furthermore, they
categorized the individuals that engage in such movements as irrational beings that fail to create
viable solutions to problems (Le Bon 1960). In this form of Social Movement Theory, protesters
were deemed as deviants that wished to disrupt society through chaos (Van Stekelenberg and
Klandermans 2009; Le Bon 1960; Gurr 1970). The latter models contested these over-generalized
assertions and offered fresh and innovative views for causes and instigations of collective action.
Moreover, scholars under this framework (Tilly 1977; McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1973;
McCarthy and Zald 1977; Aveni 1977; Breton and Breton 1969; Piven and Cloward 1977):
…were not charmed by theories that labelled them as alienated, frustrated and disintegrated
and their protest behavior as irrational. They felt that the psychological make-up attributed
to movement participants by the classical approaches did not fit them and argued that if
anything movement participants were integrated rather than isolated (Van Stekelenberg
and Klandermans2009, 7).

8

This form had five core tenets: 1) mass society 2) collective behavior 3) status inconsistency d) rising expectations
e) relative deprivation and f) Davies’ J –Curve Theory of Revolution.
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As a result, they created structural explanations for social movements, two of which will be
discussed and utilized throughout this research: resource mobilization theory and political process
theory.
In resource mobilization theory, groups that engage in collective action, gather resources
and utilize them in efforts to achieve their respective goals (Tilly 1977). In this case, resources can
include a wide array of things such as public support, media outlets, goods, weapons, money, and
much more (Tilly 1977; McCarthy and Zald 1977). Proponents of resource mobilization theory
stress the importance of 1) obtaining the necessary resources in an organized and efficient a manner
and 2) coordinating with individuals and organizations that are able to provide such resources –
both of which are crucial for the success of a movement (McCarthy and Zald 1977).
There are two core tenets of resource mobilization theory that its scholars (McAdam 1982;
Breton and Breton 1969; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Leites and Wolf 1970; Wilson 1973) typically
attest to: first, classical discussions on social movements have often attributed the phenomena to
discontentment and grievances; however, proponents of resource mobilization theory express that
grievances have stayed constant over time, thus making it an inadequate explanation for social
movements or upheavals (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McAdam 1982); second, what does change
is the availability and accessibility of resources to collective groups in order to successfully
conduct social movements (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McAdam 1982). Essentially, the more
resources that are available, the higher the chances of success for a social movement are; in
contrast, if a social movement lacks access of certain resources, the lesser a chance it will be
successful. Unlike the classical model, proponents of resource mobilization theory believe that
social movements are politically motivated, not psychologically.
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Similarly, under political process theory, social movements are politically motivated rather
than psychologically; this means that social movements do not merely evolve from grievances and
discontent, rather they emerge from politically charged ambitions. According to Cragun and
Cragun (2006) there are three distinct categories that define political process theory. The first,
which they term “insurgent consciousness” discusses the importance of grievances and that it is
“the collective sense of injustice that movement members (or potential movement members) feel
and serves as the motivation for movement organization” (Cragun and Cragun 2006, 233). The
second factor is what they term “organizational strength” but it utilizes the same tenets of resource
mobilization theory, in it that it highlights the importance of attaining the needed resources in order
to insure success (Cragun and Cragun 2006, 234). Lastly, they discuss “political opportunity”
which discusses utilizing the weakness of the political system or regime as a motivating factor to
take action and create reforms; this is plausible in cases where there is division among elites,
decline in despotism or the ability to enforce it, and/or the increase of political pluralism (Cragun
and Cragun 2006, 234). In some cases, these three factors may impact one another; for instance,
an organization that has the political opportunity to create collective action and has the grievances
to motivate them, may lack the resources to do so. Similarly, an organization that has resources,
may lack the other two facets – thus the organization would not be deemed successful in this
respect.
Tilly (1978) also highlights the importance of several factors found within the Political
Process Theory framework, namely: resources, organization, opportunity, and interest (Tilly 1978,
I-10). Specifically, Tilly (1978) states that with regard to opportunity one should observe “political
opportunity, coalition, repression, relations among governments and well-defined contenders for
power over those governments” as precursors to forming a collective action unit (I-12).
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Specifically, Tilly (1978) defines opportunity as the “relationship between the population’s
interests and the current state of the world around it” (3-5).
McAdam (1982) also highlights another factor of Political Process Theory which is the
division among elites. McAdam (1982) argues that elite division benefits movements because
elites that are in support of the opposition are incentivized to support the movement for three
reasons: first, they genuinely care for the cause of the movement; second, they lend support
because of only a few causes that matter to them within the movement; and third, they do so to
spite their opposition and may have absolutely no interests in the goals of the movement. The last
reason is solely politically based because the support lent by the elites in this case is solely to attain
support and gain power over their opposition.
Thus, resource mobilization and political process have been utilized by scholars within the
studies of social movements because they are able to 1) establish what is needed for a successful
movement and 2) establish why social movements occur in the first place. These two theories are
critical for this research as they illustrate how the movements studied hereto emerged and how the
access to certain resources, lack of cohesiveness within the elites, the instability of the state, and
the level of organization resulted in either successful movements or failures. Another component
that explains social movements and has been utilized by scholars is the study of contentious
politics.
Contentious Politics
In recent years, the theoretical framework of contentious politics has been introduced in
the works of Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow (2015). Contentious politics refers to the
“interactions in which actors make claims bearing on the actors' interests...contentious politics thus
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brings together three familiar features of social life: contention, collective action, and politics"
(Tilly and Tarrow 2015, 7). In this case, this research is particularly interested in the collective
action aspect of contentious politics. While contention refers to the claim being made by one party
against another party, collective action can be defined as “the coordinating efforts on behalf of
shared interests or programs" (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, 8). While collective actions falls under the
umbrella of contentious politics, most circumstances of collective action require minimal
contention or political involvement (Tilly and Tarrow 2015). Some scholars of contentious politics
have tried to highlight the overlap found between collective action and contention, through the
term social movement (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, 11).
Tilly and Tarrow (2015) introduce two forms of contention: transgressive and contained.
In the latter case, contention occurs within the political regime, while in the former the contention
occurs outside of the institution (Tilly and Tarrow 2015). In the Global South, transgressive
contention is particularly prevalent in hybrid political regimes or regimes that have a combination
of authoritarian and representative governments which produce “…unstable and unpredictable
outcomes" (Barlow 2018, 17). Moreover, hybrid political regimes tend to have elements of
democratic and non-democratic institutions (Barlow 2018, 18).
Tilly and Tarrow's (2015) framework has been applied to feminist movements in Iran by
scholars such as Rebecca Barlow. In her piece, Barlow (2018) analyzes two forms of feminism
and how they fall under the umbrellas of transgressive and contained contentions. The first form
of feminism is that of Islamic feminism, which Barlow's (2018) argues is part of contained
contention. The second form of is secular feminism which Barlow's (2018) argues is a part of
transgressive feminism. Upon examining the case of Iran, Barlow (2018) finds that it supports the
study conducted by Tilly and Tarrow (2015) three-fold: “(1) hybrid regimes tend to be volatile in
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nature" (Barlow 2018, 33). For instance in the case of Iran, during the first term of Hassan Rouhani,
promises for reforms and equality were made but failed to materialize due to pressure from the
supreme leader and the more clerical faction of government; (2) because of this volatility, the state
tends to embody both forms of transgressive and contained contention(s); and (3) “the consequent
permutations that characterize claim-making activities give rise to unstable and unpredictable
outcomes" (Barlow 2018, 33). Moreover, Iran has embodied both Islamic feminism and secular
feminism in an effort to promote reforms of gender biased laws (Barlow 2018). Barlow (2018)
observes two prominent movements geared towards women's rights, both of which show the
negative impacts of government crackdown: One Million Signature Campaign and Campaign to
Change the Male Face of Parliament.
The case of Iran also illustrates the importance of both modes of contention, transgressive
and contained. In 2000, the Sixth Majlis9 elected thirteen women which formed the Women's
Faction. These women placed efforts to reform gender biased laws against women from within
the realms of the institution by “relying on progressive teachings of Ayatollah Khomeini" (Barlow
2018, 20). The Women's Faction serves as an example of contained contention as this group of
women strived to alleviate the problem from within the Islamic framework. Later in 2005, female
activists in Iran created the One Million Signature Campaign which attempted to relinquish these
conservative gender laws through protests, petitions, theatrics, and trans-global awareness and
involvement. This movement, along with the many others that followed it, serve as transgressive
contention as they relied on “street politics" outside of the institution and Islamic framework
(Barlow 2018, 22). With regard to “political and social change," transgressive contention appears
to be more successful than contained contention (McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow 2003). The case of

9

Iranian Parliament under the Islamic Republic
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the One Million Signature Campaign will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Four of this
research and will assess whether its transgressive attributes led to a successful outcome.
The Argument
For purposes of this dissertation, I utilize Moghadam's (2005) work for classifying different
types of Transnational Feminist Networks (TFN). As noted, she explores four distinct TFNs which
include: (1) “networks that target the neoliberal economic policy agenda or those policies that
endorse free markets and economic privatization" (Moghadam 2005, 19); (2) those that focus on
the dangers of fundamentalism and insist on women's human rights (Moghadam 2005, 19); (3)
“women's peace groups that target conflict, war, and imperialism" (Moghadam 2005, 19); and (4)
“feminist humanitarian networks that address women's practical needs as well as their strategic
interests" (Moghadam 2005, 19). TFNs in Iran and Argentina largely exemplified elements of the
second, third, and fourth networks, which will be discussed in further detail in chapters four and
six of this research. While this structure discusses the various forms of TFNs, it is critical to
understand how and why TFNs emerge; in doing so, I can assess each of the two cases with these
guidelines.
Firstly, TFN’s should be seen as a two-sided organization: on one hand you have the
activists “on ground” or activists that reside in the home country, which I will call “Group A”10,
while on the other hand you have activists abroad which I call “Group B” (this includes the
diaspora community, western feminists, NGOs, etc.). While these two may work together, their
incentives and views may diverge. In order to understand this better, it is important to understand
why TFNs emerge and that requires examining both sides. On a general note, both sides dedicate

10

In the later chapters they will be referred to by their organization names rather than Group A/B, however for
purposes of this particular chapter I will refer to them as such in order to discuss a general framework
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themselves to a movement in hopes of creating reforms and changes within a given country; such
changes may pertain to gender bias, gender inequality, civil conflict that impacts or targets a
particular gender, and/or oppression experienced by a particular gender.
Group A has members from various backgrounds and classes (socioeconomic, ethnic,
religious, and political). I expect that women that are from lower socioeconomic backgrounds are
more likely to emerge as transnational feminist networks because they lack the accessibility to
resources they need and will engage in open communications with networks abroad that can
readily provide resources to them. Furthermore, I expect women that have had first-hand
experiences in discrimination, oppression, grievances, and injustices will be more inclined and
motivated to be involved, than those that do not have such connections. It should be noted that
members of Group A may emerge into TFNs as a result of actions committed against family
members and loved ones, not just direct attacks on themselves.
Group A is more likely to emerge as a TFN and engage with activists abroad, if it does not
have sufficient resources on its own. For instance, I expect that in the case of Iran, Group A is less
likely to have access to platforms like social media that efficiently and rapidly spread news and
information out; thus, it is more likely to lean on Group B to assist with respect to that. I further
argue that Group A’s motive for emerging into a TFN and engaging with activists abroad is to
strengthen the probability of success for its goal and to create necessary changes. For example, in
Argentina I expect that a lack of support from political elites will force activists of Group A to
seek help from NGO’s in Group B that have the capabilities to place pressure on governments.
Such pressure may be enough to create reforms, even if they are minor changes or shifts to the
laws.
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In contrast, I expect that Group B is likely to emerge as a TFN in one or more of the
following scenarios: (a) it is a diaspora network that still holds national ties to its home country
and thereby wishes to help influence change within it; (b) it is an NGO or feminist network who
has previously advocated for the same tenets laid out in Group A’s movement; (c) it is a diaspora
network whose goals and incentives diverge from that of Group A’s wherein it wishes shift the
status quo to benefit expatriates outside of the country; or (d) it is an NGO or feminist network
whose goals and incentives is to provide a humanitarian outlet for Group A.
I expect that members of Group B will likely have the social, political, and financial
resources that Group A may not have access to. Members of Group B typically live in western
countries that permit them to utilize social media as an informative platform, reach out to their
local politicians to raise awareness, raise financial contributions for the cause, create petitions in
advocacy of a particular movement, reach out to various news outlets, and conduct solidarity
protests. Typically members of Group B emerge into a TFN because of an emotional connection
to a movement. I expect that members of the diaspora community, so long as there is cohesiveness
amongst them, will engage in these movements because they still have ties to their home country.
Similarly, while NGOs may not have such ties, they may have connections to issues that are being
addressed by these movements – especially social issues that are contentious and of importance
for many people in the world. I expect that not all members of the diaspora community will be
involved; in some cases expatriates feel a disconnect to their homeland and build a sense of loyalty
to their new country which makes them less inclined to partake in activities that assist their former
compatriots – whom they may view with enmity.
As discussed earlier in this chapter, there are two modes to contention: transgressive and
contained. Iran, being a hybrid regime, has utilized both contained and transgressive contention
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since the emergence of the Islamic Republic. While there are some groups, as mentioned earlier in
this chapter, that utilize contained contention – the organizations I assess in this research utilized
transgressive contention. The reason they use transgressive contention is two-fold: firstly, as
mentioned previously, authoritarian and autocratic regimes make it challenging to use contained
contention and it is more challenging to achieve goals that way; secondly, transgressive contention
allows one to be more creative in their forms of protest. For instance, in Iran, protestors of some
of the TFNs discussed in this research utilized art and theater as a sign of protest- which is equally
unique as it is profound; seeing a woman standing atop a platform in the middle of Azadi Square
with her hair laid bare, holding her headscarf in her hand, can be more profound and speak more
volumes than a protest or demonstration. Moreover, gathering signatures can capture the attention
of many as they see the countless names on those sheets of paper. Additionally, with transgressive
contention, activists can expand their efforts outside of the institution enabling them to reach out
to activists abroad. In the same token, Argentina is also a mixed-contention as it has utilized both
contained and transgressive; however, unlike Iran it has remained relatively mixed. This is in part
likely due to the fact that there have been various regime changes in Argentina, especially since
the end of the Dirty War. In light of that, TFNs have found it more feasible to communicate their
concerns with their government and attempt to resolve their contentions within the institution.
However, in some cases, activists have had to rely on NGOs and feminist networks abroad, which
will be discussed in further detail later in this research. I expect that in the case of Argentina, the
lack of authoritarianism that is present in Iran, makes it more feasible for it to be more vocal with
the government without the fear of ramifications. This of course was not true for women in the
Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo as their initial efforts were substantially stifled and threatened by
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the Junta regime that was in place; thus, their efforts were more transgressive in nature; this will
be discussed later in Chapter Six.
As previously mentioned, Tilly and Tarrow (2015) noted that transgressive contention is
more likely to succeed than contained contention, simply because of its ability to expand and its
ability to conduct more creative lines of protest. While this is one way to assess outcome, there are
several other factors that may impact the likelihood of success or failure. First, with respect to the
diaspora community there is sometimes a lack of cohesiveness amongst expatriates which in turn
will likely result in a deteriorating movement that is not successful in achieving its goals. Thus,
the more cohesiveness, the higher the chances of success; Second, the involvement of foreign
NGOs that have no connection to a particular country may result in a lack of understanding which
again results in divergence and a lack of cohesiveness. Thus, a lack of knowledge on a particular
country will result in a lack of cohesiveness which will result in a lesser chance of success; Third,
the involvement of NGOs that share the same incentives and goals as an organization in the home
country, are more likely to garner the necessary international awareness which can place pressure
on governments to create change; Fourth, access to necessary resources such as finances,
communication technology, symbolic resources, news outlets, etc. will increase the chances for
success of a movement; and

Fifth, the type of regime in place (authoritarian, democratic, hybrid,

etc.) will determine the likelihood for success. A movement within an authoritarian regime, is
likely to be less successful than a movement within a democratic or hybrid regime, because they
face higher levels of restriction and retaliatory efforts; the latter is more likely to make a movement
disintegrate.
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Methodology
In examining the case of women of diaspora communities from Iran and Argentina the
historical and cultural nature of this analysis will best be served by a qualitative based approach in
order to better understand how transnational feminism affects the prospects for change in these
countries. Qualitative approaches are often best suited for “accessing otherwise hidden
information, for example through the narratives that emerge from in-depth interviews" (Elliot
2005, 21) and is able to capture experiences through historical analysis.
This research will be most efficiently conducted under two qualitative approaches, one is
Tilly's (1984) comparative analysis and the other is process-tracing. Specifically, this research
implements comparative process-tracing by way of a historical analysis. In doing so, I will be
evaluating any variations of outcomes pertaining to transnational feminist efforts in creating
change among their diaspora communities in their home countries. Moreover, I will be examining
the level of influence these groups have on their respective communities. Comparative historical
analysis is critical for this piece as it offers explanations that are historical in nation in hopes of
understanding “large-scale and substantively important outcomes" (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer
2012). This research will benefit most from a comparative analysis, as it will explore what factors
may influence outcomes for change among these diaspora groups.
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Comparative Historical Analysis
A method of comparative historical analysis is beneficial for this research, in particular,
because it allows us to observe historical patterns within countries overtime. James Mahoney and
Dietrich Rueschemeyer conceive of comparative historical analysis as “research defined by
relatively specific characteristics …not unified by one theory or one method, all work in this
tradition does share…the use of systematic and contextualized comparison” (Mahoney and
Rueschemeyer 2003, 10). There are three facets that make comparative historical analysis unique
and useful for researchers and particularly crucial for the research conducted hereto.
First, comparative historical analysis is interested in examining inferences that produce
bigger outcomes (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003). In comparative studies one can see interest
in observing a chain of events that have occurred throughout history, and how such events have
resulted in an outcome. Specifically, scholars of this framework are interested in “works that
attempt to locate the [inferences] of substantively important outcomes….these researchers draw
on a wide range of strategies” leading to necessary conditions (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003,
12).
Secondly, comparative historical analysis observes the sequences that unfold throughout
history within a state and believes that the occurrences that happen are not static, or single
occurrences that happen at a fixed point, but rather such occurrences happen with a process over
time (Skocpol 1984; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, 12). For example, to scholars of this
framework, a phenomenon such as a revolution or upheaval does not simply emerge overnight,
but often is a result of an accumulation of events over the course of history of a given history. In
some cases, an occurrence may unfold due to a history of revolutions and instability of a state or
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perhaps due to years of economic and political strife – regardless of the case, it is not a static
occurrence, but an accumulation of events.
Lastly, the “practitioners engage in systematic and contextualized comparisons of similar
contrasting cases” (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, 13). This is perhaps the most important
point for this research as it asserts that by focusing on a short number of cases, the researcher is
able to contrast back and forth between theory and history in an effort to compare such cases and
present an explanation for an event or events through “many iterations of analysis as they formulate
new concepts, discover novel explanations, and refine preexisting theoretical expectations in light
of detailed case evidence” (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, 13). This is not to say that such
findings should and do speak for all cases, rather Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003) make it a
point to stress that this is not the case, but that it does offer advantages with trying to examine the
cases presented.
Additionally, given that comparative historical analysis encompasses a small number of
cases, researchers become well versed in their cases as they uncover inferences within a
phenomenon (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, 13). Moreover, case selection varies under
comparative historical analysis. While in most circumstances, the cases selected and observed are
typically nation states – that is not always the case. Rather, in some instances there is a variety of
things that may be compared such as social movements, revolutions, contentions, economic
depravity, etc. (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003). As such, “the kinds of cases selected
correspond to subject matter and problem formulation, not simply to popular geographic
categories” (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, 13).
This research will implement historical comparative analysis in three ways: firstly, I will
be examining two distinct cases and their respective transnational feminist movements; secondly,
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I will observe the temporal process of each of these cases in hopes of understanding how certain
events or outcomes have unfolded; and lastly, I will attempt to uncover the various inferences
within a case, highlighting the salience of why certain transnational feminist movements are more
successful than others in certain countries given their historical background. In addition to
comparative historical analysis, this research will also utilize and benefit from process-tracing.
Process-Tracing
Process-tracing is a tool that has been evaluated and examined in a multitude of ways. In
prior circumstances, process-tracing was examined in different forms, each of which had different
goals and intended outcomes. In more recent instances, process-tracing has been portrayed as a
single method (Collier 2011; Beach and Pederson 2013; Gerring 2007a; Checkel 2008) where
process-tracing is defined as “a deductive tool to test whether [inferences] are present and function
as theorized” (Beach and Pederson 2013, 10). While this research utilizes the more nuanced form
of single-method process-tracing, which will be discussed at greater length later, it is important to
understand its prior forms and different variants in order to understand how it has evolved overtime
and how this single-method best suits the research on hand.
In the past, there have been three variants of process-tracing, two of which have been solely
theory based while the other has been strictly case study based. To begin, there are three distinct
forms of process-tracing: theory-testing process-tracing, theory-building process-tracing, and
explaining-outcome process-tracing (Beach and Pedersen 2013). While all three forms are
significant in their own respective ways, they each serve different purposes in hopes of garnering
particular outcomes or results as they pertain to descriptive case comparison.
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Figure 2.1: Three different uses of process-tracing methods11

Purpose 2

Purpose 1
Are inferences present
and does it function as
theorized?

What are the inferences
and is there a possible
connection to the
outcome?

Purpose 3
What mechanismic
explanation accounts for
outcome?

=
=
=
Theory-building
=

Theory-testing
Process-tracing

Process-tracing

Theory-centric

Explaining outcome
Process-tracing

Case-centric

Figure 2.1 illustrates each of the various methods and their distinct methods. Additionally,
it displays how each variant has a distinct purpose. Firstly, in theory-testing process-tracing, there
is either pre-existing research that has formed potential suppositions about why a phenomena
occurs or there is pre-existing theory that may be utilized to test why a phenomena occurs (Beach
and Pedersen 2013). Moreover, this particular form of process-tracing is interested in testing if a
theory is valid or an adequate explanatory mechanism for a particular occurrence. Moreover,
“theory-testing process-tracing enables inferences to be made…in a single case along with whether
the mechanism functioned as expected” (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 15).
Secondly, theory-building process-tracing goes beyond a single case study analysis and
utilizes data in an effort to uncover inferences to a potential connection to the outcome (Beach and
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Figure 2.1 Adapted from Beach, D., Pedersen, R., & Ebrary, Inc. (2013). Process-tracing methods foundations
and guidelines. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
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Pedersen 2013). One can utilize this form of process-tracing when one of two situations occurs:
first, there must be a known correlation between two cases, but the researcher is unaware of what
specific “mechanisms link the two” and there is no theory to utilize (Beach and Pedersen 2013,
15); and second, when a researcher is aware of a phenomenon in its relation to the outcome, but
unaware of the inferences that may lead to that particular outcome. So the researcher is forced to
work backwards from the outcome in an effort to understand the phenomenon in greater context
of the case illuminated by the inferences uncovered (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 15).
Lastly, there is explaining-outcome process-tracing which is utilized in an effort to explain
why a particular outcome unfolds. Similar to that of theory-testing process-tracing and unlike
theory-building process-tracing, explaining-outcome utilizes a single case study in hopes of
explaining inferences leader illuminating a phenomena. In contrast to the two prior forms of
process-tracing, this one does not rely on theories to support its claims (Beach and Pedersen 2013).
Here, “the ambition is to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a particular outcome, with
sufficiency defined as an explanation that accounts for all of the important aspects of an outcome
with no redundant parts being present” (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 18).
While all three forms of process-tracing are insightful and useful, for purposes of this
research, I utilize a single-method form of process-tracing which utilizes elements from theorybuilding process-tracing. Specifically, I am interested in examining a known outcome and working
backwards by analyzing a case study’s historical framework in an effort to bring greater light to
the phenomenon. While the other two forms of process-tracing may be helpful, they both utilize
single case studies – which is not within the scope of this particular study. Process-tracing is useful
for this research as it is able to trace inferences and events within a case directly from an outcome
in an effort to bring to light other possible intervening inferences at play (Collier 2011). Moreover,
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process-tracing “can contribute decisively both to describing political and social phenomena and
to evaluating [chains of events]" (Collier 2011, 823).
The more nuanced form of process-tracing is particularly useful for this research for a
wide array of reasons including: first, through process-tracing the researcher is able to recognize
“political and social phenomena" and be able to describe them (Collier 2011, 824); second, through
process-tracing the researcher can examine prior hypotheses and formulate new ones (Collier
2011); third, process-tracing introduces chains of events (Collier 2011, 823).
While examining only two cases may hold problems of external validity, most qualitative
approaches examining a small-N suffer from this form of validity problem. The nature of
qualitative methods having small or limited sample size has often ascribed qualitative methods as
being more deterministic than probabilistic. However, process-tracing mitigates these issues as it
strengthens the inferences found within small-N research “based on the matching and contrasting
of cases" (Collier 2011, 824). Thus, the context gained from utilizing qualitative approaches and
methods can highlight strong connections that emanate within the cases which can balance out
problems with external validity. As a result, problems with replication outside of the cases being
examined are compensated with case prioritization of circumventing problems of internal validity
using comparative historical analysis (Yom 2015, 619).
Thus comparative process-tracing is best suited for “historical puzzles" consisting of two
or more case studies (Bengtsson and Ruonavaara 2017, 46). “Puzzles" refers to similarities and
differences found within the selected case studies, particularly with regard to their outcome(s)
“from the point of view of some theoretical and empirical background assumption" (Bengtsson
and Ruonavaara 2017, 46). This research will consist of three cases with similar motives for
collective action under vastly different regime types.
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Case Selection
I have chosen these two countries to examine because their movements exhibit variation
on the outcome and some key explanatory variables. First, both countries have varying forms of
regime and governance between one another. Iran falls under Tilly and Tarrow's (2015) definition
of a hybrid regime that functions as a theocracy, but has certain democratic elements embedded
within it. In contrast, Argentina is a presidential democratic republic that underwent transition
from a military dictatorship to an electoral democracy.
Secondly, one of the cases examined, Iran, has generated large diaspora groups over the
last few decades which would make it a critical case to observe for this study; predominantly in
terms of examining whether the integration of the diaspora community within movements serves
purposeful in terms of success. With the cases of both Iran and Argentina there appears to be high
turnout of emigrant female participation in transnational movements. In the case of Iran, women
within the home country and women in host countries have relatively high turnout rates for the
campaign movement(s). Additionally, Iranian women are particularly concerned with reforms of
gender biased laws such as those that fall under the umbrella of marriage laws, divorce laws, and
custody laws. Moreover, both have differences and similarities in their fight for gender equality.
In Argentina, one of the more prominent movements entitled Madres de la Plaza de Mayo
(Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo) was formed by mothers and grandmothers seeking to attain justice
for loved ones that “disappeared" by way of forced abductions (Sikkink 2008; Bosco 2006).
Undoubtedly, “women played a central role" (Sikkink 2008, 4) and heavily influenced
transnational movements throughout Latin America and parts of Europe. Moreover, this movement
sparked international attention and assistance. Since 1977, “groups of mothers of the disappeared
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have formed in more than a dozen other countries, and many of these groups recognize the Madres
de la Plaza de Mayo as a key inspiration" (Sikkink 2008, 4).
Third, within both of these cases the outcomes have presented varying results. For instance,
while transnational feminist movements with respect to Iran have garnered moderately positive
outcomes with some reforms, they have had challenges in terms of cohesiveness between members
of the diaspora and activists within Iran which has adversely impacted their success. In contrast,
Argentina's movement was not only successful within the country, but was able to promote the
movement within other countries - some of which were additionally successful.
Fourthly, these countries each vary in terms of the form of contention. Firstly, it should be
noted that transgressive contention often arises from contained contention as the latter is often
unsuccessful in espousing change (McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow 2003). As such, one could
arguably ascertain that each of these cases has begun as a mode of contained contention and either
remained as one or transformed into a mode of transgressive contention. Iran can be considered a
combination of transgressive and contained contention as it has exerted both during different stages
of the Islamic Republic and continues to do so; albeit the movements that will be discussed are
considered transgressive. The Women's Faction in Iran, which still remains, is an example of
contained contention while the movements conducted by various female activists has been
predominantly transgressive in nature. In contrast, Argentina began with a mode of contained
contention, but as a result of limitations and growing outside support - it transformed into a mode
of transgressive contention; both will be discussed in the cases I observe.
Lastly, some of these countries had more readily available resources (i.e. accessibility to
social platforms, media, and government agencies). In Iran, women are to a large degree limited
with regard to social media as certain websites are often banned which makes it challenging to
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raise global awareness with regards to a movement or movements. Nonetheless, women in Iran
have managed to garner attention through communication lines with Iranian women living abroad
which has subsequently allowed this latter group of women to raise awareness to the social media
platform they do have access to and to formulate petitions and write letters to government officials
within their new countries. The Madres movement in Argentina was able to garner international
attention rather quickly because these women utilized media attention as a platform to raise
awareness. It is crucial for women in these countries to have access to various media outlets or at
least be able to form dialogue with women abroad to open a line of communication that would
lead to more awareness - which has taken place in each of these cases.
Despite the limitations, the context of this research and the scope of its question, a
comparative case study analysis is best suited. Given that this study is looking to better understand
how women in diaspora communities, or the lack of their presence, has influence in women crossnationally, a comparative case study analysis will observe the variations and similarities of
outcomes across different cultures in three varying countries.
Variables
The dependent variable in this research is political change that results in liberalization, or
restriction, of women’s social and economic rights. This is a qualitative outcome, and I focus on
social and economic rights related to reproductive freedom, marriage, sexual assault and violence
against women, forced adoption, employment, and clothing. In addition, I examine broader norms
associated with the improvement, or not, of accountability following periods of autocracy (i.e.,
holding officials to account for abduction, torture, and extra-legal murder).
My unit of analysis will be social movements that include feminist activism (domestic, and
transnational) in two countries: Iran and Argentina. The main inferences as they relate to the
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phenomenon will include resources (economic, as well as symbolic), the form of contention, elite
division, and regime type. The discussion of background conditions and the setting for each
movement, however, may also include discussion of the influence of various religious practices,
changes in women’s education attainment and labor force participation, women’s social roles, and
other social norms. Furthermore, this dissertation will rely heavily on data collected from prior
research, primary, and secondary sources that have examined transnational feminism as it pertains
to the cases of Iran and Argentina.
Conclusion
Throughout history, the diaspora community has been faced with the challenges of settling
and assimilating into a newfound homeland, whilst choosing to maintain connections to its
homeland or departing from it entirely. The former has played a crucial role in engaging with
movements in their homeland to attempt to create reforms and changes to different issues spanning
from economic depravities, social welfare, and gender equality, as well as many others. This
interaction between the diaspora community and their compatriots in their homeland has been
termed as transnationalism. Whilst transnationalism focuses strictly on the impact and integration
of the diaspora community in such movements, one of its subsidiary categories, transnational
feminism, examines the role of NGOs, feminist networks, humanitarian networks, as well as the
diaspora in creating change within the home country. In particular, transnational feminism diverts
from the notion of transnationalism that states that individuals engage in movements because of
direct ties to their home countries, this case that is neither a requirement nor a reason for
engagement. In the case of transnational feminism, members in host countries or countries outside
of the home country, typically engage because of humanitarian reasons that compel them to want
to create change; in other words, these individuals are compelled to help because of their
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intolerance towards the oppressive measures being committed against a particular group of people
in a country.
Within transnational feminism, as is the case with any social movement, there are theories
centered on why people engage in collective behavior. One of the more notable theories that have
explained transnational feminism, as well as other transnational endeavors, is that of Social
Movement Theory, specifically New Social Movement Theory. Generally speaking, grievances
have played a significant role in motivating people to create uprisings and protests; however, this
approach is seen as an old, drawn out explanation for collective behavior that does not adequately
explain every circumstance. Thus, after the 1980s scholars such as Tilly (1977), McAdam 1999),
and (Pivon and Cloward 1977) discussed other factors that may result in collective action:
resources and politics. These two explanations led to the emergence of Resource Mobilization
Theory and Political Process Theory. The former explains that resources play a crucial role in
ensuring the success of a movement; the more resources, the more the likelihood for success and
vice versa. Thus, activists in the home country are sometimes forced to open communications with
organizations outside of their country that have access to such resources. While Resource
Mobilization Theory does not diminish the important role of grievances, it ascertains that
grievances remain constant overtime and as a result cannot be viewed as a dominating factor for
collective behavior. Moreover, resource mobilization believes that upheavals emerge from
politically motivated circumstances, not psychological. Similarly, Political Process Theory
supports that social movements emerge due to political circumstances, but further declares that
these movements emerge from politically charged ambitions.
Tilly and Tarrow (2015) introduced another explanation for social movements and that was
the idea of Contentious politics. Within this framework, there are two forms: transgressive and
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contained. Theorists have predicted that transgressive contention is most successful. Thus, in an
effort to test this theory, I evaluate whether the mode of contention has any bearings to success;
specifically if contained or transgressive movements are more prone to success or whether they
have no impact at all. In addition to this factor, the remainder of the dissertation with examine
whether other factors such as resources, elite influence, elite division, grievances, and regime type
have any bearings on the success of a movement. Theorists have often disagreed on these matters
and the degree of their influence on success; as such, I will examine the impact, or lack thereof,
for each of these factors.
Lastly, I will examine the emergence, structure, and purpose of each of the TFNs
researched in this work. I utilize Moghadam’s (2005) criteria noted above on how and why TFNs
emerge. In doing so, I assess whether my theories listed within the argument of this piece are
correct. I also incorporate theories of contentious politics that are laid forth by Tilly and Tarrow
(2015) in an effort to assess if a movement would be considered successful according to their
tenets, or not. I will be observing two cases that encompass each form of transnational feminism.
First, I will discuss the case of Iran which has built TFNs by way of the diaspora community
abroad. Second, I will discuss the case of Argentina which has built TFNs through open
communications and assistance from NGOs and feminist groups abroad. For purposes of this
research, I hope to compare the impact of the diaspora community; specifically, whether or not the
influence of the diaspora community has any bearing on the success of a movement.
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Chapter 3:
Iran, the Pahlavi Regime, and Women’s Rights, 1925-1979

Introduction
Over the years, many scholars have studied emigrant behavior and orientation to their home
countries. In particular, some scholars have examined the role of women in raising awareness for
the rights of their fellow female compatriots in their homeland. Coined as transnational feminism,
the study has encompassed a movement dedicated towards “…the social, political, and economic
equality of women across national boundaries” (Adams and Thomas 2018, 3-7). Transnational
feminism has opened a gateway for women in host countries to manifest notions of empowerment
to women in their country of origin as well as other countries abroad. Most importantly, this
movement has created a platform and open communication between women within different
countries. In doing so, women from Iran have managed to create avenues for females in their
homeland in an effort to enable their basic rights.
While there are many contentions found within the study of women’s rights in Iran, one
thing has held true: despite the Iranian regime’s various institutional forms -- monarchy, semicompetitive autocracy, or theocracy – Iranian women have had a significant and pertinent role in
society by way of education, the work force, and political movements. Despite this, women have
succumbed to a plight that ranges from narrowly constructed gender roles, to oppression by a
theocratic ideology that stifles many of their basic human rights. Moreover, Iran is a unique
country that is consumed by various religious and ethnic dynamics that carry distinct norms and
expectations, predominantly with regard to the female population. Since the institutionalization of
the current Islamic Republic after 1979, Iranian women have been subjected to gender
discriminatory laws predominantly related to family issues including but not limited to: Marriage,
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divorce, custody, and inheritance (Sameh 2014). As a result, Iranian women within Iran and
abroad have rallied to mitigate these conditions and improve the overall quality of life for females
within the Islamic Republic. In doing so, efforts have been implemented to overturn overtly gender
biased laws which has been met with both praise and reproach. To understand the unfolding
transnational dynamic found among Iranian women, one must first examine their status throughout
recent Iranian history to present. Moreover, it is critical to review scholarly work dedicated to the
role of women within Iran and abroad. In this chapter, I focus on the changing status of women in
Iran, with a focus on the period of 1925 to 1979. Some background is also provided to understand
the influence of foreign powers, and non-state actors, during the period associated with
Constitutional Revolution of 1905, and the subsequent rise of Reza Shah.

Iranian Feminism and Women’s Rights Movements: An Overview
Iran has transitioned through various institutional forms ranging from a monarchy to a
short-lived democracy to the current theocratic state. Within each of these forms, the role of
women has also transitioned and transformed. Moreover, women have played critical and key roles
within each of these government forms (Paidar 1995; Afary 1996; Sameh 2014). Women had a
significant role in Iran during the Qajar Dynasty (1896-1925), when they sought to promote
reforms that fought corruption coupled with “long-term goals of emancipation” (Sameh 2014,
166). Moreover, the end of the Qajar dynasty witnessed movements that sought unveiling and
education rights for women.
In contrast, under the rule of the Pahlavi Era (1925-1979), by way of modernization, men
were encouraged to become more advanced and engaged in society. Similar to the unveiling and
de-Islamification of Turkey under Ataturk, Reza Shah Pahlavi strived to improve women’s rights
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in hopes of modernizing the country as a whole. As the following sections will later highlight, his
efforts were met with both praise and criticism among women throughout the country. While more
urban areas of Iran welcomed the idea of the total unveiling of women, more rural sections of the
country felt that such the Shah’s edict was crippling and oppressive.
In an effort to understand the progression of women’s rights movements in Iran, it is critical
to evaluate how these movements transformed from the Qajar Dynasty to the Pahlavi Dynasty. It
is important to assess how women’s rights have progressed throughout the country and how
women have been viewed within Iran overtime. To understand how women in Iran have attained
more rights, it is critical to analyze what roles they played from the beginning of the Qajar dynasty
to present, and how transnational feminist groups emerged over the last few decades. Most
importantly, there are vast shifts within focal points for women’s rights groups that must be
examined between these two dynasties. Moreover, it is crucial to this study to examine these two
eras in an effort to understand how transnational feminism emerged during the Islamic era of Iran.
Qajar Dynasty (1896-1925)

Background
During the beginning of the Qajar dynasty, women were regarded and viewed under the
guise of a male dominated society that prohibited women from achieving certain societal positions.
Many women under the Qajar rule regarded oppressive measures against women in Iran as a result
of Islamic customs and morals (Sedghi 2007). Some feminists believed that such morals made it
challenging to embrace the European norms and traditions that would enable women to hold higher
positions in society outside of the customary household roles espoused to them (Sedghi 2007). For
example, Bibi Khanum Astarabadi, a Qajar woman, stated that “…behind closed doors at home,
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prohibited from everything in life, education, training and social life, women are regarded as
mindless, like infants; they are confined to the burdens of household work and child-bearing and
are considered slaves and servants to their husbands” (Sedghi 2007, 25). Astrabadi was not the
only woman under the Qajar dynasty that shared such sentiments. Indeed, many novelists and
women at the time regarded the era as one that was most beneficial to men. On a similar note to
that of Astrabadi’s, Seyyed Jamalzadeh stated that “no women can be seen in this country of men,
but strangely, half of the walking population in the streets is wrapped in black bags from head to
toe without an opening to breathe” (Sedghi 2007, 25).
Women’s Rights Movements during the late Qajar Period
Throughout the years of the Qajar dynasty, women’s rights movements and feminist
actions went through a variety of transformations, ranging from movements that sought to
challenge dress codes to movements that sought greater access to social positions. During this
period, women’s status and role in society was shaped by the practice of veiling. Women were
required to wear three pieces of clothing, each of which symbolized a separation of worlds between
genders (Sedghi 2007, 26): The chador was a long veil that covered the female from head to toe
(Diba 2012; Scarce 1975; Herbert 1919; Keyvani 1982; Falk 1972); the rubandeh was a veil that
was used to cover solely the face (Fahad 2016; Welters and Lillethun 2018); and, the chaqchur
which were “loose trousers” (Sedghi 2007, 26). Each garment of clothing was used as an effort to
divide women from men. Moreover, women were referred to as two terms which distinguished
their place in society from that of the men: The first term, moti’eh which means being obedient to
a man’s will (Sedghi 2007; Atakan 2006) while the second term, zai’feh, referred to women as the
weakest link of the two sexes (Sedghi 2007; Atakan 2006; Fahad 2016). Often times, women were
referred to by the term zai’feh in an effort to establish their status quo within society. Additionally,
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women in the Qajar dynasty were not permitted to walk on the same side of the street as their male
counterparts, and they often faced police scrutiny should they choose to do so without permission
or without a suitable escort (Sedghi 2007).
As in most patriarchal societies, women under the Qajar dynasty were not welcomed at
birth. In lower-class households, women that birthed females often faced scrutiny, punishment,
and abandonment by their husbands (Sedghi 2007; Mahdavi 2015; Mahdavi 1994; Alaoui 2011;
Shiranipour 2002; Ali Karami 2018). Birthing girls was referred to by the term nang meaning
disgrace or dishonor (Davies 1987). Upon their birth, girls were “sometimes buried alive inside
walls, whereas boys’ birth would be celebrated with joy” (Sedghi 2007, 27). While the upper
classes were more tolerant towards girls and often hired tutors for them within their compounds,
they were not immune from patriarchal stigma. Within these classes, women were taught that the
only assets they bestowed to world were their reproductive capabilities and sexuality – neither of
which were ever solely their own (Sedghi 2007). Moreover, in upper class households, girls were
married off as young as the age of nine or in some cases, seven (Shojaei et al. 2010; Sansarian
2005; Mahdavi 2015; Arasteh 1964; St. Martin 1999). As Sedghi (2007, 28) notes:
The marital system ensured patriarchal domination. Patriarchy denotes a system of male
control over women’s labor and sexuality, both in the private and public spheres. As in
Shi’a Islam, permanent marriage is analogous to a commercial transaction, in which the
woman, the object of the contractual transaction, is exchanged for the mehr (bride price).
The brideprice specifies saman-e boz’ or the price for a woman’s sexual organ…marriage
is thus a contract for the legalization of sexual intercourse, not for love or even reproduction
(Sedghi 2007, 28).

As previously mentioned, patriarchal tenets under the Qajars not only impacted women in
lower classes, but those of higher classes and royalty as well. One of the more prominent and
notable princesses under the Qajar dynasty was Taj al-Sultaneh, a renowned feminist who was
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able to successfully create reforms. In her noteworthy memoirs, Taj al-Sultaneh makes comments
on both the political and social dynamics under the Qajar rule. Moreover, these memoirs spoke
volumes about her more liberal, nuanced views which demanded “…natural rights, expressing
support for the constitutionalists, and believing in freedom for men and women…the memoirs are
all the more remarkable considering the position and situation of women in Qajar society and the
restrictions imposed on them by Shiism” (Mahdavi 1987, 188).
Al-Sultaneh spoke of the many deprivations women faced under the Qajar rule including
but not limited to: child marriage, veiling, and oppression. Having been married off at the age of
eight, Al-Sultaneh describes women’s fates in child marriages by stating “What greater misfortune
could there be for an individual in childhood …to be given a husband, and that one which her heart
and soul has not chosen but her mother and elders have selected according to imaginary ideas and
obsolete values” (as quoted in Mahdavi 1987, 189).
At a young age, Al-Sultaneh was tutored in French, and she began to develop more
European ideals and drifted away from Persian norms. While learning more of European customs
and views on women, Al-Sultaneh also displayed concern for her fellow Iranian women. She
believed that women in Iran could serve their country more readily if rights were given to them as
they were in other countries both in the political, economic, and social spheres (Mahdavi 1987).
Al-Sultaneh stated:
I am sad and depressed that members of my sex, the women of Iran, are not aware of their
rights and are not fulfilling their duties as human beings…if women in this country were
free as in other countries, having attained their rights, they could enter the country’s
political arena and advance…I would choose a correct road and a proper strategy for my
elevation. Never would I buy houses, parks, furniture, carriages, and cars with people’s
money, but would acquire them through hard work and service…you laugh at my opinions
and say that men of the country could not find any other way…how can you, an uninformed
woman? But, my teacher, are not opinions free?” (Al-Sultaneh (1982), as cited in Mahdavi
1987, 189).
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Al-Sultaneh became both a pivotal and vocal point for women in Iran during the Qajar era.
She was the first female in the royal family to remove the veil and embrace European clothing.
Between the years 1905 to 1910, the Constitutional Movement and Revolution in Iran emerged,
and with it came campaigns for women’s rights. While the Constitutional Movement brought forth
many crucial issues for the advancement of women’s rights, history has often overlooked the role
of women during this period and predominantly focused on the male influence, despite the fact
that women placed a very prominent role in reforms (Sedghi 2007). This has inevitably created
“…the illusion that ‘the revolution was strictly a man’s affair, expressing only men’s nationalist
aspiration for freedom and self-expression. It certainly was not’” (Sedghi 2007, 43).
During this period, in 1907, Taj Al-Sultaneh helped to create one of the most prominent
feminist and women’s rights groups in Iran called Anjoman
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Azaadi-ye Zanaan or the Women’s Freedom Association. This was one of many female
organizations to emerge from the Constitutional Movement. The goal of the Women’s Freedom
Association was to address the various form of deprivation women face, and ultimately, to attain
equality between women and men. The group’s members engaged in discussions about their own
personal circumstances both at home and within society. Other organizations that emerged were
the Anjoman-e Zanaan-e Neqaabpush (the Society of Masked Women), the Women’s Union of
1911, Iranian Women’s Association of 1910, Women’s Absence Union of 1907, and the Central
Board of Great Women council of 1911, among many others (Sedghi 2007, Mahdi 2004; Ali
Karami 2018). Women formulated in a time where majority of their male counterparts failed to
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give support towards their respective causes, both religious and secular males alike (Sedghi 2007,
46). During the Constitutional Movement and Revolution, women “incorporated feminism into
nationalism and anti-imperialism” and that “despite the persistence of seclusion and gender
inequality, women managed to leave their homes, organized the anjomans, and participated in the
revolution…some women rose against patriarchal polity and society” (Sedghi 2007, 46).
During the Constitutional Movement and Revolution, women utilized various avenues in
hopes of creating change, which included: organizing riots, joining underground groups against
foreign intervention and countries, partaking in fights, protesting against foreign goods and
subsequently boycotting them, and promoting the “establishment of the National Bank….[and]
demolition of the Russian bank” (Mahdi 2004, 428). Additionally, women published journal
articles and magazines to raise awareness of the female plight in Iran. Many of the women’s
groups placed their efforts in publishing “weekly or monthly” magazine issues which included
publications such as “Daanesh, Jahaan-e Zanaan, Shekoufeh, Zabaan-e Zanaan, Zanaan-e Iran,
and Naameh Baanowaan” which focused on revolved around the problems women faced in their
daily lives (Mahdi 2004, 429). These women’s rights groups’ publications focused on advocacy
of female education, “freedom of women from seclusion”, and the abolishment of polygamist
marriage (Mahdi 2004, 429).
Nonetheless, despite the Constitutional Revolution, women were still met with
apprehension and stifled from partaking in public sector networks (Sedghi 2007). Upon releasing
the Articles of the newly formed constitution of 1906, equal rights were mentioned yet only applied
to males within Iran; women, once again, were prohibited from participating in the public sphere,
including but not limited to voting (Sedghi 2007). In fact, women were not only prohibited from
voting, but they were categorized under the same category as “murderers, thieves, and
66

criminals…among others” (Sedghi 2007, 48). In 1908, women submitted a petition to the newly
formed Majlis13, asking for their anjomans or women’s rights networks, to be recognized – which
was met with significant criticism and deemed as “anti-Islamic and heretical” (Sedghi 2007, 48).
In 1911, women’s groups once again attempted to file a petition to garner voting rights by way of
the liberal deputy at the time, Vakil al- Ruaayaa who gave his full support for gaining women’s
rights to voting (Mahdi 2004; Sedghi 2007). Vakil al-Ruaaya presented a bill to the Majlis which
not only demanded for suffrage on behalf of Iranian women, but the ability “to establish their own
associates” (Mahdi 2004, 428). Once again, such requests were met with scrutiny, as one Member
of Parliament having said that:
God has not given them [women] the capacity needed for taking part in politics and electing
the representative of the nation. They are the weaker sex, and have not the same power of
judgement as men have. However, their rights must not be trampled upon, but must be
safeguarded by men as ordained in the Quran by God Almighty (as quoted in Sedghi 2007,
50).
Religious leaders, in particular, found such requests to be directly against Islamic teachings and
edicts. Two of the more prominent religious individuals that were opposing proponents to
women’s rights and suffrage movements were Shaykh Fazlullah Nuri and Seyyed Ali Shushtari
(Mahdi 2004). In particular, Nuri and Shushtari opposed the education of women, often seeing it
as a threat to the status quo (Mahdi 2004). Nuri was quoted as stating: “the opening of schools for
women’s education and elementary schools for young girls” and “the spread of houses of
prostitution” as “constitutional breaches of Islamic law” (as quoted in Najmabadi 1997, 233-234).
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Extending Education to Girls and Women
Religious leaders, such as Nuri and Shushtari, argued that educating females was against
religious teachings (Shimamoto 1987; Mahdi 2004; Moghadam 2019). Interestingly, in 1906, the
education law passed which made education up to the sixth grade compulsory for both boys and
girls, but the law was never put into force and religious clerics utilized interpretations of Islamic
scriptures to defend their respective positions (Arasteh 1964, 195). Education of women was
viewed with strict scrutiny due to the actions of one prominent feminist, Qurrat al-Ain14. Qurrat
al-Ain, who had been educated by her father at a very young age in both Islamic edicts and Persian
literature, grew to be an important figure for Iranian feminism and one of the first women to
publicly unveil herself amidst a crowd of men (Mahdi 2004). Her conversion to the Babi
religion1516 tainted the view of all feminists and educated women in Iran, religious clerics having
claimed that all such women converted to Babism and engaged in blasphemous rhetoric (Mahdi
2004). Nonetheless, women under the Qajar dynasty, regardless of their religious or ethnic
affiliations, did not cease to pursue education, despite the criticism.
Other proponents of education for women included male intellectuals such as, Ali Akbar
Dehkhuda, Ahmad Kasravi, Iraj Mirza, to name a few. These intellectuals worked collectively
with feminists and women that strived to create reforms within the constitution. In doing so, they
not only voiced support for education for girls, but subsequently discussed the need for the
abolishment of polygamy and inclusiveness of women within multiple sectors of society (Mahdi

14

Known also as Tahireh
Babism/Babi religion/Babi Movement was “formed around the religious claims of a young merchant from Shiraz,
named Sayyid Ali Muhammad. In 1844 he advanced the claim that he was the Bab (the “Gate”). To his
contemporaries this term referred to an intermediary between the community of the believers and the messianic
figure of Islamic eschatology, the Mahdi, or the Hidden Imam” (Zabihi-Moghaddam 2002, 179)
16
Babism was referred as blasphemous by Islamic jurisprudence
15
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2004). In particular, individuals like Kasravi were open critics to clerical opposition for gender
equality, reproaching them for continuously chastising women on their attire (Kasravi 1942; Amini
2012). Similarly, Dekhuda, who served as Ministry of Education, chastised religious clerics for
their vehement opposition to education of women and gender equality (Sirjani 1994). Mirza
utilized his position as a prominent poet at the time to illustrate the disastrous plight of women
through his poetry (Mahmoodi-Bakhtiari 2012; Moradi 2017). One of his notable poems, and
arguably the most politically driven, was a direct attack against one of the more prominent
opposition of gender equality, Shaykh Nuri. Infuriated by Nuri’s reaction towards the progressive
Majlis at the time, Iraj proclaimed in his poem:
The Hojjat al-Islam smacks you
He clubs your head and brain
A big slapper is this champion
Look out or he’ll slap you
Now in Abdol’azim’s shrine
The Sheykh is busy scheming
God willing n a couple of days
From there he’d camp in Hell…
(Mirza 1986 as quoted in Katouzian 2013, 223).
The support women garnered from male intellectuals of this time helped raise the necessary
awareness of the dire circumstances and backlash they faced, predominantly from religious elites
within society. While the assistance of these intellectuals didn’t single handedly provide the
necessary reforms, it certainly paved the way towards more progressive thinking amongst various
members of Iranian society.
Perhaps one of the first examples of transnational support for women’s rights was
connected to education, and appeared with the case of Assyrian and Armenian girls, who were
from Christian communities. For instance, in the city of Urmia, American and British missionaries
strived to build schools for both boys and girls (Ishaya 2002; Ishaya 2006). One of the first school
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for young girls was an elementary school in Urmia in the year 1838 (Najmabadi 1997). In 1836,
American missionaries called the American Congregational Mission, under the guise of Reverend
Justin Perkins opened a school that was intended to educate the populace in hopes of the Assyrian
populace engaging in migrant work abroad (Ishaya 2006). Albeit, this particular school was not
particularly focused on female entrance, but garnered towards promoting heightened levels of
migrant work for foreign economic benefit. In 1842, American Missionaries, supported by Fidelia
Fiske, opened an all-female seminary by the name of Fiske Seminary. Fiske not only overcame
various cultural impediments, but “mountain tribes won her respect and helped set an example that
slowly improved the lives of Persian women” (“Fidelia Fiske” 2012, 1). In 1865, the Sisters of St.
Vincent de Paul or Daughters of Charity, as they are often known as, created schools throughout
various parts of Iran, including in the cities of Tabriz, Urmia, Esfahan, and Salamas (Najmabadi
1997). In 1895, Tehran opened an American girls-only school (Najmabadi 1997). Moreover,
Various religious denominations in Persia also sponsored schools for girls. The Armenians
opened such schools in Tehran in 1870, in Qazvin 1889, in Soltanabad in 1900, and in
Isfahan in 1903. Ettehad, the first Jewish school for girls in Tehran, was established by the
Alliance Israelite Universelle in 1898. In Kerman Zoroastrians established Enat- jamsidi
for girls in 1902. Tarbiat – e banat was established in Tehran by Bahais in 1911 (Najmabadi
1997, 233-34).
It appears that the intents for building these schools and educating girls was two-fold: first, prior
to the arrival of these American missionaries, education for girls was unheard of and generally
speaking, the mass portion of the female populace was unable to read- a statistic that motivated
these missionaries to create a change; second, by providing education for women, they were able
to make better housewives and mothers (“Mission to the Nestorians” 1854). Additionally, by
educating girls, the missionaries were able to encourage future scholars and educators amongst
them and promote education for future girls (“Mission to the Nestorians” 1854).
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Subsequently, the first schools for Muslim girls was opened in Tehran in 1903 and known
as Parvares (Najmabadi 1997, 233-34). Similar schools to this were opened in Qazvin (1908),
Rasht (1911), and Shiraz (1920) (Najmabadi 1997). Under the pretext of the Constitutionalist
government, a 1911 report stated that the government “proposed subsidizing five elementary
schools for girls…the selected school would be oriented toward training women teachers, of
whom there was a shortage…it is not clear that this scheme was ever carried out” (Najmabadi
1997, 233-34).
American missionaries, under the leadership of Dr. William Shedd, formed a wide array of
schools for both boys and girls throughout Urmia (Ishaya 2002). In 1906, there was an estimated
201 schools throughout some villages within Urmia. American missions were estimated to have
built 53 schools, whereas Russian missions were estimated to have built 74 schools (Ishaya 2002;
Ishaya 2006). Nonetheless, gender discrimination was still present in foreign schools. From the
years of 1906-1914, Assyrian students put on productions of Shakespearean plays, but female
students were not permitted to act; rather male students were required to play the female roles
instead (Ishaya 2002). Protestant Missions of this time, such as those committed by Shedd, carried
the intent to spread Christianity on a global scale, making Iran one of the many countries visited
(Zirinsky 1993). In addition to this goal, two other goals that emerged during this period were
spreading education and medicine (Zirinsky 1993). While it was clear that these missions would
not prove successful in converting the Muslim populations to Christianity, let alone Protestantism,
they were more successful in converting the Armenians, Assyrians, and Jews. Thus, these
missionaries focused more efforts on building schools for these individuals as they would be the
ones that would ultimately serve the most useful and purposeful (Zirinsky 1993). It should be
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noted that to a large extent, the involvement of American missionaries during this period was
politicized and influenced by the United Kingdom (Zirinsky 1993).
Summary
To summarize, the Qajar period was marked by the emergence of movements that sought
greater rights and opportunities for women. One can attribute many factors to the successes of
some of these reforms, including: (1) the efforts American, British, Russian, and Catholic
missionaries and seminaries within Iran to build schools for girls; (2) female solidarity within the
country among both intellectuals and feminists; (3) creating movements and protests in an effort
to implement reform; and (4) utilizing publication platforms to raise awareness of female plight
within the country. Some scholars have attributed successes to other factors such as the rise of the
Bahai and Babi religion, as both highlighted the importance of the role of women and emphasized
female empowerment and freedom (Mahdi 2004). In other cases, scholars have attributed success
to regional contagion effect where women’s movements in countries like Turkey and Egypt
influenced women in Iran to do the same (Mahdi 2004). Additionally, there are the suffrage
movements within the United States and Great Britain which greatly influenced the viewpoint of
many Iranian women and influenced them to do the same (Sansarian 1982). With the end of the
Qajar dynasty, the first phase of the Pahlavi dynasty emerged in 1925, which continued to highlight
feminism and women’s rights movements within Iran.
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Pahlavi Dynasty (1925 – 1941)
Women’s movements from the Qajar era continued into the Pahlavi period, which began
in 1925. On the one hand, the reigning leader, Reza Shah, was praised for his rhetoric in favor of
unveiling and heralded as a reformer of women’s rights, but on the other hand he was deemed as
an authoritarian leader that conducted oppressive measures by imposing an unveiling on highly
religious women. In order to adequately assess women’s movements in this era, it is best to
analyze them within three distinct timeframes: 1) the period of 1925 to 1941, when Reza Shah was
in power (which is addressed through two distinct phases); 2) the period of 1951 to 1953 when
Iran was under a short-lived democracy under Mohammed Mossadegh; and 3) the period of 1941
to 1979, which was under the reign of Reza Shah’s son and successor, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.
In discussing the dynamics of the Pahlavi era, I highlight the work of Hamideh Sedghi (1999).
Following her framework, during the first timeframe, I subdivide women’s participation in two
phases: 1) in the independent movement conducted in the 1920s and 2) the transformations seen
during the 1930s (Sedghi 1999). In an effort to better understand how women’s movements further
transcended into the Pahlavi dynasty and further developed their endeavors, this section of the
chapter will assess these two phases and subsequently assess women’s movements during the
Pahlavi dynasty under the reign of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.
Phase I: Small Movements towards Progress in the 1920s
The 1920s saw the end to both the Qajar era and that of the Constitutional Movement and
Revolution, but the feminist movements that began in those eras continued well into the Pahlavi
dynasty. Much like the preceding movements, feminist groups and women’s rights movements
utilized journalism and magazines to discuss issues in the daily lives of women within Iran. In
1921, in the city of Mashhad, a biweekly, turned monthly, journal by the name of Jahan-e Zanan
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or Women’s World was published by Fakr-e Afaq Batul Parsa under the guise and support of her
husband, Farrokdin Parsa (Parvin 2008). The journal tackled a wide array of topics including “the
necessity of education for women, cooking recipes, child rearing, notices about famous women,
and the like….it printed an article titled “Az Hala” (From now on) that advocated education for
women and called for their active involvement in society” (Parvin 2008, 386). As such, the article
did cause controversy and condemnation among the religious clerics which subsequently led to the
banning of the journal altogether (Parvin 2008). Consequently, the Parsas were extradited from
Mashhad and sent to Qom17 due to being deemed un-Islamic (Sedghi 1999). This incident was the
first of many during the Pahlavi era, but it highlighted hurdles faced by women in trying to achieve
reformative action.
Similar to the Qajar dynasty, many women wished to unveil, but were met with hostility
among religious and conservative groups. In 1926, Reza Shah implemented police protection for
those women that wished to walk publicly without a head covering (Sedghi 2007). Regardless,
women were still required to still wear some form of head covering such as a hat or scarf (Sedghi
2007). Nonetheless, Reza Shah strived to make Iran more westernized and had implemented goals
to heighten the female status quo within the country. In 1927, Reza Shah implemented a specific
westernized dress code for men within Iran which consisted of the Pahlavi hat18which was
mandatory head garb and to be worn with European clothing only (Chehabi 1993). This in turn
resulted in protests and riots as many men felt that such dress went strictly against their religious
beliefs and morals. Subsequently, in 1928, Reza Shah implemented the Law of Uniformity of
Dress which “outlawed men’s traditional garb in favor of Western clothing though some religious
17

It is unclear from literature why they were exiled to Qom, however given they were charged with being unIslamic, one can infer that perhaps they were sent to Qom as it is considered one of the most, if not the most, Islamic
city in Iran
18
Similar to the French Kepi (Chehabi 1993)
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authorities and chador-wearing women were exempt” (Sedghi 2007, 85). As will be discussed
later in this chapter, Reza Shah revisits unveiling later during his reign.
In some cases, women’s groups strived to create a balance between religion and
modernization. For instance, one of the most noteworthy feminist groups in Iran by the name of
Jamiyat-e Neswan-E Watanka19 paved respect towards Islamic edicts while subsequently striving
to enact reform policies for women (Sedghi 1999). As with many future movements, women in
this group utilized art as a platform to voice the deprivations women face. In some circumstances,
they performed plays that would display struggles women go through in their day-to-day lives
which often garnered criticism among religious elites (Sedghi 1999). In some cases these plays
were destroyed by angered mobs of religious clergymen that believed the women partaking in
them were unveiled which was seen as a deliberate insult towards Islamic customs (Sedghi 1999).
Sadly, during the 1930s the league dissolved, as did many groups and organizations at the time,
and many of its members chose to merge with the state run feminist movements such as that of
Kanun-e Banovan20 (Sedghi 1999).
Phase II: Reform for Women during the 1930s
Unlike the Qajar dynasty, where women were met with much opposition with regard to
obtaining education, the Pahlavi era gave much support to women who wanted to pursue their
studies. In an effort to promote female education rights and create more opportunities for women,
Jamiyat-e Neswan-E Watanka provided courses designed to heighten women’s literacy (Sedghi
1999). In 1928, women were permitted to travel abroad for studies and were even provided with
funding (Esfandiari 2004). In 1932, during the Oriental Feminine Congress, which was held in

19
20

Patriotic Women’s League
Ladies Center
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Tehran and chaired by Princess Ashraf, a group of women held a meeting where they “call for the
right of women to vote, compulsory education for both boys and girls, equal salaries for men and
women, and end to polygamy” (Curtis and Hooglund 2008,116). At the same time, the government
attempted to pass and enforce various reforms which would significantly alter the status and roles
of women within society (Arasteh 1964). These laws ranged from the education spectrum to that
of family laws. One prominent reform was making education more readily accessible for young
girls in elementary level courses throughout many cities in Iran (Arasteh 1964). As a result of these
efforts, in 1932 Congress passed “a resolution with 22 articles concerning, inter alia, women’s
suffrage, equal opportunity in education, occupation and wages, reform in family law, and
abolition of polygamy and prostitution” (Sedghi 1999, 482-498). Between the year 1934-1935,
women were finally permitted to conduct studies at Tehran University (Esfandiari 2004; Arasteh
1964). Subsequently, in 1934, Reza Shah visited Turkey where he became enamored by the
freedoms and liberations offered to women coupled with the levels of modernization and
westernization within the country that he witnessed (Sedghi 1999; Sedghi 2007). Reza Shah was
heavily influenced by Ataturk’s gender policies, “as a project in state-building, or as a
manifestation of repression, or in terms of women’s emancipation” (Sedghi 2007, 84-85). In 1935,
Reza Shah implemented rules
In 1936, Reza Shah implemented potentially the most pivotal and controversial laws in
Iranian history: kafshe hijab.21 This law was not intended to give women the option to wear the
headscarf or veil, rather it banned it banned the veil and headscarf altogether. Despite the warnings
against such a bold move, Reza Shah applied a royal decree that would abolish the veil, which
created an outcry amongst the religious clerics and conservative members (Sedghi 1999). The

21

Compulsory unveiling

76

Shah was not only interested in emancipating women through this process, but also to ensure that
religious power was limited. One on hand, the Shah was praised for his endeavors in reforming
laws against women and paving the way for more liberation of the gender, while on the other hand
the Shah was met with hostility and criticism among more religious women that felt that he was
being authoritarian in his measures – particularly among women that wished to wear the chador
(Sedghi 2007).
Later, some would argue that the Shah’s measures were not only autocratic in measure,
but highly oppressive. For instance, in February 1936, women that chose to wear the veil and fail
to abide by the decree, were banned from entering the Imam Reza shrine (Chehabi 1993). In
another occurrence, Reza Shah made it mandatory for prostitutes to keep wearing the veil in an
effort to show that the veil is not a symbol of morality, but rather an immoral one that should be
denounced (Chehabi 1993). The city of Tabriz had accounts showing that women that failed to
unveil would not receive their degrees or diplomas (Sedghi 2007). Other accounts mentioned
women being beaten and abused in the streets if they failed to comply with the decree (Hoodfar
1993). Consequently, this led to many women either becoming homebound where they wouldn’t
leave their houses to avoid not wearing the veil, or in more extreme circumstances committing
suicide as a form of protest (Katouzian 2003). As Mahdi (2004, 430) notes:
On the one hand, the ulama used the decree as proof that the women’s movement had no
other aim than ‘making women naked’ and ‘showing their bodies in public’ – acts contrary
to Islamic ethics. On the other hand, the state’s determination in issuing the decree and
implementing it vigorously, despite widespread opposition by public and religious leaders,
convinced many early ‘ feminists’ to support the decree as a ‘progressive’ measure
necessary for confronting clerical misogynistic approaches to women’s concerns.

One could argue that the decree the Shah enforced was a form of anti-feminism and women’s
rights as it didn’t take into accounts the needs and wants of a certain group of women. To some
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women, the chador was a security measure and a necessity – taking away this form of protection
and stripping women of their comfort was seen by some as anything but progressive (Sedghi 2007).
While the “majority of urban women felt psychological and physical safety with the chador,
unveiling, by contrast, symbolized insecurity and estrangement…in the way nudity would for
many Western women” (Sedghi 2007, 88). Sattareh Farman Farmaian recalled her mother’s
reaction to the unveiling stating “when my mother had learned that she was to lose the age-old
modesty of her veil…she and all traditional people regarded Reza’s order as the worst thing he
had yet done” (Chehabi 1993, 220).
In addition to this, Reza Shah insisted that high-ranking officials bring their wives to office
functions and parties completely unveiled; otherwise, they would risk removal from their position
(Abrahamian 1982). The same was expected of lower-ranking employees, where they were
required to have unveiled wives out in the public (Abrahamian 1982). Further, in 1934, the Shah
created a law that would ultimately give fines to industries such as restaurants, movie theaters, and
hotels that would refuse the entrance of all sexes (Mackey 1996). In 1936, these industries, as well
as taxis and busses, were ordered to forbid women wearing the chador to enter the premises or
utilize their facilities (Mackey 1996). In addition to this, policemen were ordered to take to the
streets and lurk for women that wore the chador and “snatch scarves from the heads of women”
(Mackey 2996, 182). Moreover, the gendarmerie and police forces embarked on using “physical
force to enforce the ban, thus violating the innermost private sphere of close to half the population”
(Keddie 2003, 100). The result was a portion of the population feeling targeted, humiliated, and
insecure within the confines of their societies. Women that wished to adhere to the chador felt that
these newly instated laws pushed forth oppressive measures.
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While the majority of discontent was found amongst the more religious women, there were
modern females that deemed the Shah’s total ban of the chador to be far too extreme (Atabaki and
Zurcher 2004). While many of these progressive women had previously fought for the removal of
the veil and the chador, they did so with the intent that women that wished to done the headscarf
would be permitted to do so; however they were mistaken (Atabaki and Zurcher 2004). One
consequence of the ban that is often overlooked in scholarly works is that many of these women
that wore the chador were not accustomed to wearing hats or putting together certain outfits that
they otherwise would not have felt the need to do (Atabaki and Zurcher 2004). In an effort to
further Europeanize the country, women were only permitted to wear European styled hats,
predominantly those donned in France or Great Britain, which were as equally costly as they were
foreign:
One major problem for most urban women was that they simply lacked the sartorial
experience of appearing in public without bodily cove, and in any case buying hats was
very expensive for them at that time. They also lacked the culture of a public hairdo and,
apart from that, would have felt much less embarrassed if they could cover their hair with
a scarf (Atabaki and Zurcher 2004, 34).
While the Shah’s motives may have been seen as extreme and oppressive by some, many
feminists and reformists alike heralded these efforts as monumental steps for progressiveness for
women in Iran. This is not to say that the Shah dismantled all forms of Islamic edicts; rather, he
did permit husbands to have more than one wife – specifically four at one time and further
permitted them to divorce without reason (Abrahamian 1982). Moreover, women were still not
extended certain rights such as voting and running for political positions within government
(Abrahamian 1982). Thus, while the Shah paved the way towards more progressive thought, he
still maintained some of the more traditional stances with regard to women.
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During the 1930s the Shah began to lose grasp of his previous support and stronghold
particularly among the upper classes, lower classes, and the overall civilian population. Firstly, he
put forth effort to marginalize the lower class from that of the upper class, which created great
discontentment and disenfranchisement among the former group. The Shah went so far as to ensure
his place in the upper class by marrying his children to royalty within Iran as well as abroad, such
as the case of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi that was married to Princess Fauzia of Egypt (Abrahamian
1982). In addition to his westernization of Iran, the Shah further tried to create more inclusiveness
with regard to oil trade and place Iran on the face of the market. He attempted to create alternatives
for countries trading with solely Britain and Russia for oil to look towards Iran as well in hopes of
heightening the nation’s economy (Daniel 2012). In an attempt to generate a powerful tripod that
would protect Iran’s “territorial integrity”, the Shah incorporated Great Britain, Russia, and
Germany – the latter leading to his ultimate downfall (Mackey 1996, 185).
Germany would have heavy influence within Iran by providing contractors within the
country’s “industrial, mining, and building program” (Keddie 2003, 101). In fact, between the late
1930s to early 1940s, prior to the Shah’s eventual abdication, Germany controlled nearly half of
Iran’s trade (Keddie 2003). In return, Iran provided housing and protection for German agents
before the start of World War II (Keddie 2003). Unfortunately, this alliance would result in the
untimely demise of the Shah. In 1941, Germany attacked the Soviet Union resulting in the latter
to join alliances with Great Britain against the former as well as Iran, now viewed as a Nazi
sympathizer and supporter (Mackey 1996). Both Britain and Russia provided opportunity for the
Shah to secure the protection of Iran by expelling all German nationals, however the Shah refused
(Brysac 2007). As a result, on August 25, 1941, Iran was invaded by British forces, while Russians
invaded Azerbaijan (Mackey 1996).
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With the unpopularity of the Shah growing, Britain began discussions of his removal yet
this decision was heavily contested among prominent government officials such as Chiefs of Staff
Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden, as well as the British Minister in Tehran, Sir Reader
Bullard, the latter being the greatest advocate for the removal of the Shah. Bullard went as far as
describing the Shah as a “greedy, ignorant savage” and that it “has got to the point when we believe
the Shah is in fact incorrigible” (Bakhash 2016, 318). While Bullard and Churchill felt that the
Shah was a threat to the security of Iran, as well as that of Britain and Russia, Eden felt more
thought was needed prior to overthrowing him as it may result in turmoil and disarray for Iran
(Bakhash 2016).
Britain was receiving ample news from within Iran stating that the Shah’s unpopularity had
heightened not only amongst citizens, but members within his own cabinet as well and that he had
become impossible to negotiate with and he had become unamiable. Soon thereafter, the Shah’s
military forces dissipated and his rule over the country quickly deteriorated and weakened. In
discussing the state of the Shah, Churchill was quoted as stating:
At the present time we have not turned against the Shah but unless good results are
forthcoming his mis-government of his people will be brought into the account…our
requirements must somehow be met, and it ought to be possible for you to obtain all the
facilities we require, bit by bit, by using the possible leverage of a Russian occupation of
Tehran (as cited in Bakhash 2016, 328)22
On September 9, 1941, Iran was once again asked to expel all German, as well as Italian, nationals
from the country within forty-eight hours; failure to do so would result in an invasion of Tehran
(Brysac 2007). While it seemed that Britain was attempting to provide the Shah with opportunity
to maintain his control of Iran, the incentives were clear: should the Shah be compliant, Britain

22

War Cabinet: Most Secret, W.M., (41) 89th Conclusions, Minute 2, Confidential Annex, 1941, Document Number
619, CAB 65/23, the National Archives, Richmond Surrey, UK.
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would have to find “a fresh reason” for wanting to enter the capital in an effort to continue its
advance (Brysac 2007, 329). On September 16, British and Russian forces invaded the capital of
Tehran after a lack of complicity by the Shah which then resulted in efforts to remove the ruler
from power (Brysac 2007; Abrahamian 1982). With the efforts put forth by members of the Shah’s
cabinet, such as Mohammad Ali Foroughi, the proposition of replacing the Shah with his son
prevailed. Bullard similarly shared the sentiments of Foroughi and swiftly proclaimed “I see no
better candidate for the throne at this time” (Brysac 2007, 330). On September 16, 1941, the Shah
abdicated his seat to his son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi” (Brysac 2007; Keddie 2003; Abrahamian
2008; 1982; Daniel 2012). There are various contestations as to whether the Shah willingly
abdicated or was forced to do so (see Bullard 1961; Ghani and Ghani 1998; Cronin 2003). In other
circumstances, scholars have written that Mohammed Reza Pahlavi expressed concern and
discontent over his father’s tumultuous rule and to some extent had promoted his removal and
abdication (Afkhami 2009; Chaqueri 1999). As Chaqueri (1999) notes, there was a “the issuance
of this secret warrant by the crown prince, apparently in exchange for the throne, that Reza Shah
was escorted out of Iran by the British forces” (501).
There is also some support for the Shah’s own hand in his abdication, namely that the
country had become so discontent, divided, and in turmoil that his abdication was not only
inevitable but necessary (Atabaki and Zurcher 2004). This is not to say that the Shah’s demise was
not foreseeable or inescapable, rather had he placated the demands of a large portion of his
population and pacified the concerns of his European allies, it would have been possible for him
to have kept his stronghold both domestically and internationally. Moreover, the Shah’s lack of
transparency further led to his deterioration; his inability to negotiate within his administration and
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with allies was not a symbol of strength, but rather of weakness and vulnerability which would
later result in his abdication.
Immediately after his abdication, his son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi became the newly
instated leader of Iran and Reza Shah was forced to flee the country to South Africa where he
resided until his death.

As previously mentioned, while the Shah’s efforts to promote

progressiveness and women’s rights were met to some degree, there was still much to be done
before full equality could be accomplished and reached. It would not be until this newly instated
government under the guise of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi where women would be extended
additional equal rights, suffrage rights, and more equality within political spheres. During this era,
women gained a stronghold within the country and as will be seen in the next section, they were
able to successfully create influence through political, educational, and social platforms.
Pahlavi Dynasty, the Mossadegh Interregnum, and Restoration of Pahlavi Rule: 1942-1978
Almost immediately following the abdication of Reza Shah, the country restored some
previous traditions, most notably reinstating property rights to citizens, lifting compulsory dress
codes for men, and permitting women to wear the chador or head scarf. The start of the new regime
was promising both for progressives and the religious community. It was the beginning of a new
era, one that both sects had hoped would bring positive change. During the Pahlavi era, women’s
rights would take a progressive shift from various contributions ranging from government efforts
to subsidiary groups and organizations such as the Tudeh Party, which will be discussed in greater
detail later in this section. To begin, it is important to discuss one of the leading faces of feminism
and women’s rights within the country during this new government.
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During the start of the era, the first female professor by the name of Fatemeh Sayyah 23
was hired at Tehran University, where she would teach literature studies (Sedghi 2007). Most
importantly, she utilized her position and stature within the university, to teach on subjects such
as female subordination (Paidar 1997). This was not only a pivotal moment for women across the
country, but it placed platforms for other women to attain the same abilities. During her short
duration of time in Iran, Sayyah became one of the most influential voices among women’s
movements. Sayyah was a necessary voice and force for women in Iran and she raised awareness
of their plight outside of their country when she would attend various conferences circulating
around women’s issues such as the Peace and Women’s Conference which was held in Paris and
the UN Conference, the only Iranian female to attend (Sedghi 2007).
Like her predecessors during the Qajar dynasty, Sayyah utilized journalism to her
advantage in an effort to raise awareness to critical issues women face. As such, she founded and
edited Zanan-e Iran24 which discussed wide ranging issues from family life for women to
education to a lack of voting rights among many others. This was just one of many notable
magazines that were utilized to raise awareness and promote activist for women, other such
journals included: Zanan Pishrow25, Ghiyam Zanan26, Hoghugh Zanan27, Azadi Zanan28, Zan
Mobarez29, and Alam Zanan30 among many others. Each of these published magazines were
fundamental to feminist progressive movements as each tackled and discussed social issues
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Fatemeh Sayyeh was not an Iranian born citizen. She was born in Moscow, Russia to an Iranian father and
German mother. She moved to Iran seven years prior to her death, but many of her cohorts have noted that during
that time she was one of the most influential forces in women’s history for Iran
24
Women of Iran
25
Progressive Women published in 1949 by Sedigheh Ganjeh ( as cited in Paidar 1997, 126)
26
Women’s Revolt published in 1949 by Soghra Aliabadi (as cited in Paidar 1997, 126)
27
Women’s Rights published in 1951 by Ebtehaj Mostahaq (Paidar 1997, 126)
28
The Emancipation of Women or Freedom of Women published in 1951 by Zafardokht Ardalan (Paidar 1997, 126)
29
Militant Women published in 1951 by Kobra Saremi (Paidar 1997, 126)
30
Women’s Universe published in 1933 by the British Embassy in Tehran (Paidar 1997, 126)
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women face in their day to day lives in an effort to garner attention from a wider audience both
within and outside of Iran.
Movements centered on women’s rights and reformist action heightened and intensified
during Mohammed Reza Pahlavi’s reign. While the former Pahlavi era did successfully create
some progressive movements for women, there were other issues such as voting, that were not as
successful. Sayyeh, along with another fellow activist, Safiyyeh Firuz, founded the Women’s Party
of Iran31 whose goals focused primarily on education, suffrage, and social status (Sedghi 2007;
Mahdi 2004; Paidar; 1997).
The Women’s Party of Iran was arguably the first organization to engage in transnational
feminism seen within Iran. In 1943, Sayyah along with another member of The Women’s Party
of Iran, Hajir Tarbiyat, obtained passports to travel abroad to Turkey in an effort to garner support
from women in Western countries in an effort to “…spread the ideas of peace to the world, prepare
the ground to send women representatives of Eastern countries to participate in the Peace
Conference, and secure their just right to benefit from the true excellence that is freedom and social
liberty, consistent with their maternal role” (Amin 2008, 9). Moreover, Sayyah highlighted the
vast advancements offered to Turkish women which were neglected to Iranian women such as
equality in marriage and divorce along with suffrage – all of which were permitted to Turkish
women between the mid-1920s and early 1930s (Amin 2008). Most importantly, Sayyah wished
to combat the proponents of suffrage and equality, by highlighting that Turkish women have never
abused their freedoms but rather have successfully contributed to society by integrating into the
workforce and political spheres while still maintaining a balanced home life (Amin 2008). In turn,
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the British Embassy “circulated” this testimony with the assistance of Iranian feminists in hopes
of creating international pressure against the Iranian government (Amin 2008). Sayyah further
proclaimed:
If we want to individually compare learned and enlightened Turkish women with
enlightened and educated Iranian women, we shall find no difference with respect to their
level of progress or capability…however, it is worth noting that the number of educated
and learned Turkish women is greater than that of educated Iranian women. Women in
Turkey participate in all social and political areas and there are many women doctors,
scholars, writers, lawyers, and judges….and important factor in the progress…is having
equal rights” (as cited in Amin 2008, 22).

Sayyah’s statement was thought provoking and profound as it captured the needs of Iranian women
without diminishing their strengths and that while they may not have the same rights as their
Turkish counterparts – they are fully capable to attain them.
The Women’s Party of Iran also relied heavily on scrutiny against critics and opposition
members that played roles against suffrage movements (Paidar 1997):
The Women’s Party criticized the opponents of women’s suffrage for their ‘medieval
views’. The secretary of the party, Fatemeh Sayyah, rejected the idea that women’s
essential duties were towards the family and argued that, ‘Where there are no rights there
are not duties’….’the equality of rights in marriage and divorce is the first thing that women
demand from the Majlis’…..’ how is it possible for a woman to perform the duties of
motherhood…when her husband can divorce her at will and take away her children from
her and leave their upbringing in someone else’s hands? (As quoted in Paidar 1997, 127).
As such, The Women’s Party of Iran believed that in order to improve a woman’s status quo within
society, one had to improve their status quo within the family. Additionally, The Women’s Party
of Iran was concerned with the status of female prisoners and the conditions they had to endure.
As a result, The Women’s Party of Iran filed a petition with the Ministry of Justice requesting to
examine such conditions and were granted to do so in an effort to better such environments (Paidar
1997).
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The Rise of the Tudeh Party: From Communism to Feminism
As mentioned previously, the abdication of the Shah resulted in invasion by Russian and
British forces. The former had a significant impact on re-establishing formerly dismantled
communist parties. As such, during this time the newly emerging communist party, the Tudeh,
started organizations that centered on women’s rights. The first communist party of Iran emerged
in 1921 and consequently dissolved in 1931 by orders of Reza Shah who banned any and all forms
of communist beliefs (Jahanpour 1984). It would not be until 1941 during the emergence of the
new governance that a fresh face to the communist party emerged entitled the Tudeh or People’s
Party formed.
The history of the Tudeh is one filled with contestations and complexities amongst
historians, former members, and scholars alike. On one hand, some historians have expressed that
the creation of the Tudeh was one under the guise of the Soviet Union (see Zabih 1966; Kianouri
1993; Ziba’I 1964); this has been strictly opposed by former members of the Tudeh that state it
was a communist organization created “independently of Soviet wishes” (Chaqueri 1999, 498).
On the other hand there are historians that have attributed the rise of the Tudeh to its founding
members that had been previously imprisoned under the Shah’s regime (see Lenczowski 1947);
such members include Dr. Taqi Arani, Abol Qasem Assadi, Iraj Iskandari, and Reza Rusta
(Lenczowski 1947).
Another theory revolving around the emergence of the Tudeh, is that of the “fifty-three.”
In 1938, fifty-three members of a notable magazine entitled Donya were arrested under the charges
of communist activity; one such member being Dr. Taqi Arani (Abrahamian 1999). The Shah had
proclaimed that these men posed a threat to his regime as well as the sanctity of Iran, while the
accused had expressed that while they did share communist sentiments, their intent was not to
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overthrow the government (Abrahamian 1999). During their time in the prison, it is said that these
fifty-three members collaborated to create what would later be known as the Tudeh Party
(Abrahamian 1999). Most of them having lived abroad in the Soviet Union or other European
countries, they’d utilized what they had seen and learned in these countries back home to Iran and
had wished to implement communist values into society. As such, have also been arguments made
with regard to when the Tudeh embraced communist ideals: one argument states that the Tudeh
was always a communist party, while others state it was a steady development over time (Chaqueri
1999).
In light of this lack of cohesive literature, it is challenging to determine how the Tudeh
truly emerged. While one cannot positively determine the causal source for the party, the Soviet
Union undoubtedly played a role in its creation, whether that be directly or indirectly. Since many
of the alleged founding members had lived in Soviet republics, they returned to Iran with ideals to
help a wide array of individuals such as “workers, peasants, women, students, and so on” and
“collaborated on communist United Front lines with other political groups” to help establish
certain changes and progressive reforms (Elwell-Sutton 1949). In an attempt to help each of these
distinct groups, the Tudeh established subsidiary movements within its party that were dedicated
to the causes of each of these individuals. Scholars such as Abrahamian (1982) have stated that
the Tudeh was the only party during the 1940s that assisted women and was designed to rally them.
While women were not permitted to be official members of the organization between the
years 1941 to 1946, they still participated and promoted movements to further their endeavors. In
1943, the Tudeh formed one of its most notable organizations dedicated to the rights of women
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which was entitled the Women’s League32 (Sahimi 2010). In 1944, The Women’s League along
with The Women’s Party of Iran pursued the matter of suffrage once again, only this time they
both utilized different avenues to raise awareness. For the first time in Iranian history, The
Women’s League was able to single handedly gather over one-hundred thousand signatures
supporting female voting rights which was a remarkable task to accomplish in it of itself (Sedghi
2007).
Regrettably, while The Women’s Party of Iran and Women’s League succeeded in other
avenues of women’s rights, like previous attempts, the movements failed to pass a law permitting
suffrage once and for all. Interestingly, these struggles for women’s rights were not just advocated
by feminist movements, but rather by men in high political positions such as Prime Minister
Ahmad Qavam who took on the issue of women’s suffrage and attempted to pass a bill permitting
it (Sedghi 2007). Unfortunately, Qavam was met with harsh scrutiny among the clergymen and
members of his own party, so much so that many of them resigned from their positions (Sedghi
2007). As a result, his efforts were laid to rest when once again the bill was denied.
Subsequently, in 1944, unofficial and undocumented female members of the Tudeh Party
formed the Women’s Organization of Iran33 (Habibi 2014; Shahidian 2002; Cronin 2013;
Abrahamian 1989; Moghissi 2005). The organization, much like its predecessors, strived for
reforms in laws regarding women, specifically those centered on the roles of women within the
family, workplace, education, and politics (Shahidian 2002). One of their more notable and
important endeavors, administered through the Tudeh party, was that of obtaining equal citizenship
for women (Vahabzadeh 2017). Specifically, they wanted to extend equal rights for women with
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respect to marriage laws, suffrage, and the ability to have legislative seats (Vahabzadeh 2017;
Matin and Mohajer 2015). Unfortunately, in 1949 the Women’s Organization was dismantled
when the Tudeh Party was consequently barred which subsequently resulted in the banning of all
subsidiary groups and affiliates (Habibi 2006).
In April 1951, Iran took a further shift when the Shah appointed Mohammed Mossadegh
as the newly elected Prime Minister (Diba 1986). Mossadegh’s reign is often divided into two
governments: the first government (1951-1952) and the second government (1952-1953). While
both governments are of equal importance, the latter serves more purpose for the scope of this
research. As such, I will briefly discuss some of the tenets during the first government, but lay
specific focus to the efforts for women’s reform during his second government.
During the reign of Mossadegh’s first government, the ideals and plans consisted mainly
of curtailing the direct influence of foreign nationals, as well as their accessibility to Iranian oil.
Specifically, Mossadegh targeted foreign countries including Great Britain, France, Germany, the
Soviet Union, and the United States for exploiting Iranian oil (Diba 1986; Katouzian 1990; De
Bellaigue 2012). Thus, June 1951, Mossadegh established the Nationalization Law which set out
to nationalized Iran’s oil (the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company) and make it inaccessible by foreign
parties (Diba 1986). The previously discussed Tudeh party had opposed the nationalization of oil
under the prior Prime Minister, Haj Ali Razmara34, labeling it as a British propaganda machine
while stating that under Mossadegh it was an American ploy to systematically remove British
nationals and influence from Iran (Katouzian 1990). The Tudeh party felt that such complicity
with Americans was a threat to the security of Iran. Nonetheless, Mossadegh proceeded with the
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Haj Ali Razmara was assassinated in 1951, thus the appointing of Mohammed Mossadegh. The duration of his
term is unrelated to the scope of this dissertation and thus will not be discussed in detail.
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plan, which cost him a great portion of his support. In turn, this resulted in a boycott from the
AIOC which then resulted in scrutiny amongst conservative members of the Majlis as well as the
Monarchy (Cleveland 2004). Nonetheless, Mossadegh still maintained support from urban elites
and individuals that had grown weary of the power from the monarchy and the direct influence of
foreign nationals.
In 1952, Mossadegh let an initiative to sway the power from the monarchy (specifically
the Shah) to the people and to provide him with power over the military – which would give him
more control and power than the Shah (Katouzian 1990). He wished to shift the country into a
more Socialist framework in an effort to assist with the economic turmoil it had been suffering
from since the abdication of Reza Shah. Neither of these plans were appealing to the Shah or to
conservative members of the Majlis (Diba 1986; Katouzian 1990; Cleveland 2004). In an effort to
place pressure on the Shah and the Majlis, Mossadegh resigned in July 1952 with hopes that
civilian upheaval would force both the former and the latter to concede to his demands. Facing
international pressure to replace Mossadegh with a more pro-British Prime Minister, the Shah
agreed to replace Mossadegh with Qavam-us-Saltaneh. With this decision, the Shah was heavily
scrutinized by Mossadegh’s supporters and was portrayed to have autocratic tendencies that were
unfavorable to Iranians.
On July 19, 1952, Qavam issued a radio broadcast that stated he would “court-martial the
opposition and deliver them into the heartless and pitiless hands of the law” and further diminished
the role of religiosity in the country (Katouzian 1990, 124). This in turn resulted in backlash from
Mossadegh supporters as well as religious elites that believed such speeches were heavily
misguided and dangerous to the democracy of the country. On July 20, 1952, protests and strikes
ensued that resulted in Qavam issuing military intervention. On July 21, 1952, soldiers took the
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streets of Tehran where they began shooting at protestors by direct orders of Qavam (Katouzian
1990). This resulted in the Shah facing pressure to ask for the formal resignation of Qavam and
the reinstitution of Mossadegh; this in turn started Mossadegh’s second government. Ironically,
one of the leading oppositions of Mossadegh, the Tudeh, shifted its support to him proclaiming
that he was preferable over Qavam (Cleveland 2004; De Bellaigue 2012).
In 1952, Mossadegh began what is known as his second government. Having been met
with great support, Mossadegh utilized this positive standing within the Majlis to request from
them emergency powers which he would later be granted and would utilize to limit the powers of
the Shah substantially and to extradite Princess Ashraf Pahlavi from Iran (Zabih 1982; Abrahamian
1982). In addition to this, Mossadegh also:
Followed up his victory with a rapid succession of blows struck…at the military [and] also
at the landed aristocracy and the two Houses of Parliament. He excluded royalists from the
cabined and named himself acting minister of war. He declared Siyeh-I Tir to be a national
uprising and casualties to be national martyrs. He transferred Reza Shah’s lands back to
the state; cut the palace budget, and allocated the savings to the Health Ministry; placed
the royal charities under government supervision…forbade the shah to communicate
directly with foreign diplomats (Abrahamian 1982, 272).
In addition to this, Mossadegh significantly cut budget spending on the military and by the time it
was 1953, the Shah was completely powerless (Abrahamian 1982).
Between the years of 1952 to 1953, Mossadegh created various initiatives that aimed at
helping the working class as well as women. It would be after these uprising that Mossadegh
would propose some of his most notable policies, especially those in favor of reforms for women’s
rights (De Bellaigue 2012). One of his most progressive proposals was that of suffrage and
emancipation of women. In October of 1952, Mossadegh drafted a bill that would essentially
extend women’s suffrage; unfortunately, this bill was scrapped due to the backlash he faced from
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religious leaders, such as Burujirdi and Bihbahani (Katouzian 1990). The majority of Mossadegh’s
more progressive bills were only proposed, not implemented.
Consequently, Mossadegh’s disintegration of foreign involvement with Iranian oil led to a
series of strong discontent expressed amongst the British and American government which in turn
resulted in a systematic plan to remove him from power. In 1953, both Great Britain and the United
States tried to reason with Mossadegh through the Truman-Churchill proposals which would have
reintegrated Iranian oil into the market (Ruehsen 1993); this plan essentially failed as it only
pushed Mossadegh to sell the oil at an astoundingly cheap market price which made both the
Americans and the British frantic (Ruehsen 1993). In February of 1953, the British and Americans
presented a new plan which was once again rejected. Between the months of February to March
there were heightened tensions in Iran that resulted in country wide protests and anti-American
demonstrations (Ruehsen 1993). Having exhausted every avenue to reason with Mossadegh with
regard to exporting oil, the United States (CIA, State, and Defense) and Great Britain (MI6)
resorted to concocting what they titled “Operation Ajax” - a plot that would create a coup d’état
against Mossadegh and remove him from power. The Shah conceded to this request in August of
1953 and by August 22, 1953 Mossadegh was successfully overthrown and the Shah was reinstated
into power. Incidentally, the majority of Mossadegh’s progressive bills had been reversed after his
overthrow and many of his proposed bills for women’s suffrage and emancipation were never
implemented. Some scholars have argued that had Mossadegh been able to implement these bills,
he would have been seen in history as one of the leading faces of reform for women (De Bellaigue
2012).
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Elite-led Efforts to Reform: The White Revolution (Inqela’ab-e Sefid), 1963 Iranian Referendum,
and the Women’s Organization of Iran

It wasn’t until the 1960s when women began to finally observe shifts in the status quo
within family matters, societal concerns, and political arenas. In 1963, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi
passed a six-point referendum entitled the White Revolution which included a wide array of
reforms, including some that promoted women’s rights (Keddie 1981; Hooglund 1982). The sixpoint referendum encompassed the following: “land reform, nationalization of forest land, sale of
state owned industries; profit-sharing in industry, enfranchisement of women, and establishment
of an education corps for literacy programs in villages” (Sedghi 2007, 104). One of the facets
within the referendum was an electoral law which was initially supposed to mitigate problem areas
such as ballot rigging, but what it subsequently achieved was suffrage for women which was a
substantial turning point for females in Iran (Shahbaz 1963).35 The Shah stated that female
suffrage was not only a necessary circumstance, but one that was supported by Islam (Esfandiari
2004). Moreover, he argued that Islam supported such unalienable rights to all people and further
evoked that equality, equity, and justice should be readily given to everyone – thus, by denying
such rights, Iranians would be against such facets of Islam (Esfandiari 2004). In turn, there was
support an admiration amongst both women and men. As one female activist, Mehrangiz
Dowlatshahi, recalled, some of the taxi drivers and shopkeepers gave their support by stating “Yes,
you are our sisters. Why should you not have the right to vote? Why should you educated women
not have the right to vote?” (Esfandiari 2004, 140).
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It should be noted that the ballots were segregated and female votes were counted separately from male votes
(Shahbaz 1963)
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Despite this significant improvement, the decision to enfranchise women was met with
protests and rioting by traditional forces and religious figures within the country (Sedghi 1999).
These protests mainly took place in Iran’s capital of Tehran, specifically in the southern part of
the city as that was where the clerics had the greatest stronghold. In addition to this, the religious
members organized demonstrations in bazaars throughout Tehran – again because majority of their
support was found in such places (Sedghi 2007). As one Iranian historian, Hafez Farmayan, notes:
“one of the protest’s specific aims…was to strike against the growing popular acceptance of
feminine participation in the referendum” (Farmayan 1971, 104-109). In turn, Iranian women took
to the streets to voice their discontentment towards continual scrutiny for female empowerment
and subsequently went on strike (Sedghi 1999). In particular, women employees in both the public
and private sectors took to the streets to voice their concerns and outcries over previous grievances
and discriminations against their gender (Sedghi 2007). In an effort to stifle the opposition, the
Shah issued the military to end any and all protests conducted by clergymen and conservative
parties which he labeled as “social and political parasites” (Farmayan 1971, 105). The White
Revolution benefits both women and the government in three ways: first, it minimized the effect
of the religious elite within the country – which had been a present force for over a century; second,
Iran gained legitimacy in the eyes of foreign states when it allowed women to vote and participate
in the political arena (Sedghi 2007). Essentially, this step proved to foreign countries that Iran was
not only modernizing, but serious about incorporating women into its overarching system; and
lastly, this decision garnered the support of many Iranian women. This is not to say that the
government did not face scrutiny by some women, but it certainly did gain the allegiance of many
other feminist and women’s rights groups (Farmayan 1971; Sedghi 2007).
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One of the more significant areas of reform was in the area of family and marriage law. A
strong voice of women’s rights movements during the 1960s was Mehrangiz Manoucherian, a
senator, lawyer, and activist. Manoucherian attempted to pass a progressive bill called the Family
Protection Act, which she ultimately signed by fifteen senators. Unfortunately, Manoucherian was
met with a substantial amount of criticism and crackdown particularly among the clergy:
The newspapers got hold of the text of the Senate bill- either by interviewing Senator
Manoucherian or through one of the committee members- and discussed some of its most
salient features with ta certain amount of exaggeration and misrepresentation. As a result,
the more radical aspects of Ms. Manoucherian’s proposed bill became a matter of
widespread debate in the country’s print media and attracted considerable attention and
caused much sensation. Some members of the clergy spoke of denouncing Mrs.
Manoucherian as a heretic causing her to leave Tehran until the publicity, and the possible
threat to her safety, subsided.36

Interestingly, Iran’s first female ambassador, Mehrangiz Dowlatshahi had drafted a similar bill,
which would later be known as the Family Protection Law, which strived to reform family laws to
protect women’s interests and rights. This bill was subsequently met with the same criticisms that
Manoucherian’s bill faced where the clergy believed it was a direct contradiction of Islamic law
and scripture – however with the help of the Majlis and legal experts, the bill was not deemed as
conflictual with Shiite Islam.37
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As such, in 1967 the Shah approved the Family Protection Law of Iran38 (hereafter, ‘FPL’)
which was a supplemental law to the Marriage Act of Iran39 of the Iranian Civil Code40. The FPL
paved new avenues for women in areas of marriage and divorce that had been otherwise restricted
for them in the preceding years. Specifically, the FPL prohibited men from being able to arbitrarily
divorce their wives and restricted their ability to engage in polygamy (Naqvi 1967). Moreover,
spouses were required to obtain a certificate of non-reconciliation before a formal divorce would
be permissible. Prior to divorce, men were required to appear before an arbitrator, and that
individual would decide whether a divorce is warranted and subsequently grant separation; this
latter procedure was in direct contrast to Section 1133 found within the Iranian Civil Code which
stated that “…the husband has the right to divorce his wife whenever he desires” (Naqvi 1967,
242). Grounds for divorce varied and included:
Maltreatment of the other by either the husband or the wife; incurable disease; insanity;
addiction; a prison sentence of more than five years; the wife’s refusal to submit [sexually]
to her husband; and/or infertility of either the wife or the husband…concurrently, the wife
was given the right to obtain a divorce from the husband in case he took a second wife; that
is, his marrying a second wife constituted sufficient cause for divorce.41
However, FPL highlighted that if a divorce is reached mutually, then an arbitrator would not be
required (Naqvi 1967). The law was mandated to prevent inequality between marriages wherein
women are often disregarded in these matters and have often bared the most consequences from

Qanun-e Hemayat-e Kanevada – will be noted as FPL from this point on.
Qanun-e Ezdewaj/Article 1041 introduced in 1931: discussed rules for matrimonial and divorce transactions. The
first and second articles required that all marriages and divorces be set up in accordance to the Ministry of Justice. If
a couple failed to comply with these stipulations they would be faced with penalties (Mir-Hosseini 1999, 184-196).
Moreover, failing to do so may lead to questioning as far as the legality of the marriage (Mir-Hosseini 1999). In
other words, while it may have been recognized religiously, it would not have been recognized by the state.
Additionally, parties that were involved in marrying any girl younger than thirteen would face up to two years
imprisonment (Mir-Hosseini 1999). Lastly, women were given the right to declare a divorce so long as they pursued
it through civil court initially (Mir-Hosseini 1999).
40
Qanun-e Madani consisted of 1,335 articles that related to family issues including but not limited to marriage,
divorce, and child custody (Mir-Hosseini 1999).
41
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such outcomes. Additionally, the law gave many liberties and freedoms to women such as
initiating the discussion for divorce or returning to her spouse should she revoke her decision for
divorce.
The FPL also highlighted matters regarding custody which previously favored the interests
of the male spouse. In the FPL, parents were permitted to discuss matters of custody among
themselves, but if they failed to come to a reasonable and suitable resolution, then “the court shall
determine and order the method of the custody of the children” (Naqvi 1967, 244). Moreover, the
FPL states that in matters of expenditure in custody:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)

From the income and assets of the father, in the first instance,
In case these are not sufficient to meet the whole expenditure, from the income and
assets of both the parents, and
If the father is not at all able to maintain the children, then from the income and
assets of the mother alone 42(Naqvi 1967, 244).

Additionally, family courts required that a custody decision be made prior to a certificate of nonreconciliation be issued in an effort to ensure that the well-being of the children are met as well as
the female spouse and to make sure that previous cases of spousal abandonment are not re-arisen
(Naqvi 1967).
With regard to the section of the FPL on polygamy, a wife’s status was substantially limited
and not offered as many liberties as with prior articles within the law. The FPL did not entirely
disallow men from having multiple spouses, however they are only permitted to do so with the
permission of their first wife, if such consent is not given then multiple marriages would be deemed
illegal (Naqvi 1967). One caveat found within the polygamy section is that if a man had the
financial means and capability of providing for more than one spouse, then he would need not seek
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the position of the first wife (Naqvi 1967). This section of the FPL highlights the issue of temporary
marriages43 or sighes. Men are permitted to attain as many temporary wives as they are able to
financially support them (Naqvi 1967).
Lastly, the FPL did substantially hinder one aspect of women’s rights in respect to
occupation. In this section of the law, a husband is permitted to “prevent his wife from an
occupation which is repugnant to his or his family’s position…but in no case shall an employer be
allowed to dispense with the services of a woman on the mere complaint by her husband” (Naqvi
1967, 246). Thus, employers were not permitted to fire their female employees because a husband
requested it, but rather they were obligated to wait until a court made its decision and see if the
judgement was ruled in favor of the husband (Naqvi 1967).
It is unclear whether the Shah was influenced by his sister Ashraf Pahlavi, then the
president of the Women’s Organization of Iran, or whether it was his own progressive motives that
mobilized him towards paving the way for more equality for women. Mohammed Reza Pahlavi
made many statements after the White Revolution and the FPL that would indicate that these rights
extended to women were merely politically motivated, rather than sincere intentions to strengthen
the female status quo. In an interview with Italian journalist, Oriana Fallaci (1973), who asked
about the role and impact of women, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi plainly stated that there were limits
to his view for equality for women:
I don’t underestimate them [women], as shown by the fact that they have derived more
advantages than anyone else from my White Revolution. I have fought strenuously to
obtain equal rights and responsibilities for them…But I wouldn’t be sincere if I asserted
I’d been influenced by a single one of them…women count only if they’re beautiful and
graceful and know how to stay feminine and…This Women’s Lib business, for instance.
What do these feminists want? What do you want? Equality, you say? Indeed! I don’t want
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to seem rude, but…You may be equal in the eyes of the law, but not, I beg your pardon for
saying so, in ability.44

He later went on to elaborate on the extent of female behavior particularly in the political spectrum
by asserting that “women, when they are in power, are much harsher than men. Much more cruel.
Much more blood thirsty…Think of Caterina de’Medici, Catherine of Russia, Elizabeth I of
England…You’re schemers, you’re evil. Every one of you.”45
Thus, it is unclear how such sentiments transformed into laws that would enfranchise
women and further integrate them into both the public and private sectors. Individuals who
opposed the Shah, such as Ayatollah Khomeini, believed his motives were disingenuous and
merely conducted to achieve a political agenda – namely, the weakening of organized religion and
the rural upper-classes (Sedghi 2007). Moreover, one could argue that promoting equal rights and
extending suffrage to women not only garnered political support, but stifled clergymen and
conservative members from having any power within the country. In fact, the decision to
enfranchise woman was an internal struggle among three key players: the Shah, the prime minister,
and women (Paidar 1995). The prime minister was concerned with maintaining the vote of
clergymen and thus appeasing them, while the Shah was undecided on the issue of equality (Paidar
1995).
Nonetheless, FPL continued to face opposition even after its ratification, especially by
clergymen such as Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini who expressed disdain towards both the Majlis
for permitting such a law to be passed as well as the feminists and progressivists that drafted it.
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Not only did Khomeini feel that these laws were distasteful and deliberate contradictions of Islamic
edicts, but he believed they went completely against Islamic family life:
The law that has recently been passed by the illegal Majlis under the name of Family
Protection Law in order to destroy Muslim family life…Women who are divorced in family
courts should consider their divorces null, and if they remarry they are committing adultery.
Whoever marries such women knowingly is also an adulterer, and should be punished
according to the Shari’a by whipping46
Ayatollah Khomeini believed that this law, despite its enactment, should not be taken seriously or
be seen as a legal ramification of any sort; rather, he encouraged to disavow such laws that stood
against Islamic edict and jurisprudence. While the 1967 bill did successfully pass, there were other
Islamic laws that still remained intact even after its enactment such as the Passport Law 47 and
Article 179 of the Penal Code48 in 1940 (Sedghi 2007; Esfandiari 1997; Bakhshizadeh 2018). Thus,
while there were progressive movements for women that substantially changed their status quo,
there were still laws that were enacted to oppress them or limit them.
While the White Revolution garnered support among women, it also gained opposition by
other female groups. From 1963 to 1979, there was a clear divide among women within Iran: on
one hand, there were female activists that were pro-Shah and actively partook in demonstrations
and participated in “political, bureaucratic, and social institutions” while playing active roles in
government run political parties and women’s rights organizations (Sedghi 1999, 492-498); in
contrast, there were women that posed as anti-regime entities and were firmly against many of the
ideals posited by Mohammed Reza Pahlavi (Sedghi 1999). The former was heavily involved in
one of the more prominent women’s rights groups, the Women’s Organization of Iran, which was
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Khomeini, Ayatollah Sayyed Ruhollah. 1984. An Unabridged Translation of Resaleh Towzih
al-Masael, translated by J. Borujerdi. Boulder and London: Westview Press.
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Article 18 of Passport Law, 1973; States that if a wife wishes to leave the country, she may only do so with the
permission of her husband or legal male guardian (if she is unwed).
48
Article 179 of Penal Code, 1940; States that if a wife is caught engaging in infidelity and her husband murders
her, he will not be punished for the act
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a motivating factor for the enactment of the FPL. In what follows, I focus on elite-led efforts to
shape the women’s movement during this period.
The Women’s Organization of Iran (WOI) was arguably a motivating factor for the white
revolution which paved the way for suffrage –a critical component to achieving female
participation (Kia 2005). The latter movement will be discussed in more depth later in this chapter
as they too strove for women’s equality and rights but in contrasting ways to the former movement.
One of the leading frontrunners of human rights and women’s rights was the Shah’s twin sister,
Princess Ashraf Pahlavi49. Having lived in South Africa during her father’s abdication, she noted
that she realized what human atrocities were when she witnessed the racism faced within the
country.50 In 1966, she formed and presided over the non-profit, government organization,51 WOI.
Subsequently, the movement’s vice-president was Queen Farah Diba’s mother, Farideh Diba
(Sansarian 1982).
Overtime, the movement became an overarching organization encompassing many smaller
women’s rights movements and grew to inhabit an astounding five-thousand members. As
discussed in Chapter 2, one of the leading proponents of New Social Movement Theory, is that of
Resource Mobilization which ascertains that it is critical for activists (be it feminists, social
workers, or politicians) that wish to make a change to be able to gather the necessary resources in
an effort to achieve their goals. The second tenet addresses the importance for these activists to
successfully incorporate and coordinate with organizations and individuals that are capable of
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M. Dolatshahi, Interview recorded by Shahrokh Meskoob, 1984, Paris, tape no. 4, Iranian Oral History
Collection, Harvard University
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Kathleen Teltsch. She May Be a Princess, but Shah's Twin Is More Interested in Equal Rights, New York Times,
22 March 1970
51
WOI functioned as a government entity rather than a movement. It “remained a hierarchical bureaucratic
organization” (Sedghi 1999)
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providing the necessary tools and resources. In this case, the resources were provided by Princess
Ashraf Pahlavi, by way of her elite status as well as her first-hand experiences of humanitarian
atrocities, as well as Farideh Diba.
The organization consisted of women from a vast array of socioeconomic backgrounds. It
also included members from diverse religious backgrounds (notably Bahai, Jewish, and
Zoroastrian faiths) – including those deemed to be minorities in an effort to create an inclusive
effort (Afkhami 2004). The goals of the movement were two-fold: first, to establish equality
between men and women within the country; second, the organization wished to form a standard
protocol and structure for all women’s rights organization in an effort to create cohesiveness,
uniformity, and unity (Sedghi 1999; Afkhami 2004). Specifically, WOI established a constitution
which laid out six specific interest areas: “women’s welfare, legal matters, publications, social
concerns, international publicity, and organizational activities” (Sedghi 1999, 492-298). It is
noteworthy to mention that while the WOI strived for these goals, they curtailed them to fit their
demands within the confines of the establishment and government (Kia 2005). Again, New Social
Movement theory discusses the other tenet which is political process. Political process states that
change and reform comes from politically charged ambitions which in this case was heavily
mobilized through efforts led by Princess Ashraf Pahlavi in hopes of creating equality for women
within Iran.
Additionally, the elite-led efforts of the WOI substantially curtailed the demands of
religious clerics, predominantly those that clashed with progressive reforms for women. In fact, as
a result of the WOI efforts, the religious clerics in Iran significantly lost their power both socially
and politically – which heightened their enmity towards the organization (Afkhami 2004). One
could argue that this elite based organization carried out its goals with the intent to disintegrate the
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stronghold of religious elites within various sectors of Iran. One could infer, though there is not
substantive literature to back up this assertion, that Princess Ashraf Pahlavi created such an
organization to ensure that the demands of these religious clerics were not met and given her
position within the government, she was able to successfully conduct this. The WOI strategically
incorporated versus from the Quran into their campaigns in an effort to show that Islam was not a
proponent of progressive thought and gender equality (Afkhami 2004). Such versus included those
from the Surat al Nisaa (“The Women”) which states, “And whoever does righteous deeds,
whether male or female while being a believer – those will enter Paradise and will not be wronged,
[even as much as] the speck on a date seed” 52 (see Figure 3.1 for original Arabic script from the
Quran).
Figure 3.1: Surat-I-Nisaa (Women)

Source: Chapter (4) sūrat l-nisāa (The Women), Verse (4:124), (English Translation), obtained from
http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=4&verse=124.

The incorporation of Quranic verses was to illustrate that feminism and women’s movements were
not far from the teachings of Islam, but rather were supported by it. It was also a strategic move
on the part of Princess Ashraf Pahlavi and members of WOI to encourage even highly religious
women to partake in their movement in hopes of gaining a greater following. They also discussed
the role of notable female Islamic figures from the Quran, such as the Prophet Muhammad’s (pbuh)

"Righteous deeds as it pertains to Women in the Quran," Chapter (4) sūrat l-nisāa (The Women), Verse (4:124),
(English Translation), obtained from http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=4&verse=124
52
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wife Khadija who was venerated in the Quran and by Muslims (Afkhami 2004). These efforts
undoubtedly diminished the demands espoused by religious clerics and further admonished their
lack of progressiveness.
One of the underlying goals of WOI was to make the average Iranian woman more
informed about politics in hopes that they would be more engaged and more proactive for women’s
rights. Members of WOI, especially Secretary General Mahnaz Afkhami, believed that ignorance
was the one greater weaknesses Iranian women could bear and that the only way to create more
progressive movements would be to educate such women so that they would be more inclined to
be politically involved (Sedghi 2007). When asked about the importance of participation, Mahnaz
Afkhami stated: “it is the duty of every Iranian woman to show her political and social growth by
participating in elections” and that such women often “fail to participate in politics” because of a
“lack of political consciousness” (Sedghi 2007, 153). The women in WOI were encouraged to
educate the women around them whether that be within their own families, social networks, or
neighbors – education was key to achieving equality. Most important, members of WOI were
encouraged to educate women with job-related skills and in literacy with hopes that this would
promote women to join the labor force (Afkhami 2004); they were however discouraged from
training in more masculine careers – specifically those that required heavy labor, because that
would narrow the prospects for marriage and domestic life for such women (Afkhami 2002). To
this end, the organization organized classes in various parts of Tehran, which welcomed women
from all over Iran, but limited the time frame for the courses and training so that the women’s
home lifestyle was not substantially altered by the program (Afkhami 2004). Unfortunately, it is
unknown and not documented as to how many women attended these courses and from what

105

regions of Iran they participated from. Women were required to attend the courses for two years
prior to being able to permanently return back to their homes and villages (Afkhami 2004).
The WOI later started the WOI Center for Research on Women, which dedicated time and
studies to women from different parts of Iran and different socioeconomic backgrounds in an effort
to analyze their problems and find resolutions for them (Afkhami 2004). Moreover, the institute
examined what methods were the best to make women more informed and what methods to utilize
in an effort to reach out to the female audience; in this case, the studies showed that women were
more receptive to radio programming networks – thus WOI used radio networks to promote their
courses in hopes of recruiting more women (Afkhami 2004). In 1974, WOI conducted a study on
women of tribal societies, particularly the Qashqai tribe, which revealed that female status quo in
those societies were based solely on tribal laws, rather than national or religious laws (Afkhami
2004). The studies showed that women in these tribes wanted to stray away from the nomadic
lifestyle and were more concerned with attaining more modernized, successful livelihoods for their
children – this in turn helped WOI understand the needs of women from certain tribes to help better
tailor their courses to make these goals more feasible (Afkhami 2004). Essentially, WOI utilized
its resources not only to raise awareness of women’s rights to females across Iran, but to
subsequently raise awareness to society and the international community of struggles and
deprivations women from all socioeconomic, tribal, and religious backgrounds face within the
country in hopes of creating more equality between genders.
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Opposition Movements, the Pahlavis and Transnational Feminism
One could argue that early signs of transnational feminism can be seen with international
support given to organizations like WOI, and international pressures that was placed on the Pahlavi
dynasty (under Mohammed Reza Pahlavi) to implement reforms, including female suffrage.
Another form of transnational influences, that did not involve state actors, included transnational
feminism. Transnational feminism is seldom discussed in scholarly work on the Iranian diaspora
in the United States and Europe (principally, France) during the Pahlavi era. Between 1961 and
1979, relations between the United States and Iran flourished; during the same period, political
dissidents in Iranian diaspora in the United States and Europe became increasingly opposed the
alignment between the Shah and the U.S. As such, during this period thousands of Iranian students
from the United States, UK, France, and Germany formed the Confederation of Iranian Students
National Union53 (Nasrabadi 2014; Matin-Asgari 1992). This group would later be known as the
“…most active and persistent force of opposition to the Shah’s regime during the two decades
prior to the 1978-1979 Revolution” (Matin-Asgari 2002, 1).
As early as 1952, a new movement emerged – with the assistance of the CIA -- called the
Iranian Students Association (ISA) (Matin-Asgari 1992).54 ISA was more than a transnational
organization; it became a way of life and a family in its own right, as it offered a place of belonging
for men as well as women (Nasrabadi 2014). The organization had branches across the United
States, from California to Washington to New York to Texas and many others (Nasrabadi 2014).
Despite being mantled by the CIA, the ISA was highly critical of the Shah and the Monarchy as a
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Referred to as CISNU throughout the remainder of this piece
Referred to as ISA throughout the remainder of this piece
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whole. One of the prominent elements of ISA was gender equality and gender sameness 55; while
these sentiments were shared by pro-Shah feminists in their home country, the ISA was far from
supportive of organizations such as the WOI. In fact, female members of the ISA abroad firmly
believed that feminists within the United States were hypocrites for giving support and aspirations
to “so-called” feminists such as Farah Pahlavi and Ashraf Pahlavi (Nasrabadi 2014, 139-140):
…the true representatives of Iranian women are…Ashraf Dehgnani who heroically resisted
the torture of SAVAK56 and later escaped; Marzieh Ahmadi Oskooei, who was martyred
at the hands of the Shah’s regime; Rafaat Afraz who was martyred in Oman while
struggling with her Omani brothers and sisters; Mother Shayegan who at the age of 53 is
resisting the Shah’s brutal tortures; and Manijeh Ashrafzadeh Kermani, the first woman
freedom fighter executed by the Shah’s dictatorial regime (Nasrabadi 2014, 139-140).
Thus, women in ISA firmly believed that feminism espoused by organizations such as the WOI
and members of the royal family was a complete farce in light of the oppressive measures imposed
by the Pahlavi government. Moreover, while they wanted to improve the status of women within
Iran, they wished to do so under the guise of an administration that was not under what they viewed
as a highly despotic regime. In their view, the government of Iran was not offering freedom and
liberation to all women, but rather to a selected few. The women in the ISA became focal points
and heralded as “heroes” for the opposition both outside and inside of Iran (Nasrabadi 2014, 140).
Women who wished to be members of ISA had to dress more conservatively (Nasrabadi 2014).
The idea behind this dress code was that if women dressed in more conservative or “gender
neutral” manner, then their male counterparts could respect them, and this in turn would allow

In this context “gender sameness” refers to the belief that one is capable of doing the same things as the opposite
gender, whereas “gender equality” refers to the belief that one should be offered the same opportunities and treated
on an equal platform in society as the opposite gender. Moreover, to some degree, gender sameness referred to
gender neutrality in the sense that women had to put aside “femininity” – however, there was a double standard
evoked with regard to this as men were not required to put aside their masculinity
56
Founded on March 20, 1957, the SAVAK was created by Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in response to the coup
against Mohammed Mossadegh. It was created to mirror the CIA and Israeli Mossad. It was a secret police
organization. For more information on the SAVAK please see works by Moravej (2011), Diaz and Moravej (2006),
Ahmadi (2002), Fardust (2004), Samii (1997), Samii (1994), Sahedi (2007)
55
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women to respect themselves (Nasrabadi 2014).

The issue with this, as noted by many of its

critics, was that while the ISA claimed it wanted to achieve equality, their rules were
predominantly targeted at women rather than both genders, making women a subservient player
in an increasingly male-dominated organization.
Nonetheless, while the dress code was viewed problematic and counterintuitive by some
members within and outside the movement, it did serve to be significantly influential for women
and anti-Shah movements in Iran. For instance, the dress code imposed by male members on
female ones was utilized during the installment of the Islamic Republic. While the ISA didn’t
necessarily implement the chador or rupush as the Islamic Republic did, it certainly ensured that
its female members maintained a proper and conservative dress code.
Women in the ISA firmly believed that to achieve equality, one had to also achieve
sameness – in this respect it meant that women were fully capable of engaging in all activities that
were formally designated to men, including armed conflict, participation in revolutionary
movements, martyrdom, etc. These women were not only focused on the Iranian case, but rather
that of all women in the Islamic world and how they have accomplished a level of gender sameness
which Iranian women should strive for as well. One of the ISA activists, Zohra Khayam
proclaimed:
We all wanted to prove that women could do anything that men can do….with the
Palestinian movement. Leila Khaled – she was one of the female symbols of the Palestinian
struggle and she participated in hijacking….There was a woman who was involved in [the]
Algerian independence movement by the name of Djamila Boupacha…really there is a
window of opportunity for us to learn about other women and how they participated in the
struggle. It was really inspiring for us (Nasrabadi 2014, 140).
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Thus one could argue that there were strong elements of transnational feminism within the ISA.
On one hand, they were significantly influence by women in other countries such as Algeria,
Oman, Lebanon, and Cuba; on the other hand, they substantially influence women’s movements
back home in Iran that were against the Shah regime. As evidenced by Zohra Khayam’s accounts
of female strength, Iranian women within the ISA were heavily influenced by women’s
movements in other countries - which they believed highlighted their own true potential and as “a
visible assertion of the importance of women to the making of history” (Nasrabadi 2014, 141).

Conclusion
The evolution of women’s rights movements can be seen from the start of the Qajar
Dynasty all the way through the Pahlavi eras. Two of the common themes found throughout the
duration of this period is 1) the role of gender-specified dress code and 2) the role of education
with respect to gender equality and cohesiveness. During the Qajar dynasty, one can see that
women from upper classes and prestige had significant roles in shifting the role and idea of what
a woman should be. Through their embodiment of masculinity and rebelliousness, women were
able to shift gender norms and roles; they were able to disassociate themselves from preconceived
notions of how women should dress and look and by doing so they were able to create a sense of
equality with their male constituents. Albeit, this shift was seen more so among the upper and
middle classes of women where education was typically offered to them, unlike the women of
lower classes that were often shunned simply for being female.
Additionally, one sees the emergence of the transnational impact towards gender reforms.
This is seen mostly with the emergence of foreign missionaries from the United States, Great
Britain, and France that came to Iran and built gender inclusive schools or all-girl schools that
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were intended to provide education for women in hopes of integrating them into the work force.
Many of these efforts, as mentioned in this chapter, were dedicated towards minority ethnic and
minority Christian groups within Iran. While some of the efforts were geared towards creating
gender inclusiveness, some of the missions were designed to provide tools to women [and men] in
hopes of boosting migration to Europe and the Americas so that they could be integrated into their
work force and thereby creating more opportunities for employment and a boost within the
economies of the respective countries.
The disintegration of the Qajar Dynasty shifted to the Pahlavi Era. Under Reza Shah, the
issue of “dress code” reemerged more aggressively. Unlike the Qajar Dynasty that frowned upon
not wearing traditional Islamic clothing, the Shah offered police security for women that wished
to walk the streets without head covering to ensure that they would not face physical and verbal
harassment; this was one of his more admired movements. Unfortunately, the maltreatment of
more progressive women, coupled by his drive for European ideals, caused him to create what
would be deemed as an oppressive measure that targeted a significant portion of the population.
As discussed, the Shah who was heavily influence by Turkey’s leader at the time Ataturk,
banned Islamic dress for both genders and mandated a European dress code; he did this in an effort
to westernize the country in hopes that this would lead to modernization. In doing so, he banned
traditional Islamic clothing for women such as the chador and the rubandeh; this in turn led to
levels of discontentment among more religious women that felt that the chador was more of a form
of security rather than a fashion statement. These measures were oppressive towards women that
wished to wear traditional Islamic clothing which arguably made the mandate appear counterintuitive towards women’s rights. As discussed in Chapter 2, feminism, specifically that of
Multicultural Feminism and Islamic Feminism with respect to this case, is not discriminatory
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towards women – in other words it is intended to be inclusive and cohesive in nature; the mandates
that the Shah proposed alienated and disenfranchised a portion of the female population in Iran
forcing them to succumb to European dress that not only diminished their demands, but resulted
in sentiments of vulnerability and inequality not only among men but among their more
progressive, female peers as well. While the intent of the Shah was likely to end scrutiny towards
more progressive women that wished to dispel garments like the chador, he consequently isolated
another group of women when doing so.
Upon his abdication, his son Mohammed Reza Pahlavi came to power and it would be
under this reign that women would witness the most reforms implemented for them thus far. Under
Pahlavi’s reign, women were finally extended suffrage and were able to politically participate.
Moreover, the Shah’s sister Ashraf was able to create an organization that would essentially
promote education in hopes of integrating women in all societal spheres ranging from political
activity to the work force. While they strived for equal rights, Ashraf and the members of WOI did
not wish to diminish the ideals of femininity and thus pushed women towards less masculine
careers in order to demolish any difficulties towards marriage later on. Towards the end of the
Shah’s reign, nearly ten years prior to the Islamic Revolution, some Iranian networks abroad, such
as the ISA, created transnational feminist networks that were anti-establishment; in particular, they
were against feminism espoused by Princess Ashraf Pahlavi as well as Shahbanoo Farah Diba –
whom they claimed were misguided and disingenuous in nature. Similar to that of the Qajar Era,
the ISA utilized clothing as a form of protest. In Iran, the Shah and his father had both created
elements of Europeanism with regard to dress for both men and women. In turn, to the ISA, the
styles of clothing accentuated a woman’s figure which further created gender division. As such,
the ISA had the female members dress in more loose-fitted garments that were more masculine in

112

nature, as well as more Islamic similar to fashion that would later be seen under the Islamic
Republic. By doing this, the ISA was able to create cohesiveness among both genders, which they
argued the current establishment under the Shah lacked.
The following chapter discusses the emergence of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and
introduces the establishment of what is now the Islamic Republic of Iran. Further, it demonstrates
how women’s movements in Iran have shifted their efforts over the years towards reforms in Sharia
based laws. In addition to this, the chapter examines how the diaspora community which is a
prevalent force among Iranian activism, has impacted women’s rights in Iran by way of
transnational feminism, if it has at all. In doing so, I have evaluated the efforts led by groups with
Iran, as well as those abroad, in order to see if the diaspora community does have an impact on the
outcomes of reforming gender biased laws. I have examined if the presence of these diaspora
networks result in favorable outcomes or less-favorable ones; in other words, if these networks
make the process of creating reforms more challenging or not.
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Chapter 4:
The Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Islamic Republic, and Women’s Movements

Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapter, women have had a critical role within Iranian society
throughout the evolution of different regime types. In the years preceding 1979 and the revolution
that followed, women witness various shifts in gender roles and norms. Between the ages of the
Qajar Dynasty up until the end of the Pahlavi era, women experienced shifts with respect to
education rights, working rights, marital rights, and voting rights. While they faced backlash from
Islamic clerical interpretations of the Quran, women still experienced various reforms that helped
enable them to become more integrated within societal roles outside of the traditional, domestic
norms espoused to them throughout their lives.
The Islamic Revolution, as will be discussed in this chapter, created a wide array of
setbacks that permeated much of the progress that was previously made towards women’s
enfranchisement and women’s rights. While women were still offered the freedoms and rights to
education under the Islamic Republic, they faced impediments with respect to marital rights and
divorce rights. Moreover, as will be seen throughout this chapter, women faced re-veiling – an act
that has been deemed as equally oppressive as that committed by Reza Shah during his proposition
of mandatory de-veiling.
The following chapter will discuss a brief historical account of the emergence of the
Islamic Revolution and the subsequent Islamic Republic of Iran. In doing so, it will discuss the
various changes made to women’s rights across different spectrums and how these ultimately
impacted their daily lives. Next, I discuss the process of lawmaking in Iran in order to illustrate
the process which it takes to propose reforms and the prospects of positive outcomes. Finally, I
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examine various transnational feminist efforts that have taken place since the establishment of the
Islamic Republic. In doing so, I place significant attention towards the diaspora community outside
of Iran and their impact, if any, towards implementing reforms in Iran. In order to understand the
emergence of these transnational feminist efforts, one must examine the establishment of the
Islamic Republic and what shifts it created with regard to laws pertaining to women, as well as the
reimplementation of traditional gender-based roles that had previously been relinquished or
significantly diminished under the Pahlavi government.

The 1979 Revolution, Sharia Law and Re-Veiling of Women
Prior to the Islamic Revolution, there was a clear divide between women in Iran. On the
one hand, there were women who were fully supportive of Mohammed Reza Shah as well as
father’s regimes. Such support was grounded in three points. First, during these two regimes
women were finally permitted to go to school. Education not only afforded women the right to
read, but to learn about aspects of life within Iran and outside of it. Moreover, education enabled
women to better themselves, and subsequently, to become better incorporated in many social roles,
including in politics and economics. Moreover, education permitted women to further educate their
other female counterparts whether it be within their family, social networks, or neighbors.
Secondly, during the Pahlavi period, women’s labor force participation increased, which later
enabled them to apply for government positions such as members of parliament and the Majlis –
both of which were successfully attained by women. Joining the work force permitted women to
shift their status quo in society from homemakers to breadwinners and placed them on a more
equal footing with their male counterparts. Thirdly, due to Mohammed Reza Pahlavi’s adoption
of the White Revolution, women gained the right to vote, an effort that was long fought for over
the years. The pivotal movement of suffrage in Iran made it plausible for women to be heard not
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only in rallies and protests, but at the ballot polls as well (Shoaee 1987). Moreover, it permitted
them to raise concerns and cast votes in hopes of seeking such concerns out and seeing them
through by voting. Lastly, the White Revolution created family laws that were often in favor of
women, making the prospects of divorce and custody more readily feasible for females and
subsequently created an equal platform for both males and females.
While some female activists acknowledged the gains made during the Pahlavi period, they
deemed the act of unveiling critically. There are many women that felt that the laws set forth to
essentially protect women, only benefited some while consequently oppressed others (MirHosseini 2002). Unveiling was not seen as a form of equality, because there were women that
wished to wear the chador and rupush as a form of protection; not being permitted to do so meant
that they were forced to be outside of their realm of their own security and comfort. As such, there
were many protesters against the Shah’s regime that consisted of women that were against such
oppression; such women, believed that their personal morality and security should not be
compromised for the sake of a portion of the female population and that their needs and wants
should have been equally heard. Thus, while the Shah was seen as a flag bearer for women’s rights
by many, he was seen as an oppressor by others; in one instance a former female protestor against
the Shah, Minoo Jalali, recalls that while the Shah had created opportunities for women, they were
not extended to all women.57 In fact, Jalali states that poorer women remained disenfranchised and
even though the Shah extended suffrage for women, free election was still not permitted to them.58
As such, he was met with significant scrutiny by many women and activists which played a
substantial role during the 1979 Revolution.
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During a very short period of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, women were permitted to dress
as they wanted to; in other words, women that wished to wear the chador or rupush were permitted
to do so without any scrutiny and subsequently women that wished to remain unveiled were
allowed to (Sedghi 2007). The protests that ensued against the Shah’s regime united people from
all spectrums: women, men, rich, poor, educated, and uneducated – all were united for a common
cause. During these protests, female dress code was no longer a concern. In fact, while some
women participated in these protests with intentions of promoting positive changes for gender
rights within Iran, they were advised against being vocal about these demands. Jalali recalls a
protest she participated it in 1978 where women were changing things like “equal rights” and
“freedom for women” and being discouraged by being told “don’t say that, instead say more chants
in support of the Islamic Republic”.59
During this short-lived period, there was also an emergence of groups that were neither
supporters of the Shah nor supporters of the newly emerging Islamic Republic. One notable group
was a splinter Marxist-Leninist movement of the Mujahidin-e Khaliq by the name of Peykar.
Unlike groups such as the Tudeh party60 that were devout supporters of Khomeini and proclaimed
that he was a flagbearer of women’s rights more than any other of the preceding Iranian leaders,
Peykar was stoutly against Khomeini and the idea of mandatory hijab – deeming it as oppressive
(Shahidian 1994). Ironically, this group would form subsidiary “women’s” groups, but refused to
incorporate gender issues into their respective causes. Nonetheless, they mobilized and utilized
female members in hopes of garnering additional support for movement. Peykar would attempt to
mobilize women, in particular they targeted three specific groups of women:
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This was short lived and ended in the early 1980s. After which the Tudeh began publishing anti-Islamic Republic
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(1) Women who were involved in production, such as working and peasant women; (2)
women who were in social services, such as professional women and teachers; and (3)
women and national minorities who were involved in the struggle against the Islamic
regime. Historically, the left had a problematic relationship with house-wives….
[They] viewed them with suspicion (Shahidian 1994, 237).
Similar to prior leftist movements, Peykar chose to not include housewives in their movement –
not because they were not trustworthy, rather because they lacked the basic understanding of class
struggles and oppression committed by the upper class (Shahidian 1994). Unfortunately, the
women’s movements within Peykar were not driven on gender issues; rather, they were politically
and class driven. Specifically, movements such as the Mothers of Martyrs Movement and
Association of Widows were both based on women lending support to their husbands (Peykar
1981; Shahidian 2002, Moghissi 2005; Moghissi 2016). In fact, Peykar went so far as to proclaim
that “organizing in defense of women’s immediate concerns and interests was ‘selfish, deviating
the attention of toiling women’, and ‘treacherous’” (Moghissi 2016, 103). Peykar attributed the
desire for gender equality and discussion of gender oppression to matters of capitalistic society
and stated:
any organization which seeks to organize toiling women around slogans such as ‘women’s
general issues’ and ‘ women’s common grievances’ and to obfuscate existing
contradictions among antagonistic classes, and consequently create a class compromise, or
to advocate that securing women’s denied-rights, which requires proletarian leadership and
can be achieved only in a socialist society, can indeed be accomplished in a capitalist
society is a deviationist organization and shall have no function but to misguide and waste
women’s fighting spirit and shall betray them and serve the bourgeoisie (Peykar 1981 as
cited in Shahidian 1994, 238).

Peykar was a short-lived movement and was officially disbanded and banished from Iran in 1981.
Another Marxist-Leninist splinter movement, the Organization of Iranian People’s Fedai
Guerrillas or the Feda’yyin, were rather silent with regard to support of women’s rights, and they
too expressed for concerns lending too much focus to those issues. During the International
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Women’s Day March of 1979, which will be discussed further later in this chapter, the movement
had the opportunity to conduct a solidarity protest, but opted not to; instead, they sent some
members to present to the protests and demonstrate as independent individuals with no association
with the Feda’yyin (Shahidian 1994). In that same demonstration, attacks against female protestors
broke out which was later condemned by the Feda’yyin (OIPFG 1982). Despite their lack of
support for women, the Feda’yyin remained its stance nearly two years after the women’s march
and discussed the importance of their class-based struggles (OIPFG 1982). What such groups did
not realize is that while they strongly opposed the Shah and believed their interests would be heard
through a new regime, the Islamic Republic would soon eradicate them and dismantle their
movements during the early 1980s (Keddie 2000).
The leftists, Marxists, and Islamists during this early period of the revolution diverged with
respect to women’s rights. The leftists, though docile and passive in many respects, strived for
gender rights for women that were reclusive from Islamic edicts (Keddie 2000). Marxist-Leninist
splinter groups based all things, including gender inequality, to class issues that derived from
capitalistic corruption (Keddie 2000). Lastly, Islamists believed that issues brought up in regard to
gender, oppression, and inequality were deviants formed in westernized culture and that women
would soon reject these thoughts by way of Islamification and re-emergence into Islam (Keddie
2000).
Soon after the revolution, women were no longer offered choices for dress, rather they
became strictly prohibited in exiting their homes without a chador. Women that continued to leave
their homes without proper covering were often met with threats and physical attacks by religious
males (Sepasi 2009; Cummings 2015). Unlike the prior media outlets that were used to heighten
women’s equality and freedoms, state media now began to promote criticism against unveiled
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women and deemed them as “immoral, lax, or heretical. Women and sexuality were becoming
increasingly contentious” (Sedghi 2007, 204). Re-veiling occurred in multiple stages throughout
the progression of the newly instated regime. During the protests against the Shah, a substantial
crowd of women that were supported by religious clerics and males from various Islamic groups,
took to the streets in black chadors (Sedghi 2007, 204).
While the Shah was heavily scrutinized for his progressive policies which enabled some
women to achieve a higher status quo, what unfolded under the Islamic revolution significantly
altered any benefits reaped during his reign. On March 6, 1979 61, the status of women in Iran
significantly changed when Ayatollah Khomeini discussed compulsory veiling of all women – a
tremendous step back for many Iranian feminists who had either personally fought for reformations
or had relatives that were involved in unveiling protests under the Qajar and Shah dynasties
(Sedghi 2007). Many women, regardless of their religious stances, protested against this obligation
because they believed women should have a right to choose (Sepasi 2009; Cummings 2015). Table
4.1

illustrates

the

brief

timeline

of

61

events

regarding

compulsory

veiling.

This date is contentious in various works. Some state that compulsory veiling occurred on March 6 while other
sources state it occurred on March 8. As a result, this research will presume that it occurred somewhere between
March 6, 1979 – March, 8 1979.
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Table 4.1: Timeline of Compulsory Veiling by Islamic Republic

Source: Gheytanchi, Elham, 2001, “Chronology of Events Regarding Women in Iran since the Revolution of 1979”, Dossier 2324, http://www.wluml.org/node/346 , [Date Accessed: October 5, 2019]; Paidar, Parvin, 1995, Women and the Political Process in
Twentieth-century Iran, UK: Cambridge University Press.

On March 8, 1979, International Women’s Day, nearly 100,000 Iranian women took to the
streets to protest against the compulsory veil, only to be met with beatings by the Pasdaran e
Inqelab62 (Derayeh 2011, 16). Additionally, the female protesters were met with attacks by mobs
of religious men, some of which were heard chanting “ya rusari’ya tusari” (either a head-cover or
a hit on the head) (Derayeh 2011, 16). Many men verbally attacked secular women by referring
to them by derogatory terms such as “Western dolls…Western prostitutes….victims of the corrupt
West” (Sedghi 2007, 205).
Haideh Daraghi, a former English professor at Tehran University, recalled one of the more
notable instances that resulted in her engaging in the protests;63 she states that when she was
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Revolutionary Guard, a paramilitary force that is not under the direct control of the Iranian military.
Haideh Daraghi, interview by Donya Ziaee The Stolen Revolution: Iranian Women of 1979, 2019
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holding a meeting at Firdausi Hall64 against the newly imposed re-veiling, a group of women
demanded she open the doors to see the chaos that had been unleashed against female protestors
outside of the university.65 One of the women had told Daraghi that some men had pushed women
into the snow-filled gutters or in some cases had “pushed women into back alleys where the men
pulled out their [genitalia] and stated ‘if you want freedom come and get it’.66 Kate Millett, an
American feminist, was present during the March 8 protests and remembers a sense of fear towards
men stating “to be in fear that they will strike you for being a female…it is odd to go about with
one’s head down, silent, to pass through this force field of masculine violence”. 67 As a result,
Daraghi, as well as the other participants of her meeting including Kate Millett, jumped over the
university fences and partook in what would be one of the most historical protests in Iran’s history.
Millett recants of some of the Iranian women, including Daraghi, shouting at the militiamen
outside “is this our freedom?”68 Many of the women that supported the revolution, immediately
realized that there was a shift in status quo for women and that this new administration was not an
advocate for women’s rights.
The protests garnered international attention, most notably by some of the members of the
French feminist and militia organization named Psychanalyse et Politique69 (Psychoanalysis and
Politics). Inspired by the drive emanated by the Iranian women, P&P stated that if “Iranian women
break their chains” then this would “mean progress for all women over the world” (Psychanalyse
et Politique 2011). P&P utilized its platform to raise awareness of the plight of the Iranian women
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Haideh Daraghi, interview by Donya Ziaee The Stolen Revolution: Iranian Women of 1979, 2019
66
Haideh Daraghi, interview by Donya Ziaee The Stolen Revolution: Iranian Women of 1979, 2019
67
Millett, Kate and Sophie Keir. 1982. Going to Iran. General Publishing Co. Limited, Toronto, p.113
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and began documenting their demands.70 In one of their encounters, an unnamed woman who
participated in the protests stated that she has been subjected to wear the chador for years and that
she has “six daughters” and doesn’t “want them to wear the veil” and “be forced to wear the veil
because of men” (as quoted in Sepasi 2009;71 Safai 2017; Mulard 1979). In another interview with
one of the protestors (unnamed in the footage) states that she is not “feeling safe at all” and that
she “felt threatened…every car that drove past me insulted me” (as quoted in Sepasi 2009;72 Safai
2017; Mulard 1979). Another protestor, a nurse that is seen unveiled in the footage, states that
compulsory hijab makes it challenging for nurses to perform their duties and serve the patients
efficiently and “in the best possible way” (as quoted in Sepasi 2009; Mulard 1979). As a result,
there was a huge outpour of nurses that participated in the protests.
P&P also interview Kate Millett where she stated that in her interactions with these Iranian
women, many of them had told her they would “even accept to be killed because they were fighting
for their rights [and that] the struggle has to be continued” to which Millett stated she had “never
heard feminists speak this way” (Sepasi 2009; Safai 2017). Millett’s statement is a testament to
the novel form of feminism emerging in Iran, Islamic feminism, which differed greatly from the
western form of feminism she was accustomed to. Unfortunately, as former feminist activist
Shahin Navai recalled, while there was international attention, the groups had very little impact
within Iran at that time, thus Iranian women were forced to rely on themselves for the most

70

P&P broadcasted a 13 minute documentary, interviewing various Iranian women that were involved in the protest.
The translated versions of this documentary are available through various outlets on YouTube (see Stop the Bomb
(Germany) – translated to English subtitles; Arjang Sepasi – translated to English (voice over);. This is the only
footage available from the protests.
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change.73 The protests intimidated male supporters of the Islamic Republic, as well as the Islamic
Republic in it of itself. Suddenly, the newly placed government was met with harsh criticism
among a great deal of its female population which in turn forced it to temporarily concede. On
March 11, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini as well as Ayatollah Taleghani74 issued decrees stating that
veiling was not compulsory; this of course was short lived and only issued in an effort to mitigate
the high levels of protest, international attention, and over-all civil chaos – which will be discussed
later in greater detail.
Shahin Navai recollected one of the key women’s movements that emerged from the March
8th protests called the National Union of Women (NUW).75 The initial goal was to issue a statement
on March 8, 1979 to notify protestors of the intent to create an organization that was centered on
women’s rights; however, the large crowds within the protests made this nearly impossible. As
such, Navai waited until a later time to publish news of a potential new organization in a
newspaper. The organization garnered a lot of support among the more progressive female
community and was officially created on March 28, 1979.76 On April 1, 1979 after the issuance of
the new Islamic Republic referendum that significantly diminished the role of women, the NUW
spoke out against it.77 Sadly, due to high levels of threats and insecurity, the NUW was only able
to remain opened for no more than eight months to a year. Due to high levels of fear, the
organization was required to destroy all evidence of membership. Navai, having been the president
of the organization, took it upon herself to go to an undisclosed, secure location and burn any and
all traces of membership or interests in the organization.78 As she tearfully recalled, “all I did was
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cry…it was so painful…it symbolized all we had done day and day out. So agonizing.” 79 The
NUW was never able to reinstate itself because they never felt safe enough to do under the Islamic
Republic.
Ironically, the lashing out against the protestors demonstrated by the Islamic Republic and
various statements Ayatollah Khomeini espoused appeared to be contradictory in nature. For
instance, On March 6, 1979, shortly before he mandated veiling, Ayatollah Khomeini addressed
the women of Qom wherein he states:
We want women to attain the high rank of true humanity. Women must have a share in
determining their destiny. The repressive regime of the Shah wanted to transform our
warrior women into pleasure-seekers, but God determined otherwise. They wanted to treat
woman as a mere object, a possession, but Islam grants woman a say in all affairs just as it
grants man a say. All the people of Iran, men and women alike, must repair the ruins that
the previous regime has bequeathed to us; the hands of men alone will not suffice to
accomplish this task. Men and women must collaborate in this respect.80
He goes on to state that in the Quran, women are revered and looked upon as equals to men.81 The
address appears to be praise towards the female supporters of the Islamic revolution, rather than
the more progressive women or reformists at the time. In it, he illustrates that women must fight
against regimes that wish to stifle and oppress them (referring to the former Shah’s government)
and that those that bravely did so should be praised.82 During another speech on June 5, 1979, the
anniversary of Khurdad 15,83 Ayatollah Khomeini once again addresses the women of Qom
stating:
Those whose hearts are truly beating for the needy and oppressed people of our country
are the women of Qum, of south Tehran, and the poor quarters of other cities, those same
people you regard as being ‘the lower classes’! They understand what human rights are all
79
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about and they act in accordance with their convictions; they donate their gold jewelry so
houses can be built for the poor. Add your efforts to theirs. I am not telling you to give
money, but at least joint them with your pen; put your pens in the service of Islam. Islam
is beneficial to you; even if you do not believe in the hereafter, Islam is beneficial to your
life in this world.84
Similar to the methods of the Shah, Khomeini ostracized a portion of the female populace by
lending support and admiration towards the sects that supported him and were more religious in
nature. As will be demonstrated throughout this chapter, Khomeini and the Islamic Republic
became more oppressive towards the more progressive females within the country, while
simultaneously commending the more religious females and utilizing them as examples for all
women in Iran.
In December 1979, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran was adopted, and the
country came under Sharia Law (as interpreted by Shiite clerics). 85 Ayatollah Khomeini
implemented the Velayate-e Faqih,86 which oversaw all proposed legislation and ensured that such
propositions were “based on Islamic principles” (Bakhtiari 2012, 34). As such, the faqih presided
over laws pertaining to the rights and responsibilities of women. The post-revolutionary Islamic
administration claimed that women held an important role in society, but unlike the previous
regime, the new regime argued that the role of women was one of piety and modesty; subsequently,
women were seen as flagbearers for family values, religion, and nationalism. Moreover, women’s
sexuality was deemed as an obstruction to their value within society. As such, women were
discouraged from leaving their homes in tight clothing. Rather, they were encouraged to uphold a
religious, conservative dress code.
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Through the implementation of the Sharia law, women in Iran began to experience a wide
array of oppressive measures. Under the Islamic rule, women were forced to wear the chador
regardless of their ethnic or religious domination. In 1983, atazirat87 was enacted under Article
102 which made “appearing in public without hijab an offense against public morality, punishable
by the ‘Islamic’ penalty of up to seventy-four lashes” (Mir-Hosseini 2002, 42). Moreover, women
were prohibited from wearing certain colors that were deemed overtly bright, but rather they were
required to wear black, blue, or brown (Sedghi 2007). One of the leading proponents of re-veiling
was Hashemi Rafsanjani, who proclaimed that the proper head covering should
cover head, neck, breasts and especially the curves of the breasts definitely….tight clothing
to visibly exhibit their bodies to the extent that they are eye-catching and attract men’s
attention; this is bad-hejabi….clothes must be loose that they won’t excite men. Nor should
women speak in such a manner and such a tone of voice to excite and invite the opposite
sex (Sedghi 2007, 212).
Thus, women’s sexuality resurfaced during the Islamic Republic and was examined with strict
scrutiny. The regime began to promote women who carried themselves in “respectable” manners
and highlighted that such women were the true faces of feminism and women’s rights – all while
many other secular feminists disagreed with this notion.
Perhaps one of the biggest setbacks to women after the emergence of the Islamic
Revolution was the retraction of the Family Protection Law. Upon the implementation of Sharia
law, the FPL was re-evaluated and much of its substance were removed. First, the minimum age
of marriage for girls was lowered to the age of nine, which was a substantial setback for women’s
rights movements in a country that had fought for decades to have that age increased (Bernardi
1986). Furthermore, the courts were permitted to lower the marriage age for a girl if her father or
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guardian gave consent of the marriage and/or if the girl exhibited physical maturity. 88 Second,
Muslim women were not permitted to marry men outside of their religion unless their betrothed
converted to Islam prior to the marriage.89 Third, custody rights substantially shifted wherein the
mother was only permitted to retain custody of the children for a small duration of time90.
Moreover, “until attaining the age of majority, which was lowered to sixteen…children are under
the legal guardianship of their father; and, after their father’s death the children are under the legal
guardianship of their paternal grandfather” (Bernardi 1986, 152). Finally, a man was once again
granted permission to divorce his wife at will at any point during the marriage91 (Bernardi 1986).
Additionally, a husband can also undergo an eddeh92 wherein he is permitted to re-marry his exwife up to three times or carry relations with her.93
As a result of these changes, many women suffered the most burdens as many of their
rights and so-called “privileges” were significantly limited and/or removed (Howard 2002). Under
the guise of Ayatollah Khomeini, women were believed to be modest individuals and that while
there were women that endorsed a more modern or westernized school of thought, they were
merely minorities within the country whose needs should not be maintained or met (Howard 2002).
Moreover, this shift of paradigm not only resurfaced power back to the religious elites within the
country, but substantially stifled a substantial part of the country; in turn this mentality towards a
substantial part of the population resulted in a clear divide between feminists of the country.
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Efforts to Promote Reforms and Improvements in Women’s Rights: Working inside
Institutions

As a result of oppressive measures, many Iranians were forced to emigrate from the
country. Former supporters and members of the Shah’s government were among the first to seek
refuge in other countries, with some leaving as early as 1977. Members of religious and ethnic
minority communities (e.g., Assyrian Christians, Armenian Christians, Persian Jews, and Baha’is)
were also significantly marginalized within the country, which again resulted in forced migration
out of the country. What ensued thereafter was a diaspora dynamic wherein many Iranians
migrated to vast parts of Europe, Canada and the United States. While women in Iran continue to
enjoy one of the highest education rates within the country, their rights became significantly
diminished resulting in their continual economic and social disenfranchisement. An example of
this can be seen by way of family laws which have limited their right to freely obtain a divorce, let
alone custody of a child were withheld from them during the revolution.
Efforts to promote reform have followed two paths. One path has involved transnational
support for activism within social movements or civil society. A second path has involved working
from within the established political institutions to make incremental changes to protect women’s
rights. Prior to discussing the impact of transnational feminism among the diaspora communities,
then, it is important to take stock of reform efforts have been efforts made within the country, and
especially by former leaders of the Islamic Republic94 and members of parliament. While such
efforts have been met with significant backlash and hostility by conservative groups, some did
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have positive impacts for women within Iran. One of the leading flagbearers for feminism and
women’s rights movements may be found in the Islamic Consultative Assembly. 95 Though they
have been met with blockades from the Guardian Council, they have relentlessly tried to
implement laws that further the rights of women.
Within the Islamic Republic, parliamentary bills are introduced in the lower house (ICA),
and then move to the upper house (Guardian Council/Velayat-e Feqih) where the bill is reviewed
for being constitutional and Islamic (Naini, 2006, 200; Tamadonfar, 2001, 214). Because the
Islamic Republic of Iran’s Constitution is solely based on Sharia law and is derived directly from
the Quran, the Guardian Council’s review of certain bills is based solely on the interpretation of
the religious text (Samii, 2001, 643; Samii, 2004); however, there is no single interpretation of the
texts. Different schools of Shiite Islamic jurisprudence exist. At times, more tolerant schools have
been ascendant, and justified western reforms as being consistent with Islamic precepts and
principles. Since 1979, a more conservative school of interpretation has been hegemonic in Iran.
Ultimately, the various schools of jurisprudence are reflective of the balance of political forces in
the country. This can be equally problematic and beneficial. Laws that can be interpreted are
mendable to some degree, but having a highly conservative committee interpreting such laws
makes that task significantly challenging. In cases where the ICA proposes a bill that is met with
angst by the Guardian Council, it is able to submit the bill to the Expediency Council 96 for
reconsideration. Essentially, the Expediency Council serves as an arbitrator between the Guardian
Council and ICA. Most important, while the Expediency Council is comprised of six Islamic
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jurists, throughout its history it has been noted as a tipping point for women’s rights struggles. In
2000, five-hundred women ran for seats within the ICA, ten of which were elected (Baniyaghoob
2005; Freedom House 2010). This was a tremendous accomplishment for Iranian women as this
was the most women to have been inducted into the ICA in the history of Iran. Two notable
progressive women that were heralded by reformists for their efforts in equal rights and women’s
rights were Fatemeh Haqiqatjou and Elaheh Koolaee (Freedom House 2010). One significant case
in 2000 was when the ICA97 submitted a bill that tried to raise the marriage age for girls from the
age of nine to fifteen. This bill was met with a veto by the Guardian Council in 2000 (Naini 2006).
When the bill was rejected by the Guardian Council, the ICA then submitted it to the Expediency
Council, where the bill was reconsidered and the age for marriage for girls was then raised to
thirteen. The revised age in the bill was a compromise, and it was part of an effort to appease both
the religious clerics and the reformists (Naini 2006).
In contrast to the success of the 2000 bill, in 201298 there was legislation passed that
prohibited women’s access to education in fourteen fields (Barlow 2018). The legislation went a
step further in restricting the admission of women to an additional 241 other fields, namely,
political science, engineering, religious studies, mathematics, as well as others (Barlow 2018).
This was a significant blow to the morale of women, as well as a setback in gender equality.
In a show of support for this legislation, on August 20, 2012, Iran’s Ministry of Science,
Research and Technology subsequently barred women from practicing certain fields within their
respective department. While departments that supported the legislation argued that women were
not in demand in certain fields, evidence supports the contrary; some statistics showed that women
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were excelling in these fields at higher rates than that of male students (Glavin 2017). Similarly,
the Oil Industry University in Iran barred female entrance altogether (Tait 2012). It is noteworthy
to mention that in 2012 the ICA was a majority conservative parliament which meant that the bills
proposed would not be in favor of social and gender rights (see Table 4.2). To a large extent this
bill was presented for two reasons: first, to shift the role of women back to a domestic realm
centered on the family dynamic and second to shift the role of men back to that of being the “bread
winner” (Glavin 2017; Barlow 2018).

Table 4.2: Majlis e-Shuray-e Islami or the Islamic Consultative Assembly (1980 – 2016)
Islamic
Consultative
Assembly
First Majlis
Second Majlis

Year

Winning Party

Ideology (R/C)*

1980
1984

Islamic Republican Party
Islamic Republican Party

C
C

Third Majlis

1988

Unknown

R

Fourth Majlis

1992

Combatant Clergy Association

C

Fifth Majlis

1996

Combatant Clergy Association

C

Sixth Majlis

2000

R

Seventh Majlis

2004

Islamic Iran Participation
Front
Unknown

C99

Eighth Majlis100

2008

Unknown

C

Ninth Majlis

2012

United Front of Principle

C

Tenth Majlis

2016

List of Hope

C

Source: Data collected from Iran Data Portal and Inter-Parliamentary Union database (historical archive of
parliamentary results) http://irandataportal.syr.edu/ [Date Accessed: September 15, 2019].
*R= reformist/ C= conservative
**ICA hold elections every four years
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As a result, female and student activists filed complaints within the Administrative Justice
Court.101 In their complaints, the activists highlighted that this legislation diminished the role of
women within society and limited them solely to domestic roles. Moreover, they indicated the
blatant sexism presented in the legislation which assigned specific genders to certain career paths
(ISNA 2013). This in turn resulted in widespread condemnation among human rights groups and
activist groups, most notably Human Rights Watch. An astounding seventeen non-governmental
organizations issued a statement, which was published by various outlets including Human Rights
Watch and Center for Human Rights in Iran, wherein they laid out discrimination imposed by the
Iranian government on various minority groups, namely women. Such groups included Amnesty
International, Iranian Democratic Student Association of George Washington University, Human
Rights Activists in Iran, International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, and many others. 102 In
the joint statement, the activist groups stated “the right to education for all persons without
discrimination is explicitly guaranteed under international instruments, which Iran has accepted or
to which it is party” and that “the UNESCO Policy further provides that…higher education
institutions should support academic freedom and fundamental human rights, ensure students are
treated fairly and justly, adopt policies that ensure equitable treatment of women and
minorities”103 Most importantly, one of the demands of the joint statement specifically centered
on discrimination of women being imposed by educational institutions, wherein they stated:
Abolishing discriminatory policies against women, including the quota system that restricts
women’s participation in higher education, gender segregation which may lead to women
“Women rights defenders filed a complaint against 36 universities at the administrative justice court,” Iranian
Students News Agency (ISNA), September 14, 2013, http://www.isna.ir/news/92062314458/
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experiencing discrimination in higher education, and restrictions on campuses and fields
of study in which women can enroll; and ending enforcement of clothing standards that
violate the rights to privacy, freedom of expression and freedom of religion or belief.104

In September 2012, Human Rights Watch pressured Iran and Iranian educational institutions to
reverse these gender discriminatory decisions. Similarly, Iranian activist, lawyer, and Nobel Peace
Prize winner Shirin Ebadi espoused discontent over the bill stating that the government was “trying
to limit the active presence of women in society” (Payvand News 2012). Ebadi’s sentiments
echoed to members within the United Nations which placed additional pressure on the government
to revoke the contentious bill. Later in 2015, the UN issued a Special Rapporteur regarding gender
inequality, including but not limited to the lack of accessibility and equality with respect to
education. In it, the UN stated that there continues to be ongoing discrimination against Iranian
women and advised that Iran begin following the guidelines provided by the Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).105 Specifically it stated:
The Special Rapporteur further calls on the Government to amend laws that violate the
rights of women, or that undermine their full enjoyment of civil political, social, and
economic rights, including the right work and to freedom from discrimination, especially
in education and the workplace. Draft legislation currently under consideration that appears
to infringe on these rights raises serious concern, and should be reconsidered106

Sadly, it is unknown whether these collective efforts were successful in overturning the legislation,
as it appears women still face discrimination in certain “male dominated” fields. Moreover, the
Rapporteur presented responses from the Iranian government wherein they swiftly denied majority
of the allegations presented against them and stated that the Rapporteur and international
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involvement was a “hasty intervention in the sovereign functions of government”107 Ultimately in
this case, the overtly conservative majority was able to maintain the passed legislation, despite
international outcry.
As seen, internal reforms, protests, and actions that sought to improve women’s rights were
not always successful. While the ICA made efforts to pass legislation that benefited the rights of
women – they often faced blockades and unsuccessful attempts. As mentioned and seen, the ICA
was not always progressive in nature; in fact, between the years of 1980 to 2016, there were ten
ICAs, eight of which consisted of a conservative majority (see Table 4.2). Article 64 108 of the
Constitution states that the ICA will contain 270 members; however, it can increase to a maximum
of 290 members. The ICA officials are elected through public elections; however, the members
are observed and approved by the Guardian Council prior to the election taking place (Sarabi,
1994, 92). This has often caused concern for its excessive power; however, despite its ability to
oversee candidates of the ICA, the Guardian Council is not permitted to use vetting measures or
interfere in elections (Sarabi 1994; Samii 2001).
While there is some research to support that a conservative ICA and a conservative
Guardian Council are more likely to be successful in passing a bill (see Naini 2006), such research
does not support that a conservative ICA is more likely to pass a moderate bill or a bill on social
issues (i.e. gender equality, marriage, divorce, etc.). That being said, an ICA that is predominantly
reformist in nature will have difficulty in passing social laws with a conservative Guardian
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Council. Moreover, an ICA that is predominantly reformist in nature is more likely to pass a social
bill or a bill reflecting gender issues than that of a conservative majority.
While there may be some minor divisions found within each of the respective ICAs shown
in Table 4.2, the more dominating parties have the most influence and rarely does a divide cause
contention within the parliament (between the reformist and conservative members). The majority
of contention is found when a bill is presented to the Guardian Council. Furthermore, the
ideological reformist position often times overcomes intra-challenges due to a desire to pass reform
bills.
The ICA has undoubtedly had some successes with regard to passing more moderate bills.
In light of that, one could assert that the ICA, even when predominantly reformist in ideology, is
able to have some influence in passing social laws, especially when involving the Expediency
Council. However, one of the more successful methods in creating reform has been international
involvement. This is not to solely attributable to the involvement of NGOs and/or foreign state
actors, but rather to members of the diaspora community who wished to create networks abroad
that help their fellow women back home. Iran has one of the largest diaspora communities in the
world – spanning across the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and many
others. As such, Iranians in these countries have been able to utilize the knowledge of lawmaking
within their home countries, as well as adopted dispositions from their host countries, in trying to
promote reforms for women back in Iran. In doing so, Iranians have faced mixed results which
will be discussed in more extensive detail in the following section.
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Transnational Feminism under the Islamic Republic
Although transnational groups have made various efforts to improve women’s rights
throughout the recent history of Iran, most notably under the Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties, such
campaigns became more profound and prevalent under the Islamic Republic. There have been
many transnational feminist movements that have influenced and shaped society for women in
Iran, there have been three campaigns that are deemed to be the most impactful: The One Million
Signature Movement, Stop Stoning Forever Campaign (SSFC), and the Iranian Women Studies
Foundation. In an effort to examine how these two movements attempted to re-shape the status of
women in Iran, it is important to analyze how the diaspora community emerged, the efforts brought
forth by other communities, the goals established by these two specific movements, whether they
were successful, and what contributed to such successes and/or failures. The latter part of the
discussion will hopefully be utilized as a platform for future efforts to utilize in their movements
in hopes of creating prospects towards more successful movements within Iran. First it is crucial
to understand the impact of the diaspora community.
The Influence of the Diaspora
As noted, following the Iranian Revolution of 1979, a mass migration took place. As
communities of Iranian emigrants formed in the U.S., the U.K., France, Germany, Canada, and
other European countries, some expatriates argued for the need for form diaspora groups to
influence Iran’s political trajectory. Specifically, women within these diaspora communities began
to advocate for gender rights and equality for their fellow women in Iran. To be sure, not all women
in the diaspora were united in supporting this effort. In some cases, there was a lack of connection
between Iranian women residing in host countries and Iranian women back home. In other cases,
one witnesses a strong bond between women abroad and in Iran (Noor 2014).
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One of the most prevalent trends documented among Iranian emigrants is a strong, deep
rooted connection to their motherland. For example, data from the well-respected firm of Zogby
International found that among Iranian-Americans sampled between 2009 and 2017, more than
50% consistently report weekly or monthly contact with family members and friends in Iran
(Zogby International 2017: 4). Although the gender breakdown was not reported in the Zogby
tables, one has good reason to suppose that the rates of contact among women and men is very
similar. In the same surveys, about one-third of the respondents report traveling to Iran yearly or
once every two years, while internet or mobile chat services became the increasingly preferred
mode of communication after 2011.
Such connections have in many ways influenced expatriates in helping women back in
Iran, despite having not been back to Iran for decades since their migration out of it. Many female
activists that were living abroad, claimed that women in Iran were being forced to assimilate into
a male driven, Islamic society. As one activist residing in the Netherlands proclaimed “…women
aren’t given space to realize their faculties; they are forced to lead according to the male defined
version of Islam, and if they challenge it, they are sent to jails”109 (Noor 2014, 50). One critical
facet is that the Iranian emigration morphed the Iranian diaspora into a “vibrant and highly
politicized emigre community” (Moghissi 1999, 189). However, as mentioned earlier in this
research, Iran offers a different dynamic. On one hand, women of the diaspora wish to influence
women back home in Iran in such ways that would promote gender equality, but fear that doing so
may negatively impact their families still residing there. On the other hand, some women feel that
it is not only critical, but essential for Iranian women abroad to work with feminist communities
inside of Iran in hopes of promoting change (Noor 2014). Moreover, women in host countries have
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found it challenging to engage in any influence within the strict confines of Iran (Noor 2014). Such
challenges have made it readily implausible to have a direct impact within the country.
Nonetheless, many female activists residing in western countries, have opted to raise awareness
within their host countries by way of political movements and solidarity protests. One activist
mentioned that she “established a group in my university, it holds different activities for human
rights especially women rights in Iran. This student’s group organizes activities in Canada and also
participates in different fora abroad”110 (as quoted in Noor 2014, 54).
One pivotal, driving force for activists has been the access to technology and social media.
As noted, survey data suggests that mobile and internet chat services are increasingly popular
among emigrants who contact their family members and friends. Likewise, by way of different
social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and the like, activists have been able to release
information and organize events more readily. One activist mentioned her efforts by stating “I
organize women rights events and also participate in international events, I am a regular
contributor to both electronic and social media, in French, English and Persian languages”111 (as
quoted in Noor 2014, 54). Social media has served as a critical asset to any activist movement as
it allows information to be leaked across countries. This open line of communication allows for
information from Iran to be received by Iranians in host countries and vice versa. Unfortunately,
Iran has often restricted many websites as a result of this, despite the implementation of proxy
servers.
The remainder of this chapter will examine three movements: the Iranian Women Studies
Foundation (IWSF), the Stop Stoning Forever Campaign (SSFC), and the One Million Signatures
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Campaign (OMSC). While some discussion will be given to IWSF and SSFC, the majority of the
discussion will rely on heavy emphasis on the OMSC as it became one of the largest women’s
rights campaigns with an astounding amount of transnational efforts dedicated to it; moreover, it
is important to examine the OMSC when observing the successes and failures of transnational
feminism because it last for a long period of time, had a vast amount of goals, and had a substantial
amount of members from within Iran and in other countries. Additionally, OMSC is a movement
that originally started in another country and was deemed successful there; thus, it would be
interesting to examine whether the outcome was the same for Iran and examine the reasons as to
why it was or wasn’t.
Iranian Women’s Studies Foundation
One important group that engages in transnational feminism is the Iranian Women’s
Studies Foundation (IWSF). Founded in 1990, the aim of this group has been to conduct
conferences that discuss the wide array of women’s rights issues found within Iran. In doing so,
they integrate women from the diaspora, Iranian citizens, and non-Iranians to speak in hopes of
influencing change and progression (Ghorashi and Moghaddam 2016).
One of the prominent roles of the IWSF is conducting conferences in different parts of
Europe, Canada, United States; these conferences are intended to educate individuals on women’s
rights issues within Iran (Moallem 2005; Ghorashi and Tavakoli 2006), and they typically bring
together both male and female panelists and guest speakers from Iran who have “been active in
promoting gender issues and women’s rights” (Moallem 2005, 221). Each conference has changed
its underlying theme depending on the year it was held (Ghorashi and Tavakoli 2006). The IWSF
has served as a stepping stone for mutual cooperation and help between the diaspora community
and citizens within Iran. Under the reign of Mohammed Khatami (1997-2005), women in Iran
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relied heavily on this group (among others) to spread information to their neighboring countries
(Ghorashi and Moghaddam 2016). Essentially such organizations served as mouthpieces for a
heavily stifled population. Moreover, these groups have access to technology which helps during
protests and movements to help spread information more fluidly. Female citizens of Iran rely
heavily on these diaspora networks to be the global voice they need for change.
Despite the benefits with this campaign, there have been issues and divides within the
movement. One crucial issue is that many of the female participants from Iran have faced physical
and verbal attacks by members of the diaspora – primarily because the female participants opted
to wear a rupush or hijab during the conferences (Ghorashi and Tavakoli 2006). In turn, this has
created a substantial divide between the diaspora members of this campaign and the Iranian
national members. Furthermore, there was division among scholars and activists within the
campaign because the former chose to over-generalize feminist movements in Iran as “Islamic
Feminism” (Ghorashi and Tavakoli 2006, 95). Some “of the Iranian activists living in diaspora
who firmly opposed the existence of Islamic feminism in Iran did not appreciate the position taken
by Iranian scholars in the diaspora…some scholars were openly attacked, labeled as postmodernist” (Ghorashi and Tavakoli 2006, 95). Furthermore, as previously mentioned there were
divisions between the more secularly-oriented members of the diaspora and the more religious
members within Iran. As discussed in the earlier section regarding diaspora intercommunication,
many of the individuals that migrated outside of Iran are of a very pro-Shah, anti-Islamic republic
mindset which often clashes with activists in Iran. One notable example of this divide can be found
when seminal activist, Mehrangiz Kar was awarded Women of the Year through the IWSF:
When Ms. Kar was chosen as the woman of the year, I did not think that anybody would
protest…again some leftist activists who were against this…..we are working really hard
but we have become narrow-minded: the young people’s view is much more open than
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ours. Those leftists were saying that Mehrangiz Kar is a betrayer, because had been
working with the regime. This is absurd….only reason for their accusations is that she has
been able to work as a lawyer in Iran and has her own office….no matter what that person
had been doing, whether that person had been in prison or not, had been raising her voice
or not; simply the fact that the person had stayed in Iran is already the symbol of his/her
betrayal” (Ghorashi and Tavakoli 2006, 96).

Nonetheless, despite these limitations, the IWSF has had modest success as a transnational
organization. One caveat is that, arguably, there are no overarching goals and therefore the
traditional metrics for judging the effectiveness of a movement remain obscure. This campaign
does not have a legislative agenda, and it is not necessarily interested in working with the Majlis
in Iran to promote reforms; it is, however, interested in raising a global awareness of the gender
plight in Iran in an effort to create a better understanding of the day-to-day struggles women face.
More than anything, the IWSF serves as an important platform where women of the diaspora and
women of the home country can come together and discuss current issues for women back home.
This is in contrast to movements such as the Stop Stoning Forever Campaign and the One Million
Signatures Campaign.
Stop Stoning Forever Campaign
In 2006, after multiple cases of stoning and honor killings occurred in Iran, a number of
female activists, including prominent human rights lawyer Shadi Sadr, formulated the Stop
Stoning Forever Campaign112 in an effort to change the Islamic Penal Code, which had condoned
this method of execution and punishment (see “Petition to Eradicate the Law of Stoning” 2006;
Hoodfar and Sadr 2010). In their petition, the members stressed that under current Iranian
jurisprudence, the government permitted barbaric acts such as stoning to continue despite the ban
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that was put in place in 2002 by Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi (“Petition to Eradicate
the Law of Stoning” 2006). This particular movement did not discriminate between genders; rather
it highlighted that both men and women were more susceptible to it, albeit women were more at
risk for death by stoning.113 Initially, the campaign utilized face-to-face methods, a strategy that
would later be utilized by the One Million Signatures Campaign.114 Once the campaign shifted its
focus from internal awareness to external publicity, the SSFC turned to technology to help promote
their cause, and specifically social media networks and telephone campaigns.115 In an effort to
enact imminent change, the campaign worked tirelessly with religious reformists and members of
the judiciary, which was primarily done to disprove the common misconception that the acts of
honor killing and stoning are Islamic – when indeed the Quran shows no support for the concept
of an honor crime or stoning as mode of punishment for such a crime.116
The movement quickly developed a transnational and feminist dimension. One prominent
international and transnational feminist group, Women Living under Muslim Laws,117 quickly
rallied behind the cause (Hoodfar and Sadr 2010). Soon thereafter, WLUML formulated the Global
Campaign to Stop Killing and Stoning Women Campaign118. This movement then branched out
from Iran and spread into other countries that had similar concerns, including Sudan, Nigeria,
Afghanistan, Iraq, and many others.119 It should be noted, however, that the campaign was not
solely focused on Islamic societies, but rather all societies where all forms of honor killing could
and did take place.120
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The tenets of the campaign were as follows: 1) create a global awareness and promote open
discussion amongst different advocacy groups; 2) create dialogue that prevents governments from
utilizing culture, tribal customs, and religion as defense mechanisms in support of these practices;
3) form women’s rights groups within the campaign that would keep records of cases of stoning;
and 4) make the cause internationally renowned in an effort to garner support from “legal,
religious, and human rights arenas.”121
SSFC’s goals started with the modest goals to change the penal code in Iran. With the help
of international recognition, it was able to successfully place substantial pressure (via public
shaming) on the Iranian government. It is interesting that the movement’s triumph followed a sharp
reversal in U.S.-Iranian bilateral relations. Indeed, the campaign’s ultimate success in 2018 came
after the US administration had decided to unilaterally withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal.
Despite this, on August 6, 2018, Amnesty International reported that Iran’s Judiciary had enacted
a suspension to execution by stoning – a pivotal, game-changing outcome.122 In thinking about
this outcome, one should recall that incremental changes had preceded the 2018 prohibition, and
these changes (between 2012 and 2017) overlapped with increased international pressure and
diplomacy between Iran and the west. In 2012, the Guardian Council moved to amend laws that
were in support of stoning as they were deemed as direct contradictions of Islamic texts. 123 It is
worth noting that in 2012, the Majjlis was dominated by conservatives, thus one could infer from
this that there was little to no division among elites, making it more plausible for the passage of a
bill124. In 2013, Iran further amended the law so that judges would be permitted to change the
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method of execution from stoning to something else, specifically execution by hanging. 125 While
the SSFC was deemed as a record success for Iranian women, it is still a work in progress since it
became a global organization through the emergence of the GCSSKW. Subsequently, in the same
year it was reported that the last case of stoning in Iran had occurred in 2009. 126 Nonetheless, by
way of transnational feminism the SSFC was able to successfully utilize the international platform
to gain recognition and subsequently place pressure on the Iranian government to instill change.
One Million Signature Movement
Background and Overview. Next, we discuss the One Million Signature Movement. On
June 12, 2005, hundreds of Iranian women took to the streets of Tehran to protest against gender
discrimination under the current regime, a move that was equally bold and noteworthy especially
given that such a demonstration had not been conducted amongst women since the beginning of
the Islamic Revolution (Fathi 2005). What began as a peaceful demonstration turned violent when
basij127 officers began beating, clubbing, arresting, and detaining women (Fathi 2005). The
protests were motivated by frustration caused by countless failed attempts towards improving the
rights of women. In particular, women grew frustrated towards the Guardian Council, which in a
matter of a month had “…rejected on the basis of their sex 89 women who had registered to run
for president” (Fathi 2005, A8). One of the more critical questions raised by the protesters was
how elected officials intended to change the status quo of women so long as the Islamic Republic
remained in power, particularly with a system that placed so much power on religious clerics (Fathi
2005).
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Just one year later, on June 12, 2006, Iranian women and men took to the streets of Tehran
once more to peacefully demonstrate against the ongoing gender discrimination issues (Sedghi
2007; Rafizadeh 2014). After a year of no change in the plight of women, demonstrations increased
and members of both genders were willing to risk arrest in an effort to create change. One leading
activist in the 2006 movement, Fariba Davoudi Mohajer, stated “…we have reached the conclusion
that we have to work together, and this a very positive development in the history of Iran’s
women’s movement. This is a continuous movement with [solid] roots. The community of Iranian
women has also accepted the costs [women] must pay for their actions. They have accepted that a
social movement has its price, and they have to pay for it” (Esfandiari 2006, 1). Within an hour
of the protest, basij forces and authorities violently disbursed the crowds and arrested many of the
protesters (Esfandiari 2006). Transnational feminist efforts began to emerge after this protest. A
speech given by Shirin Ebadi, A Nobel Peace Prize laureate, well-renown attorney, and founder
of the Defenders of Human Rights Center in Iran, highlighted the gender biased laws in Iran. In
the aftermath, many of her fellow Nobel Peace Prize laureates echoed her sentiments (Esfandiari
2006). In her speech, Ebadi discussed how such laws could not be tolerated in a society where
women had higher education levels than that of their male counterparts. Ebadi’s speech garnered
global attention among female activists from the United States, Kenya, Guatemala, and Northern
Ireland128 wherein they pledged their full support to Iranian women engaged in protests throughout
Iran (Esfandiari 2006). Subsequently, her speech and the efforts by women in Iran gained attention
from Amnesty International, which demanded that gender biased laws by abolished by the Iranian
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government and that “Iranian officials should take prompt action to address laws that continue to
deny women basic rights” (Esfandiari 2006, 1).
The Beginning of the Campaign. As a result of these violent suppression of the two
peaceful demonstrations held on June 12, 2005, and June 12, 2006, a group of roughly two-hundred
female activists united to form one of the more prevalent campaigns in Iran, namely The One
Million Signatures Campaign129 or the Change for Equality Campaign.130 It is debatable as to when
this campaign initially started, although most scholars attribute it to the violence demonstrated by
police forces during peaceful protests, while others state that in 2003, Shirin Ebadi led a coalition
of female activists encouraging them organize and form a union for women’s rights within Iran
(McKibben 2010; Hoofdar and Sadr 2010). In what follows, we will observe how the campaign
functioned, what tools it had and how it chose to utilize them, and what the final outcome was of
the movement.
Originally introduced in 1992 by the UAF131 during a similar campaign in Morocco, the
One Million Signatures Campaign was created in an effort to gather, as the title suggests, one
million signatures within the country in order to change the status quo of the female population.
Specifically, Moroccan women wished to reform the Mudawaana.132 Similar to that of the Family
Protection Law of Iran, the Mudawaana created inequality for women in various spectrums
including marriage, divorce, polygamy, and custody (Dieste 2009). Specifically, the law enabled
men to practice polygamy without the need to get their wife’s permission and permitted forced
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marriages.133 Moreover, women were forced to attain permission from a legal guardian prior to
marriage and upon such marriage, women were at the behest of their spouse and required to be
obedient,134 and, as such, women were not offered the rights to ask for divorce. Essentially, under
the Mudawaana, women were given specific domestic, family roles that limited their capabilities
in society. With regards to a right of employment, women in Morocco were looked down upon by
young, unemployed, males that embraced Islamic ideology because they felt that “women working
outside the home robbed them of [their own] opportunities” (Sadiqi 2010, 2).
As a result, in 1992 the UAF formed the One Million Signatures Campaign in an effort to
reform gender biased laws within the country135 (Salime 2011). The basic tenets of the campaign
were to: 1) increase the legal competency rate for women to twenty-one years of age in an effort
to create independence and to break free from any marital guardianships in place (Salime 2011);
2) creating equality for both genders within the compounds of domestic affairs (Salime 2011); 3)
ensuring that men and women would have the “same rights and obligations within marriage”
(Salime 2011, 33); 4) ensuring that with regards to custody, that one parent would not have
guardianship over the child more than the other (Salime 2011); 5) in the event of divorce, women
would be permitted to keep the house (Salime 2011); 6) courts would no longer be the deciding
factors of a divorce (Salime 2011); 7) both genders should have the ability to request and attain a
divorce (Salime 2011); 8) end to polygamist activity; and 9) women would have equal rights to
education and employment as their male counterparts (Salime 2011). These tenets were very
closely aligned to those laid out in the Iranian faction.
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One pertinent facet of the Moroccan faction of this movement was that it refused to accept
any assistance from outside countries, especially feminist groups within western countries. Instead,
the movement garnered the support of “human rights organizations, women’s rights organizations,
and sections of labor unions and political parties” within Morocco itself (Salime 2011, 32). The
movement strived on creating a successful campaign within the confinements of their own country.
The movement was heralded as one of the most pivotal and successful136 campaigns in the history
of women’s rights movements in Morocco. Women garnered a wide array of rights stemming from
the efforts of this campaign until reformative measures taken up until 2004; such rights included:
the ability to go to school, to work, to travel, and the ability to have an equal platform to that of
their spouse with regards to matters of the family (Sadiqi 2010). Having been both inspired and
impacted by this movement, women in Iran strived to conduct their campaign in a similar fashion
as that of UAF in Morocco.
Goals of the Campaign. As discussed previously, the faction of One Million Signatures
Campaign137 in Iran was first introduced to Iranian women’s rights groups by Shirin Ebadi in 2003.
Overall, roughly fifty-four female activists from a wide range of age groups assisted in forming
and founding the campaign which was officially inaugurated on August 27, 2006 (Badiee 2012).
As noted, the goals of the campaign were to educate the populace, particularly the females, about
how the enacted laws disenfranchised women and negatively impacted their rights and roles and
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society;138 and to reform all discriminatory laws against the female populace. 139 Specifically, the
movement wanted to reform laws pertaining to the process of marriage, divorce, polygamy, legal
age of criminality, citizenship, blood money, inheritance, honor killing, witness testimony, and
various others.140

In an effort to understand why this movement chose to focus on these

problematic portions of the law, it is important to examine what portions of each the members
found most troubling. While members of OMSC found a wide array of issues within the
constitution to be problematic, these following were some of the key ones discussed in their
campaign: marriage, divorce, custody, polygamy, and honor killing.
First, with the matters concerning marriage, members of OMSC raised issues with how a
woman must attain marriage. Under the post-1979 Constitution,141 women are required to get the
permission of their father or paternal grandfather prior to marrying.142 If such conditions are not
met, then the fathers and/or paternal grandfathers have the right to annul any marriage; this
particular section of the constitution was most upsetting to members of the OMSC, because while
the law is intended to give respect to the father, it fails to enforce this obligation and duty to sons
as well.143 Even more troubling was that even though the legal age to marry a girl was thirteen
[controversial in it of itself], a father was permitted to get permission from the court system to get
their daughter married at an earlier age than that144.
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Second, with respect to matters of divorce, men are offered too much power. If a woman
wishes to file for a divorce, she must provide sufficient evidence detailing her husband’s alleged
misconduct – failure in doing so will result in a denial for her petition.145 Moreover, the constitution
proclaims that if a woman wishes to seek divorce she must 1) receive permission from her husband
to do so and 2) forfeit her rights to her mahr146.147148In most cases, women end up forfeiting their
mehr even in instances where the husband requests the divorce or where divorce is mutually agreed
upon. Moreover, a woman bares the responsibilities to pay for any fees and costs that may arise
out of the divorce regardless of who initiates it.149
Third, with regards to matters of custody,150 women are offered very little rights. Under
the current jurisdiction, are not permitted to be legal guardians or care taker of her child 151rather,
the child’s father or paternal grandfather are the only permitted individuals to do so. Moreover,

145

Rahma Tohidi, The Effect of Laws on Women's Lives, 28 August 2006
The Civil Code of the Islamic Republic, Chapter 7 on the Dowry (Mahr), Article 1082; The Civil Code of the
Islamic Republic , Chapter 8 on Reciprocal Duties and Rights of Parties to a Marriage, Article 1105; The Civil Code
of the Islamic Republic, Chapter 8 on Reciprocal Duties and Rights of Parties to a Marriage, Article 1106; The Civil
Code of the Islamic Republic, Chapter 8 on Reciprocal Duties and Rights of Parties to a Marriage, Article 1107; The
Civil Code of the Islamic Republic, Chapter 8 on Reciprocal Duties and Rights of Parties to a Marriage, Article
1108; The Civil Code of the Islamic Republic, Chapter 8 on Reciprocal Duties and Rights of Parties to a Marriage,
Article 1114; The Civil Code of the Islamic Republic, Chapter 8 on Reciprocal Duties and Rights of Parties to a
Marriage, Article 1117; The Civil Code of the Islamic Republic, Chapter 1 on the Possibility of Cancellation of
Marriage, Article 1233; The Civil Code of the Islamic Republic, Section 2 on Dissolution of Marriage, Article 1120;
The Civil Code of the Islamic Republic, Chapter 1 on the Possibility of Cancellation of Marriage, Article 1122; The
Civil Code of the Islamic Republic, Chapter 1 on the Possibility of Cancellation of Marriage, Article 1123; The Civil
Code of the Islamic Republic, Chapter 1 on the Possibility of Cancellation of Marriage, Article 1129; The Civil Code
of the Islamic Republic, Chapter 1 on the Possibility of Cancellation of Marriage, Article 1130; The Civil Code of
the Islamic Republic, Chapter 2 on General Considerations, Article 1133; The Civil Code of the Islamic Republic,
Chapter 2 on General Considerations, Article 1145; The Civil Code of the Islamic Republic, Chapter 2 on General
Considerations, Article 1146.
147
Dowry that is paid by the groom or his father to the bride upon marriage.
148
Rahma Tohidi, The Effect of Laws on Women's Lives, 28 August 2006
149
Rahma Tohidi, The Effect of Laws on Women's Lives, 28 August 2006
150
The Civil Code of the Islamic Republic, Chapter 2 on Maintenance and Education of the Children, Article 1168;
The Civil Code of the Islamic Republic, Chapter 2 on Maintenance and Education of the Children, Article 1171; The
Civil Code of the Islamic Republic, Chapter 3 on the Natural Guardianship of the Father and Paternal Grandfather
over the Child, Article 1180; The Civil Code of the Islamic Republic, Chapter 3 on the Natural Guardianship of the
Father and Paternal Grandfather over the Child, Article 1181- 1185; 1188; 1193; 1194
151
Rahma Tohidi, The Effect of Laws on Women's Lives, 28 August 2006
146

151

the father or paternal grandfather is the one solely responsible in determining the whereabouts of
the child including but not limited to where the child will live, where they will go to school, and
what health measures should be taken.152 The current Constitution declares:
If a mother (with her own money) does buy a house for her child with the father’s
permission, the father can sell or rent this house whenever he wants, and the mother has no
right in this matter. Or, if a mother’s child is sick in hospital and needs to have surgery, it
is the father who has to give permission for the surgery to be done; without the father’s
signature the mother cannot ask the doctors to do surgery on her child. According to law,
wardship and guardianship is the “manifest destiny” of the father. Meaning, even if the
father himself wants, he cannot give guardianship of the child to his spouse153
Essentially, women are heavily undermined in this respect and their rights as mothers are
substantially stifled. Decisions and matters pertaining to their children’s well-being are not
extended to the mother, but rather solely given to the father.
Fourth, the issue of polygamy has been an ongoing battle for Iranian women. While under
the Shah, men were required to ask for permission from their wife in order to have more than one
spouse, under the current Islamic constitution men are no longer are required to request permission,
but rather they are granted the right to take up to four permanent wives and have the ability to have
an infinite number of temporary marriages.154 As a result, data showed that polygamy caused a
surge of violence and murder against husbands because of infidelity.155
Finally, on matters regarding honor killings, the Constitution permits men to commit an
honor killing against their wives if they catch them in an act of infidelity; what makes this most
troubling, is that in many cases men have been able to state that their wife committed an act of
adultery, even in cases where this was false, in an effort to effectively dispose of them and an
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honor killing would be permitted.156 One notable incident which gained the attention of Amnesty
International was that of Soraya Manutcheri who was stoned to death by her husband, Ghorban
Ali, he himself committed adultery and wished to take a new wife (Sahebjam 2011). As such, Ali
accused Soraya of infidelity which resulted in her publicized murder (Sahebjam 2011).
While these were very crucial points raised by the OMSC, there were many issues that
members addressed in their campaign. Essentially, members of OMSC highlighted every law that
not only disenfranchised the current plight of women, but further reduced her value and worth
within the country. These laws created an outline for the goals the campaign wished to meet and
address. In this instance, the OMSC wished to change these laws to make them more beneficial
for women and subsequently create equality among both sexes with these pertinent issues that
impacted the day to day lives of women. The OMSC wished to not only reform the laws, but to
shift the status quo of women once more within Iran.157.
Structure of the Movement. As discussed, the campaign began with fifty-four members
but quickly grew in numbers of supporting members. As the campaign grew larger, the members
were broken up into separate committees wherein each committee bared the responsibility of one
or more tasks; this was to ensure that the tasks were conducted in more organized, efficient, and
diligent manners.158 The approach to this campaign had to be equally systematic and careful as it
could be misinterpreted as a contestation against Islam. Members such as Sussan Tahmasebi
assured that their motives were not to combat Islamic teaching and edicts, but rather to challenge
to broad interpretations of such texts:159
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…these interpretations have not been translated into laws governing the rights of women.
We hope that our effort will convey the urgency of our demands to lawmakers and hope
that religious scholars take a more active role in examining these laws and bringing them
in line with the realities of Iranian women and Iranian society. In fact, activists in the
Campaign welcome progressive interpretations of Islam with regard to women’s rights and
some have even held discussions with religious scholars in this respect.160
Moreover, the message of the campaign was simple: to show the Iranian government that the
struggle for female equality is a wide-ranging issue throughout the country and that members of
both genders support this cause.161 In fact, collecting signatures was deemed a critical component
to the campaign because it proved “public consensus on this issue” and that it would be
“emphasized and highlighted [through the collection of the signatures].”162
Members of OMSC conducted various methods to ensure a maximum and successful
impact. Firstly, as its name suggests, the OMSC embarked on collecting one million signatures, a
task that sounds feasible but proved to be challenging. While anyone could sign the OMSC
petition, only the signatures of Iranian citizens living in Iran would be counted and presented to
the Majlis.163 Children born to Iranian parents that were living outside of Iran were also permitted
to sign the petition.164 While non-Iranian signatures were not permitted, the movement did allow
for International support and camaraderie; specifically OMSC welcomed the support of members
from various human and women’s rights campaigns that were abroad because such movements
were able to spread information through different networks and raise the awareness of the
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international community.165 In this sense, the offshoot of the movement in Iran departed from its
predecessor in Morocco.
Secondly, the campaign conducted door to door efforts where they spoke to members of
their respective neighborhoods166 (Sameh 2014). This was done in an effort to reach women and
understand their perspectives on key issues and what specific problems are more important to
them; moreover, it was a crucial method to educate these women from different socioeconomic
backgrounds of their basic rights, and most important, of rights being denied to them. 167 Older
members of the OMSC urged younger members to be “…generous and kind…..patient and open”
when approaching individuals168 as many of these women “are mothers, sisters, wives, lovers, and
friends” whose plight is the same as those involved with the campaign.169 The goals of these
interactions was to 1) raise awareness and educate the masses while 2) educating oneself in an
effort to raise awareness of pertinent issues that each women voiced. It should be noted that while
women were the predominant targets of discussion, campaigners also placed effort in speaking to
men in hopes of gaining their support as well. Members of OMSC believed that this face-to-face
interaction was a key to success as well as a necessity for interchanging information:
The campaigners believe that women must be empowered and that awareness is one of the
most important steps towards empowerment. Because women have more limited access to
information than men, women must exchange information with each other. Up until now,
exchange of information took place through the usual methods of mailing, gatherings and
word-of-mouth. However, now, this information exchange is taking place person to person,
face to face170
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Furthermore, the activists and members were highly strategic in who they chose to approach first
– in most cases members of the OMSC interviewed and spoke to their own network of family and
friends and progressively moved outward171. This campaign and these face-to-face interactions
gave women in Iran a platform to be heard not just within the country, but across borders as well.
Third, activists used more artistic measures to display their discontentment and the
disenfranchisement women were facing. Consistent with social movement theory, the repertoire
used by the movement was designed to maximize its visibility in Iran. Such measures included
street theatrics and plays. Local activists also utilized the internet in “support of changes to
discriminatory laws against women” so that there would be an open communication built between
both genders in hopes of raising awareness of the ongoing plight of women (Sameh 2014, 166).
Members of each distinct committee also conducted gatherings to “publicize the campaign’s goals
and related local issues throughout society.” 172 Finally, members travelled all across Iran in order
to get signatures. In 2007, committees had circulated through Tehran, Hamedan, Tabriz, Karaj,
Shiraz, Esfahan, and many others, collecting signatures from each gathering and face-to-face
meeting they held173.The campaign had two distinct phases: phase I consisted of gathering the one
million signatures (Sameh 2014) and phase II consisted of working with legislatures in hopes of
passing new, more reformative laws in favor of gender equality (Sameh 2014). The results of both
phases will be discussed later in this chapter.
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A Transnational Phenomenon. One interesting facet of the OMSC is that while the
movement tried keep its efforts contained within the confines of Iran, the inevitable spillage
resulted in many activist and feminist groups outside of the country becoming involved in efforts
to assist with reforming gender biased laws (Badiee 2012; Sameh 2010; Sameh 2014; Basu 2018).
As mentioned previously, Shirin Ebadi played a noteworthy role in promoting the movementespecially on an international platform with garnering the attention of many women’s rights groups
around the world. She was able to set the podium for a transnational dynamic branch out from the
movement. The “loose network structure” made it feasible for groups outside of Iran to spread
information more readily by “distributing information about the campaign, gathering signatures,
and publicizing the campaign on the internet” (Sameh 2014, 168); some of these groups included
Men for Equality174 and the Mothers of the Campaign175 (Basu 2018).
What began solely in Tehran soon spread to different cities and crossed over between
nations resulting in a transnational movement with sub-branches located in various countries,
including the United States, France, Italy, Germany, and many others (Tohidi 2010; McKibben
2010). In fact, the branch in the United States has been the most critical in making the campaign
more transnational (Tohidi 2010). Similar to that of the Iranian branch, the American chapter raised
awareness for the movement by way of theatrical skits and motivational speeches encompassed by
elements of feminism and empowerment (Badiee 2012). While many scholars have often focused
on how the OMSC transcended from a domestic to a transnational endeavor, such researchers often
overlook whether transnationalism assisted their efforts or further hindered them. While there are
some activists that argue transnationalism is a benefactor of any social movement because it can

174
175

Mardan Barayeh Barabri
Madaran e Campaign

157

raise further awareness and garner additional support, there are others that are more skeptical. As
discussed in earlier chapters, activists must be very careful with regards to transnationalism as it
is a delicate process and if done incorrectly, it can cause a wide array of failures to any movement
– regardless of its location and political dynamic.
As such, there was a divide within the OMSC as there were some members that were
strictly opposed to any foreign involvement, while subsequently there were other members that
saw transnational efforts as a tool to further echo their concerns and demands. One of the
prominent founders of the Million Signatures Campaign, Noushin Ahmadi Khorasani, stated that:
The campaign brings to mind the image of raindrops falling, forming rivulets, and then
converging on an ever-larger scale until they become a river. First there is a murmur, a
trickle, and then, gradually, a torrent of voices sounding together and reaching far and wide.
(Khorasani, 2009, 2)

The Iranian chapter of the campaign has stressed that international movements can be most
beneficial “by publicizing the efforts of Iranian women, especially as conditions get increasingly
dangerous” (Badiee 2012). Thus, transnational feminism came into full effect when the campaign
became a more widespread phenomenon. Some scholars have attributed the success of these
campaigns to the transnational networks, such as Tohidi (2002) who proclaims that:
Diaspora women activists have contributed to the women’s movement inside Iran at
different levels, including the political, informational, theoretical, technical, and
organizational. They have made these contributions through teaching, research, women’s
activist groups, and, more recently, internet sites (878).

One of the largest benefits from diaspora involvement is that while expatriates may no longer
reside in Iran, they still understand the dynamic culture and laws that are at play. In many ways,
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this prevents any negative implications that might otherwise arise from transnational involvement
when groups that have no connection or formal knowledge of a given country become involved.
Moreover, women within the Iranian diaspora community have successfully utilized the
tools provided in their highly “progressive societies” and have the “potential to introduce the
perspectives and aspirations of the global South to the global public opinion” in ways women in
their home countries would be limited in doing (Khorasani 2009, 78). Specifically, female activists
of the diaspora are able to utilize their knowledge to 1) raise awareness through various platforms
that are not readily accessible to activists in Iran, such as certain social media outlets and
petitioning networks, 2) educate activists in their host countries of the dynamic within Iran in ways
that makes them more astute of the female plight there, rather than forming their own biased,
highly skewed generalizations and 3) conducting solidarity rallies within their host countries and
even neighboring countries.
With regard to the second point, the diaspora community that assisted female activists in
Iran with the campaign faced many trials and tribulations, particularly in Southern California,
where many expatriates were opposed to assistance and intervention of any kind; majority of
individuals felt that Islam was to blame for gender inequality, however the activists among the
diaspora community argued that even in the United States women continued to fight for equal
rights and they do not have an Islamic Republic, thus it is a societal issue, not a religious one
(Sameh 2014). However, in the case of the OMSC, the majority of activists outside of Iran were
part of the Iranian community and they continued to maintain cultural ties to their home country
which made them more dedicated towards the cause176. As Sameh (2014) points out and as my
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discussion in chapter 2 illustrates, activists in NGOs that aspire to aid women in other countries
often face cultural, religious, political, and societal divisions that hinder the progress and success
of their efforts. As one activist mentioned:
When activists from different countries sit and talk with each other, it’s a huge vote for
both sides. Because I’ve seen a lot of problems for women in Iran…But now I see a lot of
problems that are very specific to women in America. Like sexism, this objectification, all
these things that we didn’t have over there….But if there was an opportunity we could
share, I think it would bring knowledge to both sides. The way I feel is that a dynamic right
now is that a women’s rights activist for America working for this country thinks she knows
better about the whole world. They talk about Afghanistan, Afghan women, like they know
better what’s going on over there. And I just think it’s harmful for both sides because
….they try to apply their local solutions for it and it absolutely doesn’t work. Things fall
apart (Interview by Catherine Sameh as cited in Sameh 2014, 178).
Nonetheless transnational feminism can prove to be very vital if the diaspora community is utilized
in such a way that was illustrated in the three points previously mentioned. It can be argued that
transnational feminism has attributed to the strength garnered by the campaign as well as the
progression of women’s rights in Iran. Additionally, the diaspora community assists in making a
movement transnational because typically the community helps garner attention of the members
from their host country which often results in an information spillover to neighboring communities
and countries.
Is Transnational Feminism Successful in Contemporary Iran? Why or Why Not?
It is challenging to clearly define what a success is in terms of the movements discussed
herein. In the case of the IWSF, one could argue that the movement is deemed a success because
the intended goals were to be more globally informative in an effort to create platforms for activists
within diaspora communities and within Iran to communicate with one another about gender
related issues and such goals were achieved. While the IWSF may have not made direct
constitutional changes, it opened a portal of communication between women residing in different
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parts of the world in order to share stories of hardships faced by women in Iran. This in turn,
perhaps inadvertently, assisted in preventing issues with overgeneralizations often espoused by
women’s rights groups in outside countries. However, one could argue that the IWSF faced its
own limitations with the internal struggles within its campaign. The lack of cohesiveness caused
contention which resulted in many members withdrawing from the movement and limited its
influence as a movement.
In the case of the SSFC, female activists in Iran embraced transnational feminism and
utilized it to the best of their advantage. While their initial efforts used door-to-door and face-toface methods to spread information within the country, members of the campaign knew that in
order to place substantial pressure on the Iranian government one would have to involve the
international community – thus, they embarked on using technological advancements at their
behest to create a spillage of information throughout the world. This not only resulted in an
international outcry, but it creates a subsidiary campaign that raised awareness on the issue of
stoning in Iran and other countries as well. While this offshoot to the SSFC has not been able to
eradicate stoning in all countries, both movements have undoubtedly created a plethora of
information and raised substantial awareness to the cause. Many countries, including Iran, have
crackdown on acts of stoning – which is a success in it of itself. The SSFC would arguably not
have been as successful as it was had it not been for the efforts put forth by the transnational
organizations and the international recognition.
In the case of the OMSC, there are some that would argue this movement was a success,
while others may argue that is a failure. Unfortunately, OMSC was not able to collect the one
million signatures needed to successfully complete its first phase; this is primarily because many
of its members, especially its leaders, were arrested and repressed, which made it significantly
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challenging. In contrast, its second phase was deemed more of a success wherein it put some
pressure on the government to slightly shift some of the laws to be more in favor of women. In
2008, a bill was passed through the Majlis and approved by the Guardian Council that essentially
omitted tax provisions that would be offered to men during the course of prenuptial contracts as
well as polygamist provisions (Erdbrink 2008). It should be noted that the OMSC had a very
narrow and specific set of goals that do take a substantial amount of time to achieve. One difference
between the movement in Iran and that of Morocco is that the latter did not face arrests and torture
at the hands of the government; rather, it was able to successfully place pressure on the monarchy
and achieve its intended goals. Unfortunately, in the case of Iran, it was limited in that respect and
many of its members faced beatings, torture, and arrests.
While some scholars may disagree, one could argue that case of the OMSC illustrates that
transnationalism may have a hindering impact. The common misconception is that if it there is
enough global awareness, change will ensue; however, this case shows that sometimes global
attention may backfire. In the case of the OMSC, activists that were not a part of the diaspora
failed to remain focused on the issues and goals on hand. Specifically, many non-Iranian activists
chose to lay more attention on issues outside of the realm of the campaign; in turn this created a
significant disconnect and inaccuracy of information being presented. A secondary issue found in
the OMSC, is that activists within Iran became politically divisive. As Sameh (2012) articulated
“the campaign has contributed to what Reed and Foran (2002) have called ‘political cultures of
opposition.’ These cultures of ‘individuals, groups, and organizations’ articulate ‘plurovocal and
potentially ways of understanding’ (c, 338-339) the period they are living through” (Sameh 2012,
100). This political divisiveness and ambiguity, coupled with the substantial amount of arrests –
resulted in the dissolving of the OMSC.
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It should be noted that this movement did not lack any basic resources in order to
successfully conduct the campaign per say; they had technological tools coupled with strategic
methods in play. While they may have been limited in access to certain social media platforms,
they had significant connections outside of Iran that were able to utilize tools at their behest as
well. Moreover, activists within Iran were able to communicate readily with members of
parliament, as well as jurists, in efforts of discussing law reformations and implementing such.
The main issues that resulted in the downfall of this particular transnational feminist movement
can be boiled down to cohesiveness and integration. While the OMSC may be seen as a success
for the level of awareness it garnered, consequently it failed to meet all of its goals.
I argue that this movement was a success for two reasons. First, it had access to elites, in
particular the more progressive Majlis (7th Majlis). Having a direct line of communication and the
Majlis having been conscious of the OMSC, the movement utilized the parliament to either
propose more gender equal bills or prevent bills that were harmful to women from being passed.
There are three examples of this between the years 2006-2008. The first, was already previously
mentioned in this section with regard to the bill passed in 2008 that omitted tax provisions. The
second, was also in 2008 and prevented two bills that were proposed by Ahmadinejad’s
conservative government from being passed; the first would permit men to marry additional wives
without the need for permission from their wife and the second would force women to pay a tax
on the dowry (Khorasani 2009; "One Million Signatures" 2010). The third, was the presentation
of several gender equal bills including “equality of inheritance between husband and wife; the
equalization of blood-money payments across genders; the equal weighting of legal testimony;
and the legal age of punishment for children” (Khorasani 2009, 61). There was also a clear
presence of division among the progressive 7th Majlis and the overtly conservative government of
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Ahmadinejad, as well as the Supreme Leader Khamenei. Moreover, in 2009 prior to
Ahmadinejad’s controversial second term election, two progressive candidates emerged: Mehdi
Karroubi and Hussein Moussavi. Both candidates utilized the demands espoused by the OMSC
and likened movements to help orchestrate their respective campaigns and make them more gender
equality driven (Khorasani 2009). Both Moussavi and Karroubi “…shift[ed] their public positions
toward gender equality, moving away from the complementary model for male-female relations
favored by the Islamic Republic. The campaigns of both men also then vowed to support
ratification of the UN’s Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, a document that Iran’s Guardian Council has condemned as anti-Islamic” (Khorasani
2009, 3).
Based on the criteria illustrated in chapter two of this research, the OMSC had the necessary
resources to carry out the movement, had the incentive and grievances to set forth their respective
goals, had elite support from within the Majlis and more progressive politicians, had the ability to
create some change to gender unequal laws and prevent some from being passed, and had the
presence of elite division which enabled support from the regime’s opposition. Unfortunately,
despite successes in these areas, the movement failed to collect one million signatures which was
its main goal and purpose and it failed in terms of organization because it began to disintegrate
once foreign NGOs and feminist organizations became involved which caused the goals to diverge.
It would be fair to say that this movement should be deemed a success in some respects, but not
entirely.
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Conclusion and Findings
Iran has a long-standing history of women’s rights movements beginning from the 1900s
to present. After the Islamic Revolution, the women’s rights movements continued to persevere,
only this time with the assistance and support of a large diaspora population outside of Iran.
Women in the diaspora have tried to convey the needs of women in Iran through direct
communication with networks within the country, but oftentimes as a result of limitations and
restrictions, they are forced to create organizations within their host countries instead. In doing
so, women in host countries often raise awareness about women’s rights issues in Iran in hopes of
creating a more global movement.
Several aspects of the Iranian case are distinctive. First, the system to pass laws is a
challenging and complex one; in short, this process makes the prospects of passing any reform law
highly tedious and difficult because it has to be examined through the scope of Islamic jurisdiction.
Second, despite common misconceptions, women in Iran hold one of the highest education and
literacy rates in the Middle East; this is important because as Shirin Ebadi once noted, such
educated women will seldom accept mediocrity and gender inequality. Thus, despite the lack of
social and economic freedoms in some areas, women have persevered and utilized the tools they
have at their behest to further their interests. Third, as noted, Iran has a history of women’s rights
movements throughout the beginning of its history which makes these movements embedded
within its culture. Fourth, despite the limitations that have been presented thus far, Iranian women,
with the help of transnational groups in some cases, have been able to successfully make changes
to their status quo. While they undoubtedly have a lot more progress ahead of them, they have
created a stellar platform for future movements to come. Despite its uniqueness, then, the Iranian

165

case is broadly suggestive of the potential – and limitations – of transnational feminism to effect
change.
It is unclear what influence transnational feminists hold for women still residing in Iran,
but it is clear that their efforts are highly pervasive. In some cases, Iranian activists in the diaspora
believed that it wasn’t necessary to have direct communications with groups in Iran, but rather it
was more important to raise awareness about the social issues within the confines of the host
country and surrounding regions (Noor 2014). While these movements are a step in the right
direction for change, they seldom yield results on their own. It would be a disservice to activists
within Iran to attribute any success solely to these transnational feminist groups – rather it should
be seen as a joint effort. On one hand you have the diaspora that helps disburse information in
ways that is otherwise not readily available to activists in Iran and on the other hand you have
members of campaigns within Iran that are working first hand with important members of
legislation in hopes of creating reforms. Moreover, women in Iran have the capabilities of going
door-to-door throughout their respective neighborhoods and cities and being able to interview their
fellow women to get their first-hand experiences and concerns – a tool that women in the diaspora
communities are not able to do.
One drawback that one faces with these campaigns is the presence of clashing political and
religious opinions between the diaspora community and citizens in Iran, which has led to a lack of
cohesion within movements. When discussing the diaspora in Southern California, Mostofi (2003)
states that:
These immigrants are, for the most part, products of the Pahlavi era, in that they were
economically prosperous, inclined to Western influence, and belonged to Iran’s newly
formed, predominantly secular middle class. They were the majority class in Iran who not
only immigrated with the principles of Westernization, secularization, urbanization, and
modernization but also with traditional ‘Persian’ and anti-Islamic, therefore anti-Muslim,
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ideals. They immigrated to Southern California prior to or soon after the Islamic
Revolution. They came to the United States as professional or entrepreneurial immigrants
living in exile while creating an identity in diaspora based on these notions (683)
Moreover, in some cases, activists and members of campaigns find it incredibly difficult to
communicate with the diaspora as some of them are against their campaign efforts proclaiming
that it only heightens ties with the Islamic regime (Sameh 2014). Nonetheless, despite such
limitation, the post-Islamic Revolution movements have been able to create some successful
changes with the help of transnational feminist groups.
When examining the movements presented in this chapter, one could assert that the
diaspora serves as a tool for success just as much as it can be a path to failure. In some cases, the
diaspora has worked closely with movements in Iran, but in other cases it has diverged with regard
to goals and perspectives; this in turn has resulted in tension and lack of cohesiveness which
negatively impacts the likelihood for success. One thing that should be noted with the movements
addressed in this chapter is that in all three, the movements were able to communicate with
legislatures and judiciaries in hopes of creating reforms; some were more successful than others.
Moreover, it appears when there is divisiveness among the elites, as was seen with the case of
OMSC, activists are able to utilize that to their benefit by opening a line of communication with
the regime’s opposition, as well as the parliament.
Each of the movements discussed in this chapter were not entirely successful, but had
elements of success. The SSFC was able to raise international awareness which placed significant
pressure of the Iranian government to eradicate stoning; while there has not been legislation passed
on this, there haven’t been any new reports of stoning since 2009. While the OMSC was unable to
collect the one million signatures required, they were able to push for legislation and prevent
legislation that would disenfranchise women to be passed. The IWSF lacked a concrete goal that
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would change legislation, but it was able to create speaking platforms to discuss pertinent issues
women face – which was their sole purpose and goal. It seems that the IWSF had the least amount
of success in achieving cohesiveness among the diaspora which consequently resulted in its
disintegration. Similarly, OMSC had issues of divisiveness between its Iranian based activists and
the non-Iranian activists abroad that attempted to push their own agendas which resulted in some
setbacks for the movement. Moreover, the transgressive element did help aid the success as the
ability to utilize the resource from activists abroad was key to leaking information out about the
goals and incentives for the movement. In the next chapter, there will be discussion of how
contained and transgressive contention worked in the cases of Argentina. Unlike Iran, Argentina
had both forms of contention between the 1970s to present because of its frequent transitions of
regime types.
The next chapter will discuss a historical account of feminism and gender equality in
Argentine history from the late 1800s to the early 1970s. Thereafter, I will discuss each of the
Argentine movements that developed into TFNs. I will address the same points seen with the case
of Iran, but there will be a lack of the diaspora effect. This is done to see if movements are more
successful without the intervention of the diaspora network and if transnational feminism
movements are more successful through the help of NGOs and feminist groups that have no direct
ties to a country. In the case of Iran it appeared that the ones that were involved often clashed with
Iranians in Iran or in some cases, even with the diaspora community. In the case of Argentina, I
will examine the interaction of these NGOs and feminist networks and activists in Argentina to
see if there is cohesiveness or contention.
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Chapter 5:
Argentina: A Historical Overview, 1890s to 1970s
Introduction
Similar to the case of Iran, the history of women’s rights movements in Argentina is full
of complexities. Since the start of the 1800s, various factors contributed to the rise of female
activism and in some cases transnational feminist endeavors; such factors included shifts in
economic opportunities and an influx of immigrants that brought with them their own norms and
ideals. As seen in the case of Iran, there were divides among Argentine women; on one hand,
some women wanted to be freed from patriarchal standards and wished to create an equal platform
between genders, while on the other hand women wished to keep ties to domestic roles and
conservative norms. As will be seen throughout this chapter, these two mentalities substantially
clashed with one another for decades. In addition to this, the high levels of migration to Argentina
from southern Spain and Italy in the early 20th century brought with it new political ideologies
such as Anarchism and Socialism, both of which significantly impacted labor but also feminist
movements (Baer 2012, 107-112). Moreover, many feminist groups outside of the country, such
as those in the Spain, the United States, France, and Italy, influenced groups within Argentina to
form their own sister organizations and at times work with their affiliates abroad to further heighten
the success of their activities and goals.
Between the years of the 1890s to 1940s, Argentina witnessed various movements ranging
from socialist feminism, to anarchist feminism and efforts to promote gender equality. These
groups tackled a multitude of efforts including suffrage rights and reforming a Civil Code that not
only treated women as second class citizens, but made them to some degree crippled by their
husbands, unable to have any control over their own decisions, wages, and properties.
Unfortunately, it wouldn’t be until the Perón era where women would see the most changes; this
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is not to say that the successes that occurred during this era were solely as a result of the Perón
government, but rather because of decade’s worth of efforts put forth by various feminist groups.
The remainder of the chapter will consist of a historical overview of feminist emerged
during the period spanning from the 1890s to the 1940s, with frequent communication among
feminist groups in Argentina, Uruguay and Chile, each of which monitored the others’ progression
in women’s rights endeavors. Moreover, the influx of European immigration from countries such
as Spain, Italy, and France created significant influence on a social and political sphere that shaped
many feminist groups in Argentina. It is crucial to study this period as it illustrates how feminism
and feminist acquisitions emerged within the country and how later such efforts transformed into
bigger transnational endeavors. Chapter Six of this dissertation will be dedicated to detailed
historical accounts, speeches, and interviews of the aforementioned transnational feminist
campaigns, their goals, their impacts, and whether they were deemed successful or not.
The Emergence of Argentine Feminism: 1890s to 1940s
The endeavors of feminist efforts in Argentina can be seen as early as the mid to late1800s.
During the end of the nineteenth century, Argentina’s sentiments towards anarchism and socialism
heightened as a large inflow of immigrants, predominantly from Europe had increased; immigrants
from these states brought with them sentiments of socialism and anarchism, which was often the
driving force for their migration to begin with, due to the fact that these ideals were not accepted
within their home countries (Molyneux 1986; Rock 1975; Abad de Santillan 1930; Ferns 1960;
Bourde 1974; Carlson 2005). Additionally, Argentina began experiencing a substantial increase
in economic growth coupled with a developing labor movement, which further led to calls for
changes in the class structure (Molyneux 1986; Quesada 1979).
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Argentina, like many countries, faced issues surrounding gender inequality and inequity
which resulted in feminist movements and demands for female emancipation. Unlike other
developing countries, however, Argentina did not have issues pertaining to education and literacy
rates; rather, education was relatively accessible for both women and men, at least for those who
were middle and upper class177 (Molyneux 1986; Little 1978).178 Women faced discrimination
within the work force, particularly in regards to lower wages and longer work hours in contrast to
their male counterparts.179 Unfortunately, data showing how many immigrant women comprised
the working class during this time period is unavailable; nonetheless, there is substantial evidence
providing that wages for women were significantly lower than that of men and that there was
discontentment present as a result of this gap.180 As a result of this ever-growing gender bias,
women began forming movements and social platforms to voice their concerns and disdain
towards societal norms for their gender.
During the end of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century,
Argentina’s feminists transitioned through three distinct movements. In the beginning, one sees
the pertinent, albeit brief, momentum of the anarchist feminist. The anarchist feminists were
unique in their own right because to a certain degree, they stood against the many ideals professed
by other feminist groups. One such ideal, the role of the woman at home, was commonly addressed
in anarchist feminist rhetoric; in this case, the anarchist feminist argued that a woman was unable
to perform her domestic duties because she was forced to work and support her family in a class
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This is not to say that education was always easily accessible to women as to that of men. Rather, there were
movements that demanded for the accessibility of primary and secondary schools for girls. Moreover, poorer classes
as a whole did not have access to education as girls in middle and upper classes. In fact, many anarchist feminists
strived to create equal access to education so it was still an issue for some socioeconomic classes, but not as
pertinent of an issue as it is in other developing countries
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structure dominated by bourgeois elitists and a society that was male driven. The socialist feminist
which emerges towards the end of the nineteenth century highlighted the issues of social class
structures as well and that the labor market hindered the rights of women, men, and children alike.
In contrast to their anarchist counterparts, socialist feminists strived to achieve gender equality.
Similar to that of socialist feminism, liberal feminists in Argentina strived for gender equity and
equality, coupled with a shift in the status quo and the role of women within their societies. To
better understand these three dynamics, this section will illustrate how each began and transformed
overtime.
The End of the Nineteenth Century: Anarchist Feminism and La Voz de la Mujer
Anarchist feminism is both controversial and critical to the history of feminism in
Argentina for a few reasons. On the one hand, some members strived to break free of traditional,
religious, and societal norms established against women, while on the other hand some members
wanted to make domestic responsibilities more readily feasible for women. Moreover, anarchism
has not always gone hand in hand with feminism; rather, many male anarchists at this time were
stoutly against feminist rhetoric which in some cases created divisions within anarchist groups
(Molyneux 1986). Anarchist feminists, as will be illustrated throughout this section, argued that
women were oppressed within two realms: domestic and labor. Under the domestic realm women
were often subjected to forced marriages wherein they experience stages of emotional, physical,
and sexual abuse.181182 In the labor realm, anarchist feminists voiced their discontent against
unequal pay and unequal work hours in contrast to that of their male counterparts and that such
inequalities made it challenging for them to perform their day-to-day domestic duties as wives and
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mothers. During this period, women voiced their concerns in magazines and newspapers. During
the peak of anarchism in the country in the early 1890s, male anarchists wrote propaganda
pamphlets that addressed social emancipation for women, but disregarded women’s plight in the
labor force and the inequality they were subjected to in employment relationships (Lavrin 1989).
In addition to the pamphlets, newspaper articles emerged that would slightly address these labor
issues but highlighted the social and domestic inadequacies women were subjected to even more
so. One of the most notable anarchist feminist endeavors was a newspaper published in 1896,
which was founded by Virginia Bolten entitled La Voz de la Mujer.183 The piece was dedicated to
both feminism and anarchism – the first of its kind in Argentina.
Arguably, La Voz could be seen as one of the first transnational feminist efforts in
Argentine history. Although the publication was concerned primarily with creating awareness of
the plight of Argentine women, it also tried to diffuse anarchist sentiments espoused by Spanish,
Italian, and French immigrants. La Voz had a distinct motto: “ni dios, ni patrón, ni marido” or as
it is translated “no god, no master, no husband”184 (Molyneux 1986). While the periodical has
been heralded as the first feminist publishing in Argentina, this claim is not entirely accurate as
historians have uncovered prior publications that contained feminist themes.185 However, La Voz
is unambiguously the first anarchist feminist publishing within the country. Because education
was readily available to most women and literacy rates were relatively high, the publication
garnered a wider audience among women in higher socio-economic brackets;186 however, it
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Referred to as La Voz hereto
Introduction, La Voz de la Mujer, 1896
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In 1830, Al Jaba was published. It centered on issues pertaining to education for girls and ensuring that schools
would mandate policies that would offer primary and secondary education to females. This newspaper has also been
noted as the first feminist newspaper publishing; In 1852 La Camilia was published and in 1854 La Educación was
published which again tackled issues centered on education for girls (Molyneaux 1986)
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It is noteworthy to mention that some of this can be attributed to the anarchist run schools which were free and
completely separate from government and church run education systems (Carlson 2005)
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should be noted that the goal of the publication was not to create a mass movement but rather to
create a small collective of individuals capable of implementing societal and economic change,
coupled with the effort of shifting the roles of women to make it easier for them to conduct their
domestic duties (Molyneux 1986).
La Voz discussed the ongoing suffering and lamentations expressed by women and
encouraged women to break free of such normality and pen their concerns to paper:187
Long evenings of work and suffering dark and horrific days without bread…it has been
necessary for us to feel the dry and shrieking cry of our hungry children, so that we would
grow tired of such misery and suffering, we have decided to let our voices be heard, no
longer in the form of lament of supplicating complaint, but in a vibrant and energetic
demand. Everything belongs to everyone188.
The newspaper encouraged women to take charge of their own “life, body, and sexuality.”189 The
writers addressed a wide array of societal issues women face including but not limited to “an end
to unequal and restricted opportunities for women, discrimination against women at work,
domestic slavery, unequal access to education, and men’s uncontrolled sexual demands upon
women” as well as an “abolition of marriage” (Molyneux 1986, 141). While the themes of their
concerns resonated with Argentinian and immigrant women within the country, the tone and
expressions caused disconnect between the writers and some of their readers. Moreover, their male
constituents within the anarchist field reprimanded and scrutinized writers of La Voz for their tone
and abrasiveness (Lavrin 1998). The female writers of La Voz responded to their critics by
stating190:
When we (despicable and ignorant women) took the initiative to publish “La Voz de la
Mujer”, we already suspected it, oh modern rogues! That you should receive our initiative
187

The following is a translation from the original text in Spanish
Martinez, Josefa M.R.,“Nuestros Propositos”, La Voz de la Mujer, 8, January 1896
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with your mechanic and accustomed philosophy because you should know that we stupid
women also have an initiative and this a product of thought; you know, we also think. The
first issue of the “La Voz de la Mujer” appeared, and of course there was Troy!191 “We are
not worthy of so much! No Sir! “Emancipate the women?”, “for what?” “What female
emancipation?” “Let our emancipation come first and then we ‘men’ are emancipated and
are free, we will see then192

La Voz was only printed for a year, and while there were efforts made to expand the newspaper to
neighboring countries such as Uruguay, it was not able to do so. The demise of the newspaper can
be attributed to three distinct flaws. First, while it was vocal about pertinent issues that women
faced within the state, it did very little to discuss what should be implemented to create change.
Instead, the newspaper opted for passionate speeches that highlighted the role of women in society
as being nothing short of a sexual slave to one’s husband and a slave to one’s labor. While their
notions were sound, their methods failed to rally enough individuals to create change nor did they
attempt to propose ideas that would implement such change. Secondly, while La Voz, despite
claiming that labor equality was a pertinent issue , seldom incorporated discussions of class and
labor issues within their publications. While some of their publications made mention of the long
strenuous and hours women had to work in order to feed their children, they did not give detailed
accounts of the labor conditions, low wages, and long hours nor did they make that the focal points
of their discussion (Lavrin 1998). Finally, the newspaper significantly limited itself by only
publishing and submitting copies within Buenos Aires, and arguably the cities of Rosario, and La
Plata193. While literacy rates for women in Argentina were relatively equal to that of men that did
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This is a way of referencing that havoc erupted and there was a sense of chaos due to the publishing of the piece.
Barcla, A. Aparecio Aquello! La Redaction. La Voz de la Mujer, 31, January 1896
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newspaper was supposed to re-emerge in Uruguay, but such attempts failed and never occurred
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not mean that all women in Argentina had access to this newspaper as it was not distributed
throughout the country.
The Beginning of the Twentieth Century: Emergence of Socialist Feminism
The Argentine Socialist Party
Formed in 1896, the Argentine Socialist Party served as one of the flagbearers for early
notions of feminism, gender equality, and suffrage in the 20th century (Mead 2000; Mead 2001;
Lavrin 1989; Walter 1977; Adams 2014). One of the unique facets of the Socialist Party is that the
endeavors the party committed towards female emancipation and equality were done so by both
the female and male members. While it faced its critics within the Catholic Church, the Socialist
Party was one of the first organizations to request a reform within the Civil Code (Adams 2014).
The Civil Code, which was first enacted in 1871, set forth various restrictions on married women
and women as a group. In one instance, the Civil Code barred women from being “…witnesses to
public instruments” and mentions other prohibited individuals including “unemancipated
persons”, “insane persons”, “the blind”, “persons who do not know how to sign their names” and
others.194 In other instances the Civil Code discusses the outcome of rape -- which is possibly one
of the more alarming parts written at that time:
If the offense should consist of rape or abduction, the indemnity shall consist in the
payment of a sum of money to the woman aggrieved, if she has not contracted marriage
with the delinquent. This provision applies also when the offense consists of carnal
copulation with the use of violence or threats against any chaste woman, or the seduction
of a chaste woman under eighteen years of age.195
In this example, the law allowed men to satisfy a rape charge through monetary compensation and
is exempt if the act is committed by a woman’s spouse – both of which are demeaning to the status
194
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of women. Other sections of the Civil Code prevented women from making donations unless they
obtained the consent of their husbands196, prevented women from having property rights unless
they obtained the consent of their husbands197, and prevented women from having prescriptive
rights without the consent of their husbands.198 Essentially, without their husband’s permission,
women were not permitted to retain their own properties, retain their own income, integrate into
the labor market, and/or witness any legal documentation of any sort (Lavrin 1986).
As such, the Socialist Party highlighted these shortcomings in terms of how they
disenfranchised females in the realm of the domestic and social spheres, as well as the labor sphere.
One of the leading faces of the Socialist Party was Alicia Moreau, wife of Juan Justo, the founder
of the Socialist Party and a leading activist and writer (Lavrin 1986). Much like many of her other
cohorts, Moreau highlighted the importance of female emancipation in the labor force and
economy. Moreau placed heavy emphasis on education of all women, because in her view
education could pave the way to many other rights (Rappaport 2001). Later, Moreau would argue
for female suffrage rights “…especially for working women, precisely because worked and paid
taxes” (as quoted in Lavrin 1989, 98). During the 1930s, Moreau created an organization that was
dedicated solely to the attainment of female suffrage and was called the Socialist Women’s
Suffrage Committee (Rappaport 2001); this movement unfortunately was not deemed a success as
some women were proponents to universal female suffrage and believed that illiterate women
should be exempt from voting (Rappaport 2001).
Similarly, another prominent member of the Socialist Party, Alfredo Palacios, created the
Socialist Women’s Center which did not just focus on labor questions, but addressed all aspects
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for female equality (Chetcoff 1918; Hammond 2004). The Socialist Women’s Center was similar
to the National Council of Women, which will be discussed later in this chapter, in it that it
“…created facilities to instruct mothers in modern child care and hygiene” and subsequently
“petitioned Congress on issues such as the limitation of alcohol sales and the right to divorce”
(Hammond 2004, 56). One of Palacios’ biggest goals was the reform of the Argentine Civil Code
which he entitled the “Palacios Project” (Congreso Nacional 1902; Hammond 2004). It should be
noted that Palacios did not want to take an extreme feminist approach, but rather rectify the
imperfections found within the Civil Code:
Palacios also specifically rejected ‘declamatory and exaggerated feminism’ that sought to
establish ‘a perfect equality that the natural conditions of [women’s] personality prevents.’
Instead, he merely wanted to correct the outdated and ‘irritating’ inequalities contained in
the Civil Code. In the process of making his case for reform….the source of his arguments
and his reform proposal clear – ‘this project was formulated by the feminist center’”
(Hammond 2004, 60-61).
Undoubtedly, Palacios’ efforts were an important step in feminist and women’s rights history
within the country.
While the Socialist Party was one of the earliest advocates of female equality and
emancipation, there have been debates concerning its motives. On one hand, members such as
Palacios strived to create true, unequivocal equality in all dimensions for women for their own
betterment within society, while on the other hand other members of the party did not wish to
diminish the traditional patriarchal role of a woman (Lavrin 1986; Lavrin 1989; Hammond 2004;
Hammond 2011). The latter group’s strategy was similar to the approach adopted in La Voz as well
as La Protesta.
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La Protesta
While La Voz may not have been the quintessential success story for the collaboration of
anarchism and feminism within Argentina, it certainly did not hinder the perseverance of anarchist
feminists within the country. During the beginning of the twentieth century, Argentina witnessed
a shift towards more progressive factions within both anarchist and socialist groups – both of which
aimed to change the status quo and roles of women. Some of the most notable anarchist feminist
groups that emerged at the peak of the twentieth century were Federación Obrera Argentina
(FOA) and Federación Obrera Regional Argentina (FORA), both of which had strong ties to one
of the most prominent newspapers published for anarchist feminists, La Protesta Humana or
simply La Protesta.
First established in 1897, La Protesta was not a newspaper dedicated solely to the cause of
women, but it did discuss their untimely plight in many instances (Thompson 1984; Lavrin 1989;
Baer 2015). While its tenets were to discuss the dire economic and labor situations faced by both
genders and to raise awareness of political atrocities committed against their own members or
individuals affiliated with anarchism and socialism, La Protesta became one of the most pivotal
platforms for feminist outcries at the time and served as a useful tool for women that wished to
pen the struggles of women both domestically, socially, and within the labor unions (Lavrin 1989).
La Protesta told stories of women that were forced to work long hours, predominantly night-shifts,
while receiving lower wages in poor working conditions (Lavrin 1998). As noted, La Protesta also
garnered the attention of members of the FOA.199 In addition, one of the most notable anarchist
poets and intellectuals of the time, Pietro Gori, published in this venue and supported an end to
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night shift work for both women and children – ideals that had been previously addressed but often
ignored (Oved 2017; Lavrin 1998). However, Gori’s discourse reflected paternalism and
protectionism that focused on women’s chastity and vulnerability as mothers. Indeed, in 1901,
Gori stated “…women should be prohibited from working in those areas which could be dangerous
to maternity and which could undermine their morals” (as quoted in Molyneux 1986, 129).
Gori’s arguments notwithstanding, members of the FOA adopted progressive positions,
including a vote “…to support equal pay for women and the organization of women workers”
(Lavrin 1998, 265). Arguably, La Protesta was influential in these FOA votes by illustrating the
magnitude of women’s issues within the labor force the way that La Voz and other newspapers and
pamphlets could not.
Women’s Exposition of 1898
During the Colombian Exposition in Chicago, women from various parts of the world
displayed centuries worth of accomplishments in art, science, education, and other fields;
unfortunately, Argentina did not participate in the exhibition and nor did the Argentine state offer
them the opportunity to do so. This was troubling for many individuals, most notably a professor
at the University of Buenos Aires, Dr. Ernesto Quesada. Dr. Quesada was so disturbed by the lack
of support for Argentine women, especially those who had achieved accomplishments in art and
medicine that he orchestrated the Women’s Exposition in 1898 in hopes of rectifying the disservice
done to Argentine women (Carlson 2005). With the support of nearly twenty women’s
organizations, the Women’s Exposition was to display the biggest accomplishments including
crafts, ads, art, and charitable services (Mercer 1998).
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Unfortunately, this exhibition did not display the work of Argentine women as other
countries were able to do so; Argentine women did not partake in the exhibition in astounding
numbers as women from other countries did. While women in Argentina could have presented
their various accomplishments in the arts, which Dr. Quesada vocalized was one of their greater
achievements, they did not do so. Dr. Quesada reasoned that this was due to a lack of self-worth
within the female population200 (Carlson 2005). Moreover, Dr. Quesada believed that such selfworth had to be instilled from within the country; in other words, if society was espousing that
women were nothing more than moral, domesticated wives and mothers, their other qualities
became diminished and viewed as unimportant. As a result, Argentine women did not have the
necessary support. Dr. Quesada was a pioneer for women’s rights movements in Argentina and
had given significant lectures highlighting the importance of gender equality. During such lectures,
Dr. Quesada advised “women of Argentina to work first on an educational program and, after they
have attained equality before the law, then to take up the matter of political equality” 201
During his speech entitled La Cuestión Femenina, which he delivered at the Exposition, he
highlighted how women had evolved over time and how independence has made the female even
more important and great (Quesada 1898). Additionally, he noted that while there were success
stories of liberators (e.g., Joan of Arc), there are many women that are unable to live to their
potential because they are limited by societal norms (Quesada 1898). Dr. Quesada was one of
many Argentine progressivists that strived to shift the status quo of women. Nonetheless, while he
espoused equality for women, he stressed that he did not wish to diminish the domestic role of
women – in other words, while women should be offered equal pay and equal opportunity, they
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should not try to change their duties as wives and mothers (Carlson 2005). Quesada believed that
women could and should play crucial roles both domestically and publicly (Quesada 1898).
While the exposition was not a success by the Argentine women,202 it did focus necessary
attention on the many plights and issues women faced within Argentina. Moreover, it moved some
female activists towards affiliating with more progressive groups within the country. One of the
most notable of these groups is that of the National Council of Women – which was inspired and
bolstered by European and North American states.
National Council of Women
Perhaps one of the most effective movements created during the late nineteenth century to
early twentieth century was that of the National Council of Women. This particular movement can
also be seen as a transnational feminist effort for two reasons: 1) it was an extension of an
organization created in France, but influenced many countries and as a result created other
branches throughout the world; and 2) the establishment of this group within Argentina was done
through transnational efforts and appeals. Created as an offshoot of the International Council of
Women (ICW), first created in Paris, the National Council of Women was founded by Isabel King.
In 1896, King requested sponsorship at the behest of the government and then President Uriburu’s
wife to launch this branch of the ICW, but her requests were left unanswered (Grierson 1902;
MacLachlan 2006). As a result, King turned to female members of other women’s groups to assist
in her endeavors. In doing so, she gained the attention of two prominent women’s rights activists,
Jean Thompson Raynes and Cecilia Grierson.203 In 1899, the two traveled to London where they
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One should note that by success, I mean that in terms of having an impact for Argentine women and being able to
present the region and the world with accomplishments Argentine women have. I also mean success in terms of
female participation and attendance in comparison to women from other Latin American countries
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Cecilia Grierson was a prominent figure in her time. She was the first woman to graduate medical school in Latin
America, having done so by disguising herself as a man. Grierson became a key figure in women’s rights activism in
Argentine history as well as in the field of Medicine.

182

attended the ICW (International Council of Women). There, Grierson was inspired by European
ideology towards women and the progressivism she witnessed, so much so that she wanted to
create an offshoot of the movement in Argentina (Carlson 2005; MacLachlan 2006). As Carlson
observes:
The membership appeared to heed the ICW’s motto which was the Golden Rule: ‘Do unto
others as you would have others do unto you.’ She was impressed also by the discussions,
which dealt with philosophy, education, temperance, women in industry, the interests of
professional women, women’s clubs, legal and political matters and the question of a single
moral standard for both sexes which would put an end to legalized prostitution (Carlson
2005, 91).
Upon returning to Argentina, Grierson embarked on gathering support from the government, clubs,
and organizations. During the course of her search for provision, Grierson approached the idea
with then president of the Beneficent Society,204 Alvina Van Praet de Sala205 who agreed (Bonner
2004, Carlson 2005; MacLachlan 2006; Hammond 2004; Michelotti 2013).
Alvina Van Praet de Sala was named as president of the National Council of Women,
whereas Grierson became one of five vice-presidents (Carlson 2005, 95; MacLachlan 2006). One
of the more notable goals of the society was to pave the way of education of all women. In the city
of Rosario and La Plata, the organization built libraries and “…courses were given there in
secretarial and other vocational skills, in first aid, child care and languages” (Carlson 2005, 95).
As such, the NCW placed efforts on education of women as it would enable them to achieve a
higher status in society along with respect (Carlson 2005; Bonner 2007). Another leading endeavor
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women, and hospitals designated to women. The Beneficent Society did not permit religious elites to run these
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section.
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was that of maternity leave. Van Praet de Sala proposed that should be given a month of maternity
leave (two weeks before labor and two weeks after), to which many of the professional members,
including Cecilia Grierson and Elvira Rawson, of the NCW believed should be extended to paid
maternity leave and “…called on the government to provide funds for extensive maternity leave
and benefits, including social services” (Carlson 2005, 99). Nonetheless, many of their meetings
were deemed as problematic and counterintuitive. As such, the members of the NCW drafted a bill
which they submitted to the Argentine Congress for review; unfortunately in 1906, the bill was
rejected (Carlson 2005). This was not the last of attempts for the movement to create reforms
through congress. In 1908, the NCW along with three other organizations206submitted a bill to
congress that would legalize the act of trafficking or selling prostitutes207 (Carlson 2005; Mirelman
1973; International Survey Committee 1932); this bill was later rejected by Congress as well.
While the movement was garnered towards the betterment of women and the inclusion of
women within society, it is likely debatable as to whether or not it should be considered a feminist
endeavor. Firstly, Grierson did not wish to make suffrage one of the tenets of the organization208;
this was in part due to the fact that certain men had not gained suffrage rights yet, thus it was
implausible to demand women’s suffrage when that was the case (Carlson 2005; Rappaport 2001;
Grierson 1902; Hammond 2011). Moreover, Van Praet de Sala and her supporters believed that
the idea of female suffrage had direct ties to feminism and atheism, and as such would never be
embraced by the organization (Carlson 2005). This raised issues in the eyes of the ICW as it

Jewish Association for the Protection of Girls and Women, Young Women’s Christian Association, and
Association against the White Slave trade
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This was in large part introduced by the Jewish Association for the Protection of Girls and Women as there had
been many cases of young Jewish girls being trafficked from Europe in hopes of reaching Argentina, only to be sold
to brothels later on (Mirelman 1973)
208
This is not to say that she did not feel suffrage was important. On the contrary, Grierson had dedicated many
years to fighting for suffrage rights (Rapaport 2001)
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believed suffrage was one of its global tenets and all of its subsidiary groups had to strive for such
ideals within their home countries. As such, the ICW raised its concerns with the NCW and asked
that suffrage be incorporated into their tenets; the NCW responded by stating that simply that the
discussion of suffrage was too early because women still had many other issues and hurdles to
overcome before they could even think of approaching the idea of voting (Adams 2014).
Secondly, the NCW’s president, Van Praet de Sala, refused to embrace feminist tenets,
particularly ones espoused in ICW organizations within North America and Europe. She reasoned
that the term “feminism” was directly associated with atheism, thus in an effort to avoid such a
comparison, Van Praet de Sala incorporated religion into each of the NCW meetings which
included having a priest present during every session (Grierson 1910; Bonner 2007). The more
educated and professional members of the NCW felt that the approaches taken by Van Praet de
Sala and her supporters were far too lax and not geared towards the betterment of social and
economic depravities women faced (Grierson 1910; Bonner 2004; Bonner 2007). Members of the
professional class were highly astute and more aligned with the European ideals of feminism, while
the philanthropist members believed the norms and morals in Argentine society were far different
and required an alternative approach – one that appeared to be more symbolic in gesture than
anything else. Rather than create contention, in 1902 Grierson and other members of the
professional class formed the Argentine Association of University Women (AAUW) which would
later be integrated into the NCW (Carlson 2005; Rappaport 2001; Lorenzo 2016). The AAUW was
far more progressive than that of the NCW:
Such an organization, which would address the needs of women university graduates and
working women was, they said, needed now, as Argentina moved in a more progressive
era…they announced that their aim was not to revolutionize the social order, but to provide
moral support for professional women, and to preach rational feminism (Carlson 2005, 97).
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While Grierson was the member that introduced the idea of the NCW, she was rapidly flushed out
of the group which led to her departure as well as that of various other professional members in
1910 (Lavrin 1998; Grierson 1910; Bonner 2004; Bonner 2007; Hammond 2011).
Despite this setback, by the 1920s the NCW continued with its endeavors of female
education and joined another highly conservative and religious establishment, the Patriotic League
(Lavrin 1998). One diplomat praised the NCW for the lack of feminism it embraced and for
“promoting the elevation of feminine culture….as well as preparing the weaker sex for the struggle
of life. It does not pursue the noisy and aggressive emancipation envisioned by some feminist
propaganda, as extreme as it is absurd” (Lavrin 1998, 259). This acknowledgement in it of itself
made the status of NCW debatable in matters concerning the benefit of women; while this diplomat
regarded the efforts placed of the organization as praiseworthy, others argued that this group
substantially failed the progression of women within Argentina – especially given their platform
and ability to garner change. Moreover, the organization had the potential to garner transnational
assistance had it embraced it’s European and North American counterparts, as had previously been
the intent of its local branch founder – Cecilia Grierson; rather, Van Praet de Sala shut out any
connotations and elements of non-Argentine sentiments and thereby secluded the organization
from the ICW and other affiliates.
Argentine Association of Free Thought, National League of Women Freethinkers and the Liga
Feminista Nacional
The period of 1900 to 1920 paved the way for the emergence of some the most prominent,
educated feminists within the country. One of the leading faces of suffrage movements and
women’s rights movements in Argentina is that of Julieta Lanteri-Renshaw. She was the founder
and/or leading member of various movements throughout Argentine history including the National
Feminist Union (NFU) or National Feminist Party, Argentine Association of Free Thought
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(AAFT), and the National League of Women Freethinkers (Rappaport 2001; Hammond 2004;
Hammond 2011). Lanteri espoused a multitude of ideals including suffrage rights and the role of
men in obtaining such rights. She placed heavy responsibility on men and blamed them for the
current plight of females stating that “…they wanted [women] to be dolls, and so they became”
(as cited in Doria 1920, 23). Lanteri highlighted that men had viewed women as threats to their
political and labor status, and, as such they’ve repeatedly erected barriers that women faced;
moreover, men were afraid that the traditional patriarchal society would shift should women be
offered the opportunity to vote. She conducted a similar method to many of the ones found in
women’s groups in Iran, predominantly under the Qajar Dynasty, where she did not permit her
gender to be distinguished through a dress code; thus, Lanteri opted to wear more loose-fitted
clothing, rather than form-fitting ones (Rappaport 2001; Guy 1998).
Much like the NCW, the AAFT was formed from a parent group called the International
Association of Free thought which had subsidiary groups throughout North America and Europe
(Carlson 2005). The parent organization was attempting a transnational feminist endeavor as it
wished to build the AAFT in Argentina and hold a conference in 1910 in hopes of promoting other
Latin American countries in joining as well – particularly countries with high levels of European
immigrants (Carlson 2005). Most women that chose to join the AAFT avoided joining the NCW
because they felt the goals of the NCW did not meet their own. This was a pertinent organization
in Argentine history because it allowed women a platform to pen their concerns, shortcomings,
and demands, without being stifled or monitored as they would have been in other organizations
such as that of the NCW. Similar to the NCW and sentiments shared by Cecilia Griergson, the
AAFT did not wish to pursue women suffrage until universal suffrage was achieved – this was
much to the dismay of many feminists and some of its members (Carlson 2005):
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Most members of the AAFT wished to defer the struggle for women’s suffrage until he
achievement of universal male suffrage…The feminists wanted both goals to be sought at
the same time; it was infuriating to them that poor, ignorant men should vote while
educated women remained disenfranchised (Carlson 2005, 116).
Some of the most noteworthy contributors to the AAFT that took issue with the methods conducted
by the AAFT were Julieta Lanteri and Maria Abella de Ramirez. Ramirez was criticized
significantly for her lack of compromise and her estrangement and hostility towards male members
of the AAFT which consequently led to her downfall within the group. As previously discussed,
Lanteri was very much of the same sentiments towards her male counterparts. During her time at
the AAFT, she too targeted men which created a division and the “AAFT men were not carried
away by enthusiasm for women’s rights, and spirited debated on the subject were held” (Carlson
2005, 115). As a result, she and Lanteri started their own free-thinkers movement called the
National Association of Women Free Thinkers, which function similar to that of the AAFT but
did incorporate sentiments of women suffrage and was more aggressive in their demands.
Moreover, the Free Thinkers separated themselves from religious sentiments and backed their
beliefs through science. Both Lanteri and Ramirez hold significant places in Argentine feminist
history for their individual contributions outside of the Freethinkers society.
Like that of NCW, the Liga Feminista Nacional was a branch from a European parent
organization based out in Germany and had elements of transnational feminism. First
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by Maria Abella de Ramirez in 1910, Liga Feminista had four core tenets: obtaining divorce rights,
obtaining political rights for women, obtaining civil rights for married women, and obtaining
protective rights over childhood (Longhi 1910; Lavrin 1998). Similar to the endeavors espoused
under the Socialist Party, Liga Feminista wished to obtain equality for women in various facets
including domestic, political, and social. Additionally, Ramirez did not wish to diminish the
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traditional roles of women within patriarchal societies – she believed the role of women within the
family was vital and crucial (Rappaport 2001).
She upheld the importance of motherhood, which she felt was grossly undervalued, and
fought hard against the entrenched view that women, once married, were assumed to have
no desire for any autonomy. It was the value placed on motherhood by society that was in
need of reappraisal. Like many of her Latin American feminist contemporaries, Abella
believed motherhood to be fundamentally empowering rather than disabling. Women who
opted for this role should be protected by the state and should not have to forfeit their
economic and civil rights as a result (Rappaport 2001),
Liga Feminista, unlike the NCW, strived for female suffrage and wished to create reforms within
the Civil Code (Rappaport 2001). As such, Liga Feminista aligned itself with an international
group entitled the International Woman Suffrage Alliance (Rappaport 2001). Unfortunately,
Ramirez was not able to witness suffrage rights for women but nearly twenty years after her
passing was it established.
Similarly, Julieta Lanteri wished to create fundamental change on all platforms for women.
Lanteri had thoroughly studied the Civil Code and what it entails for universal suffrage. A closer
look at the Civil Code shows that women are technically not exempt from some of the stipulations.
For instance, one section of the Civil Code states:
Every Argentine citizen is obliged to take up arms in the defense of the country and this
Constitution, in accordance with the laws which Congress may enact to this end and the
decrees of the National Executive. Citizens by naturalization are free to render or refuse
this service during a term of ten years from the day they obtain their letters of citizenship209.
This part of the code uses the term “every” without discrimination by gender, race, or nationality,
thus one could interpret it as being all inclusive. Moreover, it would appear that in order to gain
citizenship, one would have to be enrolled in the military. As such, in 1918 Lanteri, along with the
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189

Socialist Party of Argentina, formed the National Feminist Party or National Feminist Union. Her
party focused on female suffrage as well as social, political, and labor rights (Rappaport 2001;
Hammond 2004; Carlson 2005). There, she utilized her interpretation of the Civil Code and
Constitution in an effort to highlight its ambiguity. Lanteri requested permission to serve in the
military twice, but was consequently denied by a federal judge (Rappaport 2001; Lavrin 1998).
Lanteri’s interpretation was later reviewed by a federal attorney, Horacio Larreta. Larreta reviewed
both the constitution as well as a law that was enacted in 1869 wherein he concluded that he shared
the same sentiments, that “there was no limitation by sex in either…Julieta Lanteri was simply
exercising a right guaranteed by the Constitution” (Lavrin 1998, 268). Lanteri even attempted to
present her case to the Supreme Court, but it deflected and refused to give opinion on the matter
(Longhi 1932).
1926 Civil Code Reform: A Step towards Progress
As was seen in the case of Lanteri, it became seemingly challenging for judges and other
officials to provide reasons and interpretations of why women’s emancipation could not be
plausible; especially given that a high number of women were educated, seeking education, and/or
working in the labor market (Lavrin 1978). Between the periods of 1918 to 1926, Argentine
legislatures put forth every effort in proposing reforms to the Civil Code, to which they were faced
with scrutiny and difficulties. Finally, in August 1926, the Senate as well as the Chamber of
Deputies reviewed the requested reforms and voted in favor of the changes. On September 22,
1925, the newly reformed Civil Code of Argentina210 was enacted and women were able to see
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In 1935, the Justo regime would attempt to overturn some of these reforms, particularly in cases of labor rights
for women and the rights over personal finances. The Justo administration wished to make a woman’s field of work
the choice of her husband and to ensure that any income she has is managed by her husband. Large groups of
feminists, predominantly within the Argentine Women’s Union, protested against this attempt of reversal and
successfully placed an end to it (Hammond 2011)
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progression of their status within the country (Lavrin 1978; Ireland 1933; Marotta and Parise
2014). The newly enacted Civil Code proclaimed that “an adult unmarried woman, single,
divorced, or widow, is given the same rights and civil powers as an adult man” (Ireland 1933, 161)
and the “adult married woman is given the right, without the necessity for marital or judicial
permission, to practice any honest profession, industry or business and dispose freely of her
earning and investments therein” (Ireland 1933, 161). In addition to this, woman had sole control
over their properties and they were offered custody rights over their children. Unfortunately, the
reform did not offer women suffrage, nonetheless it was a monumental achievement for women’s
rights in Argentina, especially given the decade’s worth of work that was dedicated towards
achieving these changes within the constitution to better the lives of married and single women.
This would not be the last change made to the Civil Code, rather there would be at least three more
during the years of 1936, 1954, and 1968; these reforms were not centered particularly on women’s
rights but rather abuse of rights (Marotta and Parise 2014).
While activist in the late 19th and early 20th centuries did not achieve women’s suffrage
rights, they certainly paved the way for future movements to build off of their endeavors and
potentially succeed in doing so. Movements in this period also paved the way for future
transnational feminist endeavors. During this period, there was a large influx of European
immigrants, which many of these movements utilized as examples for how they wanted their
country to shift. European immigrants brought with them sentiments of anarchism, socialism, and
feminism and as such many of the feminist and women’s rights networks utilized parent groups
abroad to help assist them in their struggle to reform the current constitution. Argentina would not
see a shift in the plight of voting rights for women until the Perón era and while this period did not
necessarily incorporate the same transnational elements, it is notable to mention as it did achieve
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what the aforementioned groups and organizations worked hard to accomplish. It should be noted
that prior to the Perón era, Argentina underwent a wave of political changes and instability and
while such shifts are critical to the historical component of the country, it goes beyond the scope
of this research to discuss them in detail.211.\ As such, the following section is strictly dedicated to
the transition to the Perón era and how this government paved the way towards reforms and gender
equality.
Perónism meets Feminism: 1946 to 1976
In 1943, the standing-in president of Argentina, Ramon S. Castillo, was overthrown by the
military as a result of ongoing charges and allegations of corruption and fraud (Wynia 1986, 14;
Hammond 2011). This was done through the help of General Arturo Rawson, who had willingly
agreed to supply the necessary soldiers to the United Officers Group (GOU)212 to ensure the coup
would be successful. Upon his overthrow, a military dictatorship ensued under the GOU which
was comprised of a small group of members, including future Argentinian president, Juan
Domingo Perón (Carlson 2005; Argentinian Nationalism 2000; Rapaport 1986; The United Press
1943; Alexander 1965; Barager 1968). During a short period, the GOU appointed General Arturo
Rawson as president, but when he failed to place GOU members within his cabinet and opted for
civilian members instead, he was quickly overthrown and replaced by General Pedro Ramirez
(Carlson 2005; Arnaldo Cortesi special Cable to The New York Times 1943; The United Press
1943; Potash 1969).

The only historical background that will be given in this section is that of how the Peron’s took power within the
country.
212
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During the Ramirez reign, Argentina shifted into a more nationalistic, anti-communist state
that pushed forward a campaign for “moral purity” (Carlson 2005; Josephs 1944; Baily 1967). The
campaign consisted of a strict ban against things that were considered overtly sexual in nature and
promiscuous; this included, lyrical tango music, soap operas, contraception, and advertisements
promoting divorce (Carlson 2005). Additionally, Argentina took a more religious turn wherein
Catholic rhetoric was enforced and mandatory in all schools (Carlson 2005). Perhaps one of the
more stringent of changes was that of the role of women within society. Under the Ramirez regime,
women were seen pure symbols that were morally superior to that of their male counterparts
(Josephs 1944; Carlson 2005). In schools, girls were taught that “the Argentine woman should
know how to jealously fulfill her natural obligations…. the dignity of woman consists in accepting
her specific bodily functions….The new Argentina wants pure, strong, and clean women” (Josephs
1944, 5-116). In line with this mentality, the government was also anti-feminist and it was seen as
a direct threat to the sanctity of the country and Catholicism (Carlson 2005). Despite these
sentiments, there were officers within the current regime that shared feminist sentiments –
particularly in regard to suffrage rights (Hammond 2011).
Unlike some members of the current establishment that viewed the role of women as
minimal at best and through the lens of patriarchy, Juan Domingo Perón saw the value of women
as both necessary and important (Carlson 2005; Hammond 2011). However, there was evidence
that Perón’s feminist sentiments were politically driven, rather than out of genuine concern for
advancement of women. During his role as the Secretariat of Labor and Provision, Perón emanated
the importance of “stability and well-being in the workplace” because as he noted “all conflict in
the workplace…not only affected the economy but also ‘destroyed the balance of social harmony,
so necessary for process of progressive evolution” (Hammond 2011, 145). In addition to this,
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Perón supported the rights of women within the workforce as well. In 1944, he created the Division
of Work and Assistance for Women (DTAM) which was geared towards married and unmarried
working women, in an effort to help better their conditions, but most importantly to strengthen the
nation.213 Perón also ensured that DTAM would offer female workers assistance, especially with
daycare facilities, as he believed that if women were rest assured that their families were taken
care of then they could place their focus on their work which would minimize any distractions or
inefficiencies (Hammond 2011; Hollander 1974).214
In 1945, Perón added a subsection within the DTAM solely dedicated to the progress of
universal suffrage entitled the Pro-Women’s Suffrage Commission (Deutsch 2012; Hammond
2011; Carlson 2005; Wellhofer 1977). That same year, Perón
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requested female suffrage by

submitting a petition to then-president Farrell. In turn, many feminists strongly opposed these
efforts for a variety of reasons. First, some activists felt that this decision was done strictly as a
politically incentivized move to help Perón win the presidency (Carlson 2005). Secondly, they felt
that a presidential decree would simply be overturned should a new president takeover, and thus
this form of suffrage would was not secure (Carlson 2005). Lastly, for decades the Socialists had
fought substantially hard for women’s rights, and they felt the sudden bold move taken by Perón
would prevent the Socialites from benefitting from their pre-existing efforts (Carlson 2005).
Feminists were also significantly divided with respect to Perón’s involvement; on one hand
some feminists welcomed this outpour of support from someone with a high position within the

“Crónica economíca: costo de la vida, trabajo y salarios,” Revista de economía y estadistica, 6:3, 1944
For a general overview of the relationship between Perón and the labor movement (a core constituency) during
this period, see Collier and Collier (1991), Ranis (1992), and Tuman (2007).
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During this period Peron was preparing to run for presidency and this particular decision was viewed as a
politically charged motive
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government, on the other hand many216 found it problematic to garner suffrage rights under a
military dictatorship, and that support stemming from this regime would forever tarnish the
suffrage movement (Hammond 2011; Hammond 2004; Hollander 1974; Deutsch 1991; Deutsch
2012). Moreover, there was a clear division between suffragists that were activists under prior
administrations and pro-Perónist feminists and suffragists; firstly, many of the suffragists
attributed themselves to the socialist, anarchist, and radical parties – all three of which were of
opposition to Perón, as well as the current military regime in power; secondly, there were
differences between socioeconomic classes. Juan Perón was steadfastly opposed to members of
oligarchy and the prior suffragists that were associated with that group (Hammond 2004;
Hammond 2011). Nonetheless, Perón strived to make women’s suffrage one of his most important
endeavors because he felt societal benefits would arise from universal voting.
Having risen in the ranks of government over the course of a few years, Juan Perón ran for
presidency, wherein he made his wife, Eva Perón, one of the leading forces of his campaign; in
fact, she appeared and spoke during his first campaign rally at the Plaza del Mayo, a move that
warranted much criticism (Carlson 2005; Hammond 2004). Eva Perón would play an important
role throughout Perón’s campaign and reign, especially with regards to women’s rights endeavors.
In February 1946, Perón won the presidency in what was deemed as Argentina’s first legitimate
election since the military regime (Hammond 2004; Hammond 2011; Crassweller and Alexander
1979; Rein 2013; Horowitz 1963; Smith 1969). Perón had garnered and rallied the support of a
substantial part of the labor movement and female population; while women could not vote, they
certainly garnered support for him. Similar to that of the reign of Mohammed Reza Shah, the

Some notable proponents to Peron’s involvement in suffrage endeavors and feminist movements were: Cecilia
Grierson, Alicia Moreau, Victoria Ocampo, and Elvira Rawson, as well as the Woman’s Center for Civic Culture
and the National Assembly of Women (Carlson 2005, 187-189)
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incentives behind gender equality and suffrage rights were debatable under the Perón
administration. While Perón exhibited interest in gaining suffrage rights, it was apparent that his
motives were not solely the betterment of the status of women, but the betterment of the country
as a whole. When discussing the importance of women’s suffrage, Perón was noted as saying “the
incorporation of women in our civic and political activities with all the rights that no are only given
to men, will be an indisputable contribution to the perfection of our civic customs” (Dos Santos
1983 3, 11).
Nonetheless, Perón became one of the leading faces for women’s suffrage and it would be
during his reign that Argentina made the most progression towards attaining it and eventually
enacting it. Upon his election, the emergence of “Perónist feminism” ensued and with it came one
of the biggest achievements for women’s rights in Argentina: suffrage. As will be later seen in
this section, Perón was met with criticism not just for his disingenuous interest in gender equality,
but because he was credited so much for a movement that was for decades a battle Socialists
committed to achieving.
Perónist Feminism and Suffrage
Shortly after Perón’s election, he and Eva presented a bill to Congress that would grant
women the right to vote (Carlson 2005; Navarro 1999). Ironically, one of the leading faces of the
Perónist feminist era was that of Juan Perón’s wife, Eva Perón or “Evita” as she is affectionately
known as by her supporters. I say ironically because contrary to how she is represented in popular
culture, Eva Perón was not an advocate of feminism. In fact, she had not been a proponent of prior
feminist groups and feminist rhetoric espoused during the late 1800s and early 1900s, some of
which were discussed throughout this chapter. In particular, she overgeneralized feminism as being
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one conducted by women that wished to be men in society, rather than accepting the roles given
to them as wives and mothers. At one point, Eva Perón was quoted as stating:
I felt that the woman’s movement in my country and all over the world had a sublime
mission to fulfill…and everything I knew about feminism seemed to me ridiculous. For,
not led by women but by those who aspired to be men, it ceased to be womanly and was
nothing: feminism had taken the step from the sublime to the ridiculous. And that is the
step I always try to avoid taking! (Perón 1951, 185-186).
In fact, Eva Perón highlighted that there was a vast difference between feminism and that of Perón
ism. While the two appeared to co-exist under Juan Perón’s reign, they were vastly different and
to a large extent, Eva’s role in the movement was an appeasement to her husband’s request – which
it in it of itself was a counterintuitive approach to feminist rhetoric. In her autobiography, La razón
de mi vida (My Mission in Life), Eva Perón states:
In this, as in everything he [Juan Perón] showed me the way. The world’s feminist will say
that to start a woman’s movement in this way is hardly feministic…to start by recognizing
to a certain extent the superiority of a man! However, I am not interested in criticism. Also,
recognizing Perón’s superiority is a different matter (Perón 1951, 182-183).
Nonetheless, Eva was utilized as a leader for the movement, and, as such, she conducted prosuffrage rallies where once again she gave speeches and spoke to the masses about the importance
of female involvement within the country (Carlson 2005). During these speeches, Eva often was
“demanding that Congress give women their due” and “promised men that, after enfranchisement,
women would not become masculine or overbearing” (Carlson 2005, 189). Eva eluded that women
that were offered voting rights would actually become more feminine and that they would become
more nationalistic placing “God, country, and Perón above their individual desires” (Carlson 2005,
189).
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In many ways, she diminished the efforts of so many of the preceding feminist activists.
While she was fighting for the right to vote for women, she substantially overshadowed the true
intentions of the prior feminist movements within the country; it was not the intent of women like
Grierson or Moreau to become men, but to create and equal platform for their gender. In fact, as
has been discussed throughout this chapter, much of the feminist movements aspired to keep the
domestic roles designated to women. Nonetheless, Eva held an important role within the
government and her sentiments seemed far less “extreme” than prior feminist groups which was
more appealing to the male constituents. Thus, on September 27, 1947, suffrage was finally
legalized for women and Law 13.010 was enacted (Carlson 2005; Duarte de Perón et al. 2015;
Wellhofer 1977; Jaquette 2018; Hammond 2004; Hammond 2011; Hollander 1974; Walter 2001).
This was one of the most pivotal moments in Argentine history for the progression of women’s
rights, albeit the motives behind it may not have been as altruistic as how some historians have
portrayed it to be. While this was a momentous period in Argentine history, one of the more
frustrating aspects of it is the credit that is often solely attributed to Eva Perón. Historians and
Perónists often overlook the decade’s worth of movements dedicated to women’s suffrage by
feminist and women’s rights organizations, at least fifty years prior to the emergence of Eva Perón
(Walter 2001).
In addition to suffrage, Eva was also credited with integrating women into politics; again,
by prior feminists in Argentina and, to some degree transnational feminist groups, had sought to
achieve the representation of women in politics. However, the political incorporation of women
during this period occurred largely as a top-down program initiated by the political regime. In
1949, Eva Perón created the Perónist Women’s Party217 as an organization that would not only
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work towards ensuring female involvement in voting, but also promote women to run for political
positions (Walter 2001; Wellhofer 1977; Hollander 1974; Meyer 1979). Though Eva Perón did
not believe in feminist antics, she did believe women should have a role in society and should have
emancipation, but in a way that did not question their domestic roles (Perón 2015). As Eva had
stated in a speech she gave on July 26, 1949, “‘[s]olamente los humildes salvarán a los humildes’,
también pienso que únicamente las mujeres serán la salvación de las mujeres” (just as the humble
will only save the humble, I think that women will only save women).218 Moreover, during another
speech wherein the Perónist Women’s Party was inaugurated, she stated:
Women are doubly victimized by all injustices…despite the great inconveniences of their
lives and the injustice with which they were treated women did not conform themselves to
be spectators, and they became actors in the most transcendent phenomenon of modern
time, the proletariat…women have not been mere spectators of the social drama. We have
been actors and we will be in the future with more intensity. We demand a part in the
struggle because we have suffered as much or more than men… (Perón 1949)
The sentiments Eva Perón espoused here and throughout the span of the Perónist Women’s Party,
was one that highlighted women’s endurance throughout Argentine history. Most important,
despite her prior sentiments, it appeared she was paving the path toward a broader liberal feminism,
which to a certain degree frightened her (Meyer 1979).
I confess I was a little afraid the day I found myself facing the possibility of starting on the
“feminist” path. What could I, a humble woman of the people, do where other women,
more prepared than I, had categorically failed? …they seemed to be dominated by
indignation at not having been born men, more than the pride of being women. They
thought too, that it was a misfortunate to be a woman….the ‘feminists’ the immense
majority of feminists in the word, as far as I could see, continue to be a strange species of
women (as quoted in Meyer 1979, 150).
While Evita may have been steadfastly against the beliefs espoused by previous feminist
groups, she did agree with them in one respect: women have been disenfranchised and undermined
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in Argentina for far too long and this had to be changed. She knew this because she herself had
fallen victim to the patriarchal society established in her country; while dying from cervical cancer,
she had tried to run for vice-president of the Perónist party, only to be blocked by elites in the
regime (Hollander 1974; Nijensohn 2015; Young 2015; Meyer 1979). Moreover, Eva Perón
created the organization with hopes of creating equality amongst the male sect of the Perón ist
branch without trying to overshadow them in the slightest (Hollander 1974); the Perónist
government was broken into three parts which included the Perón ist Women’s Party, Perónist
Men’s Party, and the General Confederation of Labor – each of which were equal to one another
(Hollander 1974, 48).
Eva wanted an organization that would give women the opportunity to voice their opinions
and needs within a political platform. In addition to this, the party was intended to intensify the
prospects for equality of women socially and economically as well (Hollander 1974; Hammond
2011; Walter 2001). For the first time in Argentine history, women would be permitted to vote so
it was important for Eva that they all partake in this historical event. As such, in 1951 there was a
tremendous voter turnout by women, the majority of which voted for Juan Perón, who
subsequently won the re-election (Hammond 2011; Meyer 1979). There are scholarly debates,
particularly among historians and anti-Perónists (See Moreau 1969) as to why so many women
voted for Juan Perón. Anti-Perónists overgeneralized the reasoning by stating because Perón gave
women the right to vote, women repaid him by re-electing him (Hollander 1974); this mentality
falls in line with the same misogynistic mentality that would state that women are readily swayed
and are followers rather than leaders. While this reasoning may or may not have been true, many
Perónist women voted for him for a multitude of reasons ranging from political affiliation to their
support of Eva Perón.
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In 1955, after four years in office with a plethora of controversies attached to his
government and the death of his wife, Eva Perón, Juan Perón faced a coup amid political
backlash219. After two failed coup attempts,220 conservative members of the Navy and Army, most
notably Eduardo Lonardi and Pedro Aramburu, conducted a successful overthrow of Juan Perón
who consequently resigned and fled to Paraguay (Lee 1969; Cavendish 2015; Mangone and
Warley 1984; Brennan 2009). Perón would reside in various Latin American countries before
settling in Spain, where he would live in exile for nearly twenty years prior to returning to
Argentina in the 1970s. Lonardi would become president of Argentina, but would soon be
overthrown after nearly two months. Soon thereafter, Lonardi was replaced with Aramburu who
would serve as Argentina’s president for nearly fifteen years until being overthrown and later
abducted and killed.; it was later revealed that the left-wing Perón ist organization, the
Montoneros221 were responsible.
In 1973, Juan Perón returned to Argentina to seize power which he did until his death.
Thereafter, his second wife Isabel Perón took over as the first female leader of Argentina. What
followed soon after this was nothing short of turmoil and a humanitarian crisis. As will be
discussed in the next chapter, soon after the presidency of Isabel Perón was established, there was
a military coup, and the Dirty War ensued which sparked years violence, murder, and forced
disappearances. It is at this point in Argentine history where we see a reemergence of feminist
and transnational feminist activities by way of the Mothers of the Plaza del Mayo. Henceforth,
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feminist and transnational endeavors took a shift from their prior objectives and goals and
addressed new issues ranging from raising awareness of missing children and grandchildren, to
obtaining abortion rights, to re-establishing the LGBTQ community, to ending violence against
women.
Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that feminist and women’s rights movements in Argentina
emerged in the mid to late 1800s, due largely to European immigrants, economic growth, and
female integration into labor markets. The influx of migration from European countries, most
notably southern Spain, Italy, Germany, and France introduced the currents of socialism and
anarchism. While the latter was not the biggest advocate for feminists, the former became one of
the leading flagbearers for gender equality and women’s rights movements. Early notions of
feminist movements can be found in works such as La Voz de la Mujer and La Protesta, both of
which tried to break ties from patriarchal mindsets and pave way for more independent women.
Later, with the emergence of the Socialist Party, one sees endeavors committed towards achieving
female emancipations and reforms against the Civil Code that disenfranchised women and
significantly diminished their roles and worth within society. This endeavor to reform the Civil
Code would be tackled by many movements hereafter.
Later during the start of the twentieth century, Argentina attempts to build a sister
organization entitled the National Council of Women, what would be a subsidiary group to the
parent organization in Europe entitled the International Council of Women. While the original
founder, Cecilia Grierson, wished to promote gender equality and follow in the footsteps of that
of the ICW, the president of the NCW would make this improbable and challenging to accomplish.
What should have been an opportunity for Argentina to embrace transnational assistance in
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achieving women’s rights, turned into a stifled attempt wherein leading members of the
organization wished to keep the patriarchal and religious norms into play. This movement could
have been one of the most successful transnational feminist endeavors in Argentina, had the
president and her supporters been more open to ICW goals; moreover, had the NCW been more
cooperative and receptive towards ICW demands, the movement would have likely garnered the
assistance it needed to create a change of status quo for women.
While Argentina would witness a plethora of women’s rights movements (Liga Feminista
Nacional, AAFT, National Feminist Union (NFU), etc.) throughout the early 1900s, real change
did not occur until the years between the 1920s to the 1940s. In 1926, the Civil Code was finally
reformed to where women gain the right to work, the right to their own property, and their right to
their own income; sadly, suffrage was still not permitted. Despite various attempts at interpreting
the Civil Code and presenting the flaws in its language, women still had a long road ahead of them
before voting rights would be extended to them.
During the 1940s, Argentina witnessed a period of political instability followed by a
military dictatorship that remained in place until the victory of Juan Perón in 1946. During this
period his wife, Eva Perón, became a notable face for women’s rights movements. Despite her
negative sentiments towards feminism, Eva Perón espoused the necessity to integrate women
within the country and the vitality in doing so. Moreover, having been a victim of sexism and
gender discrimination herself, she noted the flaws found patriarchal societies and fought against
them. Finally, in 1947, Law 13.010 was enacted which permitted women suffrage rights. While
the fight for suffrage rights was a long endeavor, first embarked by socialist and anarchist groups,
Eva Perón is often accredited with the success in its entirety – which had garnered criticism by
some anti-Perónist feminists. Eva Perón would later create the Perónist Women’s Party which
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encouraged women to register to vote and partake in political positions in an effort to make their
voices and demands heard. The party was supposed to be the female version of the Perónist Men’s
Party and an attempt to create gender equality. Although indigenous and transnational feminism
had helped lay the foundation for these gains in prior decades, suffrage came largely through
Perón’s populism, which incorporated women but in a way that limited opportunities for
advancement.
In nearly sixty years, feminists and transnational feminist groups and associations worked
hard at creating reforms within Argentine laws. In some cases, these groups wanted change but
wished to keep the domestic roles for women; while in other cases, feminist groups wished to wipe
out these gender-based roles in their entirety. While majority of the successes are seen during the
Perón era, one should not diminish the roles that prior efforts had in those successes. The various
movements that took place certainly played a role in the momentum presented during the forties
which resulted in suffrage, as well as other women’s rights accomplishments. While this historical
account may not be a parallel to the next chapter, it certainly is a critical and vital introduction to
the role of feminism and transnational endeavors within Argentina. Moreover, it introduces the
importance that migrants had in establishing ideals they brought with them from their home
countries into their host countries or in some cases how women’s organizations abroad assisted
organizations within Argentina. This phenomenon would be continued from the 1970s to present,
but with different goals and different issues.

204

Chapter 6:
Argentina: Transnational Feminism from the 1970s to Present

Within the past forty years, Argentina has witnessed a wide array of women’s feminist
movements that have evolved into transnational endeavors. To a certain extent, these movements
were also influenced by transnational activism. Such campaigns and movements focused on
crucial concerns ranging from forced disappearances in the Dirty War, to abortion, and ending
gender-based violence. The following chapter will examine transnational feminist movements that
emerged in Argentina between 1976 to the present. Specifically, the chapter will analyze three key
campaigns: The Mothers and Grandmothers of the Plaza del Mayo, which given its profound
impact and monumental efforts will be discussed at great length; the National Campaign for the
Right to Legal, Safe & Free Abortion by the Encuentro Nacional de Mujeres (National Women’s
Meeting), and Ni Una Menos (Not one Less) movement and its role in the International Women’s
Strike. Although each of these movements differed from one another, each made a significant
impact on the day-to-day lives of women within the country. I will briefly describe in an overview
why these cases played such a momentous role in Argentine history and legislation for women and
later will discuss these pivotal achievements in greater detail within each respective section.
Overview
Between the years of 1976 to 1982, Argentina succumbed to regime change and
widespread and systematic human rights violations. During what would later be known as the
“Dirty War,” Argentinians experienced state terror that was supported by the newly instated
military dictatorship, the Proceso, as well as the US-supported “Operation Condor.” During this
period, tens of thousands of political dissidents and ordinary citizens fell victim to forced
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abductions, disappearances, torture, and killings. From this stemmed the disappearance of roughly
30,000 individuals from which emerged one of the most prominent and long-standing transnational
feminist efforts: The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo. What began as a small movement among a
closely-knit group of women morphed into a transnational feminist phenomenon that spanned
across countries. The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo not only garnered international attention and
intervention, but its success also started sister movements in other Latin American countries.
Another campaign involved attempts to secure reproductive rights. In 2005, the National
Campaign for the Right to Legal, Safe & Free Abortion was created by Encuentro Nacional de
Mujeres (National Women’s Meeting) (Sutton and Borland 2018; Branigan 2018; Sutton and
Borland 2013). In 2003, Encuentros conducted early pro-abortion marches that would create the
platform for the National Campaign for the Right to Legal, Safe & Free Abortion. The campaign
became centered on not only legalizing and decriminalizing abortion, but subsequently creating
mandates that would offer women access education on sexual reproduction and rights, provide
provisions and permissions to utilize contraception, allow women to abort in cases of rape or events
where the mother or child’s life may be in danger, and pro-abortion care and planning for women
and girls that undergo the procedure.222 This campaign is currently still an ongoing endeavor and
as I will elaborate later in the chapter, despite the strong transnational dynamic that has emerged
from this movement, the campaign has endured hurdles and challenges – predominantly by the
strong interference and condemnation by the Catholic Church.
Lastly, this chapter will highlight the movement Ni Una Menos or Not One Less223 which
emerged from protests against the growing emergence of machismo attitude and gender based

“Objectivos”, Campaña Nacional por el Derecho al Aborto Legal Seguro y Gratuito (English translation: “Goals”
National Campaign for the Right to Safe and Free Legal Abortion
223
“Carta Organica” Ni Una Menos June 3, 2017
222
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killings (Pomeraniec 2015). Ni Una Menos is considered to be one of the most pivotal,
transnational feminist movements to develop in Argentina, and it has achieved the same visibility
as Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, National Campaign for the Right to Legal, Safe, and Free
Abortion, and the Federación Argentina de Lesbianas, Gays, Bisexuales y Transexuales.224
Each of these movements, despite their different goals, served and continue to serve as
pivotal points for women’s rights ambitions within Argentina. Moreover, each of these movements
not only were transnational feminist endeavors, but they subsequently managed to motivate other
countries in adopting and creating their own local sister movements (i.e., Chile, Brazil, Italy, etc.).
The Dirty War, the Disappeared, and the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo
The Dirty War: The Montoneros and los Desaparecidos
Between the 1950s to the 1970s, Argentina experienced frequent political instability and
military coups. However, one of the most haunting periods occurred during the Dirty War, with
the most atrocious of acts being seen between the years of 1976 to 1979. Historically, the events
that unfolded during the Dirty War have been debated. On one hand, there are families of victims
and survivors that view the actions committed by the military to be nothing short of a systematic
genocide, while on the other hand, military men and government officials under that regime
believe that reports were distorted, inaccurate, and exaggerated. The start of the violence can be
traced as far back as the overthrow of Juan Perón in 1955, but most certainly during his return
nearly twenty years thereafter.
Under the rule of Juan Perón, the regime was divided between the leftist wing and the
rightest wing – both capable of being extreme in nature, but simultaneously, equally supportive of
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Perón. Still, the left-wing and populists of the emerging Partido Justicialista lent more loyalty to
the late Eva Perón, and she had equally voiced her support for them. In contrast, the rightest wing
of the Perónist regime harbored many of Juan Perón’s closest confidants and members. The onset
of the 1955 coup against Juan Perón forced him into exile. Thereafter, Perón help orchestrate
groups of insurgents to help “break political impasse” in Argentina, as well as “connect with and
take advantage of the country’s youth and to inspire a worker-based mass movement” (Paul et al.
2013, 299-300). These insurgent groups would later disperse and joint one of two groups: the ERP
(People’s Revolutionary Army) or the Perónist Montoneros – both of which were part of the leftist
wing of the Perónist Party (Paul et al. 2013). The latter of the group has a highly contentious history
full of contradictory depictions which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
The Montoneros has been described by some as a terror organization, while others, namely
surviving members and families of victims within the group, believe it was an organization of
young students that just strived to make a progressive change within society (Hoeffel and
Montalvo 1979; Sanders 2008; Blaustein and Portillo 1985; Feitlowitz 2011; Izaguirre 2016;
James 1976; Paul et al. 2013). As described by broadcast journalist Bernardo Neustadt, the
Montoneros were bi-products of anti-Perónists; ironically, the Montoneros were advocates for
Perónism (as cited in Sanders 2008). In many instances, the Montoneros conducted various violent
acts including bombings, assassinations, and extortion against various groups (most notably
corrupt, right -wing trade unionists), multinational corporations, and the militarized police
(Mandelbaum 2008; Paul et al. 2013). In his 2008 documentary entitled “Our Disappeared,” Juan
Mandelbaum225 discusses how one of his closest schoolmates, Patricia Dixon, had joined the
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Montoneros while studying at the University of Buenos Aires; while she herself was not a violent
person nor did she personally engage in acts of violence, she as well as other members were
obligated to support the actions and motives of the Montoneros (Mandelbaum 2008).
The Montoneros believed strongly that political violence was a necessity to embedding
change within Argentina. As a result, they often targeted policemen, generals, and the children of
police officials (Sanders 2008). Prior to the return of Perón, tensions arose between rightest and
leftist groups which would lead to one of the largest atrocities committed in Argentina, as well as
the emergence of one of the largest transnational feminist endeavors within the country.
After years of efforts dedicated towards the return of Juan Perón, the former leader returned
from nearly two decades of exile in Spain. In June of 1973, millions of his supporters, having heard
of his return to Argentina, traveled to Ezeiza to greet Juan Perón, thinking he would be arriving at
the Ezeiza airport. The majority of the gathering consisted of Montoneros members. As one of the
former members, Jose Pablo Feinmann, stated “the Montoneros came unarmed with the idea of
upstaging it with their massive presence. They occupied the first three-hundred meters so that from
the stage Perón could only see the Montoneros in Ezeiza” (Mandelbaum 2008). There, in what can
only be described as an act of terror, the gathering of supporters were ambushed by snipers and
rightest wing guerillas, resulting in thirteen fatalities and hundreds of injuries (Feitlowitz 2011;
Izaguirre 2016; James 1976). The majority of the targets were members of the Montoneros
organization as well as other leftist organizations within the Perónist Party. Ironically, Juan Perón
did not land at Ezeiza Airport, but rather another location in its entirety (Mandelbaum 2008). This
created a definitive divide between the leftist and rightest sects and consequently resulted a
permanent end to their alliance. There is a lack of consensus among scholars as far as the aftermath
of the massacre. Some accounts state that Perón was distraught about the event, while more popular
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accounts describe Perón as apathetic, dismissive, and in some cases a lead orchestrator of the
massacre. Regardless, the Ezeiza Massacre was a stepping stone for the genocidal acts that would
ascend soon thereafter.
In 1974, despite having utilized them to regain power, Perón made his stance clear by
disbarring one of the most predominant leftist groups, as well as the greatest advocate for his
return, the Montoneros. Perón argued that the group had become more rogue and was relentless in
its efforts to ascertain power, which in turn threatened his position (James 1976). The leftist wing
and many of the Perónist supporters, felt a sense of security with the news of Perón’s return; in
many ways they felt that democracy would be restored and that positive change would ensue
(Mandelbaum 2008). However, upon his return, it was clear that the old Perónist ways were no
longer plausible and that the country would take a drastic shift towards more dictatorial ways.
Moreover, it was apparent that a significant portion of the country would soon become ostracized
and labeled as dissident which would not only caused heightened tensions, but high levels of fear.
That same year (1974), Juan Perón passed away, and his Vice President and third wife,
Isabel Perón, became the first female President of Argentina (Perelli 1992; Knudson 1997; Paul et
al. 2013; Feitlowitz 2011). Shortly thereafter, Isabel – with support of conservatives in the regime
-- created an “ultraconservative government program” and signed decrees that would “exterminate
subversion” and annihilate subversion” by way of paramilitary groups (Perelli 1992, 420). During
this time, military and paramilitary members would raid universities for students considered to be
subversives or hold anti-government sentiments; once found, they were abducted, tortured, and
killed (Blaustein and Portillo 1985). One of the more prominent Perónist right, militarized group
was the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (AAA) which behaved as a death squad that conducted
strategic attacks against the Montoneros and other leftist organizations (Feitlowitz 2011). While
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the organization was labeled as a paramilitary force, to a large extent its actions were nothing short
of an act of pure terror. In one of its first attacks, the AAA threatened Hipolito Solari Yrigoyen,
the Radical Party senator, and later conducted detonated a bomb in his car in 1973 (Memoria et al.
1991). There are many horrific accounts of some of the acts committed by AAA; as a former
militant, Antonio Viana Acosta accounts:
For several days I’d had the feeling I was being followed. I awoke at 3:30 a.m. to the sound
of breaking windows and saw that someone was forcing open my bedroom door. Police
captain Juan Ramon Morales aimed a gun at me…they dragged me to the terrace…kicking
me for a long time. Since I earned a bit of money by running a small radio repair shop from
home, they found some wires and electrocuted my right there….and continued to
electrocute me for two weeks (Memoria et al. 1991, 20).
Perhaps one of the most shocking assassinations that was committed by the AAA was that of
Father Carlos Mugica, an affiliate of the leftist movement, most notably the Montoneros. Prior to
his assassination, Father Mugica was known for assisting the poor and conducting a multitude of
missions, most notably that of the Santa Fe mission (Memoria et al. 1991); during this undertaking,
various founding members of the Montoneros party took part in it. Upon the return of Perón, Father
Mugica and the president formed a bond, but upon the death of the latter, Father Mugica faced
threats from the new government and the AAA. In 1974, upon exiting his church, Father Mugica
was shot several times and killed by the AAA (Memoria et al. 1991; Mandelbaum 2008).
In 1975 alone, the AAA admitted to be responsible for “at least a third of the 1,000 political
killings” (Omang 1975, 21). During these decrees, the targets were subversive individuals which
considered mostly of students and professors (Perelli 1992; Feierstein 2014). Specifically, Decree
No. 261, signed on February 5, 1975, gave “the army operational control of the Federal Police and
the Provincial Police of Tucuman (a stronghold for the ERP, the leftist People’s Revolutionary
Army)” (Feitlowtiz 2011, 258). Decree Nos. 2770, 2771, and 2772 further expanded this control
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to all of Argentina (Feitlowitz 2011). This caused intensified clashes between the paramilitary
organizations and the leftist groups.
The Dirty War
The economic conditions within Argentina deteriorated substantially in 1975-76, and while
fiscal turmoil and political instability ravaged the country, the plausibility of a coup occurring
became more accepted in the military and society more generally (Sheinin 2012; Feitlowitz 2011).
As such, in 1976, the military junta overthrew Isabel Perón and replaced her with General Jorge
Rafael Videla (Sheinen 2012; Brennan 2018). Videla essentially suspended any form of civil
rights. One of the first commercials that aired after his transition to power stated: “Order! Order!
Order! When there is order, the country can be built from top to bottom” (Mandelbaum 2008).226
It would be clear later what the junta meant by the term “order” and who they deemed a disturbance
to such. Under the guise of Videla’s commands, the Dirty War was orchestrated between the years
1976 to 1983, the worst of the atrocities being committed between the years 1976 to 1979 (Brennan
2018). Members of the military justified the orders given to them and believed that:
Argentina was at war, a war against subversion being wage inside and outside national
borders. The military were quick to declare it and the guerrillas took up the gauntlet. Both
groups spoke of war. For the military, thinking about matters in terms of war put them in
a ‘professional’ situation, removing them from the purely repressive functions historically
reserved for the police, while feeding this binary view of friends and enemies….they chose
to show themselves as an army at war to increase their importance and apparent
dangerousness (Feierstein 2014, 152).
Videla presided over a systematic program of state terror even more aggressively than his
predecessor, and he held extreme views on acts of subverts, being quoted as stating a terrorist is
“not just someone with a gun or a bomb, but anyone who spreads ideas that are contrary to Western
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and Christian Civilization” (Butko 2006, 148). During such time, the Junta conducted abductions,
torture, interrogation, murder, and forced disappearances. The junta wanted to instill fear within
the populace, mostly towards those they deemed as subverts. They did this in a multitude of ways,
but as Jose Feinmann recalled, the junta would often park refrigerated trucks in the middle of
roads; such trucks had hanging corpses of the victims visible to everyone (Mandelbaum 2008).
These acts were committed in hopes of garnering enough fear that it would lead to loyalty. Some
of the targeted subversives were politicians, lawyers, students, teachers, scientists, psychologists,
bankers, clergymen and women, human rights activists, actors, actresses, and leftist affiliates
predominantly part of the Montoneros organization (Pirellli 1992). In cases of the lawyers, they
were often abducted for defending the “subversive” accused and psychiatrists were abducted for
treating the accused that were tortured and later released (Knudson 1997). In addition to this,
family members and friends that questioned the whereabouts of their loved ones were subjected to
the aforementioned measures.
The perpetrators of what can only be described as a genocide, often defended their actions
by relying on French decrees and doctrines. For instance, the Brigadier General Acdel Vilas, who
was the head of Operativo Independencia, was tasked with obliterating the ERP in the Tucaman
region. In his book where he discusses what led up to the operation, he notes the various influences
he had that in his mind justified his actions:
While I was flying, approaching, more and more, what would be for almost a year my
combat trench, I thought again about the words a specialist in the glorious French army in
Algeria wrote in his book – which was my bedtime reading during my spell in Tucaman.
In Subversion and Revolution he wrote: “ A slave to its traditions and training, the army is
ill adapted to a war that military schools refuse to teach…like a sledgehammer trying to
squash a fly, it strikes, mostly at empty space, wasting considerable resources...the army
should address the complex challenges of revolutionary war…The French officer’s pity
considerations summarized my own ideas and concerns regarding the operations that very
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soon, and after a century of peace, the brigade would begin against the country’s most
dangerous and deadly enemy: Marxism (Feierstein 2014, 133).
Thus, the military junta was tasked with two distinct roles: the first being to “identify subversives
and isolate and eliminate them” and the second being “to prevent the infection from spreading
inside society” (Perelli 1992, 422). By definition, their actions and methods were considered
genocidal227.
A Method to the Madness
During the Dirty War, it is estimated that 30,000228 individuals were systematically
abducted and became part of the desaparecidos or the “disappeared” (Knudson 1997; Bouevard
2002). Majority of the victims of forced disappearances were young students that had aspired for
change; while many of them were affiliated with the Montoneros movement, they did not assist in
the violent acts that were being projected but rather engaged in their protests and backed their
sentiments. Some of the victims were students that were studying law or psychology, while others
were human rights activists that had voiced concerns over the level of poverty within their country
which they attributed to the current establishment (Sanders 2008; Blaustein and Portillo 1985);
such sentiments warranted disappearances. It is believed that most of the “subversives” that were
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disappeared were detained because of “non-violent actions undertaken in support of subversive
(broadly defined to include action or teaching contrary to the military’s conception of social order)
groups, e.g., poster and pamphlet distribution and a variety officials”229
There are various accounts of what occurred during the abductions. As one survivor,
physicist Mario Villani recalled, he was “kidnapped by men in an unmarked vehicle” where he
was later taken to an undisclosed detention camp and relentlessly tortured (Sanders 2008). One of
the more challenging things during the Dirty War was the fact that the perpetrators carried out the
abductions and attacks through a level of “anonymity” where they were untraceable (Bouvard
2002, 27).
What made these raids so terrifying was the fact that…the security forces did not identify
themselves or wear uniforms. Assuming that a mistake had been made, the frightened
relatives believed that as soon as they notified the relevant authorities and explained that
their loved ones had done nothing wrong, they would be returned. Instead, the parents,
husbands, or wives of the disappeared faced a long and disorienting ordeal as they made
the rounds of police stations, hospitals, and military garrisons only to be told there were no
records of their loved ones and that they would have to direct their efforts elsewhere
(Bouvard 2002, 27).
Many of the victims were taken directly from their homes, schools, or places of employment
(Bouvard 2002). The perpetrators also tactically took these individuals during specific parts of the
day or certain days of the week:
Usually the abduction was staged at the end of the week, at night, so that time would elapse
before relatives could take any action. The timing and violence…were intended to terrorize
and thus silence the relatives. But the army also made certain that neighbors and entire
communities were intimidated…people were terrified of talking about what they had seen.
They feared that they, too, would become targets (Bouevard 2002, 32).
There were multiple accounts from relatives as well.
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Many of the desaparecidos were taken to concentration camps where they faced a
multitude of outcomes including death. In the documentary, The Disappeared, one of the
prosecutors against the perpetrators of these disappearances compared the motives behind these
concentration camps to that of the Nazi decree “Nacht and Nebel” which basically “called for
isolation of detainees and alienation from their families and put fear on the families” (Sanders
2008). When questioned as to the whereabouts of the disappeared, the Rafael Videla was quoted
as saying that they should be considered “neither dead nor alive” (Sanders 2008). In fact, in most
accounts when questions, the Argentine government neglected to provide sufficient responses as
to the whereabouts of the disappeared. As one CIA report indicates, “there has been no significant
official effort to collect and publish information on persons who allegedly have disappeared. When
queried about disappearances by non-governmental organizations or foreign governments, the
Argentines’ standard response is ‘no information.’”230 The junta made every effort to evade the
question regarding forced disappearances. In some occurrences they claimed that the names of the
disappeared individuals were made up and those individuals that did exist were terrorists that were
not forcibly disappeared, but rather were away on missions for their respective insurgent groups
(Bouevard 2002). In other cases, they claimed that some of the disappeared had been killed in
combat and clashes with the military. Denial was the key to the junta’s success. In some cases, the
disappeared would be killed and thrown into mass graves, while in other cases the whereabouts of
their remains were often unknown.
One of the more notable concentration camps, ESMA (or Escuela Superior de Mecanica
de la Armada), held thousands of detainees. In many cases there were instances where “el doctor,”
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as he was called, would inject the detainees with a drug called pentho-naval which would
essentially put them to sleep (Sanders 2008). Martin Malharro, a journalist during the Dirty War,
recalled how the detainees would then be lured onto airplanes and thrown out alive into the ocean
(Sanders 2008). Many of the victims also included Uruguayan immigrants that were affiliated with
leftist movements. In one account, an anonymous Uruguayan father wrote to Amnesty
International in hopes of garnering global attention to assist in helping his son as well as many
other missing children. There, he discussed the haunting image of bodies floating above the Rio
Plata:
Dear Amnesty International,
In the midst of our anguish and sense of desperation given the probable death of my son,
we write to you in a desperate attempt after all other efforts with the responsible Uruguayan
and Argentine authorities have failed…I initiated the legal steps for an appeal of habeas
corpuses as well as knocking on dozens of doors of various military and police authorities.
From all of them, I received the same reply: ‘We don’t have information on the case; your
son is not being held by those under our jurisdiction.’….my concern was increasing daily
given the disappearance of many Uruguayans from Buenos Aires….I was deeply troubled
by the increasing number of unidentified cadavers that had been appearing in recent months
along the shore of the Rio Plata…given the fact that after this letter is sent out, our own
lives will be in danger also, I ask that you use the greatest possible discretion with respect
to my identity – A father231
This was just one of many accounts of the horrors committed at these concentration camps. In
other cases, some of the perpetrators such as Ricardo Lanzo, were responsible for cutting up the
bodies and burning them (Blaustein and Portillo 1985). Ironically, Admiral Massera, the head of
the Navy at that time, was quoted as stating that there were no missing children at all and that the
accusations that the military had deliberately and systematically abducted individuals was a farce
(Blaustein and Portillo 1985).
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Within the concentration camps, most notably ESMA, thousands of “subversive” women
were detained, many of whom were pregnant. These women were kept in such camps until giving
birth at which point their children were taken from them and given to military families or more
“worthy” families232 (Blaustein and Portillo 1985; Crenzel 2011; Martin 2012). In 1999, when the
Seventh Federal Criminal Court presided over the cases concerning the abductions of babies during
the Dirty War, the court found that between the years 1976 to 1978, the junta had illegally
kidnapped children from their imprisoned mothers, falsified their identities, and placed them in
military families.233 The president of one of the prominent movements during this time, the
Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo or Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, Estella Carlotto stated “they
kidnapped pregnant women. They kept them alive until they gave birth and then they would take
their babies away” (Blaustein and Portillo 1985). It is estimated that 500 children were illegally
abducted and given to families during the Dirty War (Infobase 2012). In other instances, some
children were placed in detention centers that were monitored by the female brigade in the police
units (Bouvard 2002). In cases where the children were born with mental deficiencies or
disabilities, they were killed (Bouvard 2002).
One of the most frightening things with the case of the disappeared was the tactic and
motive behind it. The Dirty War was a quintessential blueprint of how genocides occur. As is the
case with most genocides, the first step is to dehumanize a group (Jones 2006; Kelman 1973; Harff
1984). The junta, as well as their predecessor Isabel Perón, created a negative connotation towards
members of the leftist sect by attributing the term “subversive” to them. In this case, “subversive”
is attached to other synonymous terms such as an insurgent, disrupter, or rebel. By attributing this
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term, the junta created an “us versus them” mentality which is often seen in genocidal instances.
In this case, the term was intended to create division between the pro-government and rightest
sects against those against them. The second step is to annihilate the subject groups (Lemarchand
2011; Jones 2006; Lemkin 2008; Lazar 2015). In this case the junta strategically planned a way to
thoroughly eradicate the leftist sect and anyone that sympathized with them. In some cases, those
that were abducted were not affiliates of the leftist wing, but merely espoused sentiments that were
deemed subversive towards the government; for instance, individuals that sympathized with the
poor and slums were often targets of the junta disappearances. Jorge Videla was quoted as saying
“first we kill subversives, then their collaborators, then their sympathizers, later those who remain
indifferent. Finally we will kill the timid” (as quoted in Simpson and Bennett, 66). The disappeared
were by definition not only abducted, but erased from society. The third step and the final one that
will be discussed in this case, is the use of children. In some genocides, rape was often utilized
against women in hopes of eradicating any blood ties to the targeted ethnic, religious, or tribal
minority (see cases such as Guatemala, Rwanda, and Bosnia). Not only is rape a way for the
perpetrator to end the reproduction of a particular group, but it is a tool utilized to mentally disable
a woman as well as demoralize them. In the case of Argentina, the junta illegally abducted the
children of the subversives and gave them to military families in hopes of eradicating any relations
or ties to leftist affiliates. During some of the recollections of the disappearances, some of the
surviving women indicated they had either been raped or witnessed rape being done to other
captives (Fisher 1989). Nonetheless, the act of kidnapping the children of these women was
equally crippling and dispiriting and the motive and intent was the same as it were in other
genocides: to rid the country of the targeted group. By eliminating the identity of these children,
the junta was eliminating the lineage of the target group in its entirety.
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The Dirty War created an onslaught of fear within the population; fear of asking questions,
fear of speaking out, and fear of who would be next. As Perelli (1992) notes, the Dirty War created
a culture of fear which shifted the natures of the Argentine people to more aloof and apathetic in
an effort to survive. Amidst these sentiments of distress and panic, emerged a group of brave
mothers and grandmothers that demanded to know the whereabouts of their children and
grandchildren. Despite all possibilities of government retaliation, these women formed the
Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo as well as the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo and took to the
streets every Thursday demanding to know where their children were and their current state. These
two movements would become one of the biggest, cohesive efforts in Argentine history as well as
one of the largest transnational feminist undertakings within the region. Most importantly, the
mothers and grandmothers successfully ensured that despite the physical elimination of their
children, their memories would be kept alive and thereby making the biggest intent carried out by
the junta – unsuccessful.
The Mothers and Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo
How and Why the Movement Emerged. In 1977, mothers and grandmothers gathered
around the Plaza de Mayo with white scarves around their heads, often displaying the names of
their disappeared children, along with photos of their sons and daughters around their necks. Their
goal was simple: they wanted to know the whereabouts of their children. If their children were
deceased, they wished to have their bodies returned to them for burial, and if they were alive, they
wanted to know why they were being held and where they were (Blaustein and Portillo 1985;
Memoria et al 1991; Foss and Domenici 2001). Moreover, many of the mothers were aware that
their daughters or daughter in laws that were abducted were impregnated at the time and wished
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to know where their grandchildren were. Their movement became highly publicized and as such
these women became targets of the military dictatorship.
The movement began with one woman, Azucena Villaflor (or Azucena de Vincente), after
the disappearance of her son and his girlfriend on November 30, 1976. Villaflor contacted the
Ministry of Interior inquiring about their whereabouts, but she was not met with answers. Rather,
she encountered other mothers asking about their children as well. There, Villaflor was heard
stating “we should get a thousand of us together, meet in the plaza, head into the Casa Rosada, and
stay there until they tell us something” (as quoted in Memoria et al. 1991, 6). This was a valiant
move, especially in a time where questioning the whereabouts of these individuals was motive
enough to abduct and make people disappear. The secretary of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo,
Maria del Rosario de Cerruti, described her attempts at locating her son prior to the movement:
we started to search in every possible place…we would go to the Ministry of the Interior,
we would go to the Command Unit, to the Police Department, but it was of no use. Along
the way we kept meeting other mothers…in July 1976 we went to the Episcopate. By then
there were about forty of us…We started to search everywhere. Two of us would go see
one bishop, two would head to a church, two more to a ministry, two to the mental hospital,
two to Devoto prison…and so on, searching in more and more places. We would spend the
whole day in streets, completely alone (Memoria et al. 1991, 5).
As was the case with most people that inquired about the whereabouts of the disappeared, the
mothers and grandmothers were given ambiguous answers and were often redirected. Having been
met with little replies to their demands and questions, they grew tired and began orchestrating a
movement that would ideally raise global awareness and hopefully entice change.
The women formed two groups: The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo (Madres de la Plaza
de Mayo), and the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo (Abuelas de la Plaza de Mayo). The women
chose Plaza de Mayo as a meeting place for several reasons: first, the area drew a lot of public
attention as it was in a major public venue; second, the plaza is located in front of the Presidential
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Palace; third, the Plaza de Mayo was a symbolic place in Argentina and was seen as the “heart of
Buenos Aires” (McFarland 2018, 60); and finally, due to the location of the plaza having been in
the middle of a public vicinity, the mothers and grandmothers felt that it would be less feasible for
the junta to abduct them (Hernandez 2002).
The women agreed to meet every Thursday at 3:30 p.m. (Hernandez 2002). The movement
grew and “the first Thursday they met, there were fourteen mothers; soon this number grew to
3,000” (Hernandez 2002, 398). During the first meeting, the women were prepared for any
possible attacks by the junta; as a result, they formed in a small group and opted to wear flat shoes;
as one woman stated, “…we wore flat shoes so that we could make a run for it if they came for
us” (as quoted in McFarland 2018, 59). Azucena proposed the idea to wear white scarves,
preferably the former nap blankets used by their children, with the names of their sons and
daughters stitched on them (McFarland 2018). In addition to the names of their children, the
women stitched the words “Aparción con Vida” meaning the “reappearance with life” (McFarland
2018, 60). In doing so, they garnered much attention in Buenos Aires and were able to quickly
spread the basis for their formulation. Many of the women also began carrying photos of their kids,
especially if their daughters or daughter in-laws were pregnant in the photos to show that they had
grandchildren that were also missing.
Nonetheless, by forming these two groups, the women involved were monitored by the
junta; they were followed, their phones were tapped, and they were directly targeted (Blaustein
and Portillo 1985). The junta became a steadfast opposition of the movement and even tried to
publicly humiliate and belittle it. General Ramon Camps, the Chief of Police in Buenos Aires, was
quoted as stating “…don’t forget that these ladies are continuing the subversive actions started by
their children. To believe the Mothers and Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, who are obviously
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responding to the interests of International Marxism, is to be on their side” (as quoted in Blaustein
and Portillo 1985). It was clear that the Mothers and Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo were
seen as targets of the junta regime. The government became wary of the slow growing support and
attention the women were receiving and felt that they needed to send a clear message not only to
their supporters, but the women themselves and any one that wished to join them.
On March 12, 1977, the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo began meeting at the Santa Cruz
Church (Memoria et al. 1991). In addition to this, the Mothers were joined by two nuns, Alice
Domon and Leonie Duquet, as well as other supportive members of finding the disappeared, many
of which were men. There, the Mothers as well as the other supporters, discussed publishing the
list of names of the disappeared in the public newspaper, La Nación; in an effort to successfully
publish the piece, the Mothers raised money through the Church. On October 5, 1977, the Mothers
successfully published the piece, but doing so placed them under the scope of the junta, most
specifically the Navy (Memoria et al. 1991). As a result, the ESMA began seeking out members
of the Mothers, as well as their supporters and assigned Special Task Group 3.3.2 to conduct the
targeting and abductions. The ESMA knew that the Mothers had garnered male supporters and as
a result they strategically sent one of their own members, Frigate Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz, or the
“Angel of Death” as he is known, to emulate a fellow supporter and gather intelligence on the
movements (Memoria et al. 1991; Galeano 2014). There, Astiz presented himself as Gustavo Nino
and claimed that he was there after the disappearance of a male relative; he would later be
responsible for the deaths and disappearances of twelve people.
Due to the attention the first publication received, the Mothers opted for a second article to
release before Christmas, once again highlighting the goal of finding the disappeared and releasing
names of the sons and daughters that had gone missing. Astiz reported back to the ESMA which
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made the junta believed the Mothers and their supporters were becoming incontrollable and nonsustainable. As such, on December 8, 1977, in what can only be described as a “kiss of death,”
Astiz forewarned the task force that he would point out the targets by placing a kiss on their cheek
as he left (Memoria et al. 1991; Ferguson 2011). As a result, some members of the Mothers of the
Plaza de Mayo, as well as one of the nuns, Alice Domon were kidnapped that same day. On
December 9, 1977, two of the male members of the movement were consequently abducted. Many
of the mothers grew fearful of publishing the second article, but Villaflor persevered and believed
that the publication was an important component of their cause; as such, La Nación published the
second piece. On December 10, 1977, Leonie Duquet, a second nun, was kidnapped. Shortly
thereafter, on the same day, Villaflor was abducted while she had just left her home in an attempt
to go to the store (Memoria et al. 1991; McFarland 2018; Partnoy 2007; Ferguson 2011). That
would be the last time Villaflor was seen in public until her body was uncovered decades later.
The twelve people that were abducted were taken to the ESMA, where they were tortured and later
drugged, placed on a plane, and thrown into the Atlantic. When their bodies washed up on beaches,
the local police had the bodies taken to NN (No Name) gravesites (Memoria et al. 1991).
The junta tried to send a signal to the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in hopes that their
efforts would waver and they would grow too scared to continue their movement. As one of the
mothers, Nora Cortinas was quoted as saying, “it was like a bolt of lightning and it shook our
families tremendously. Our husbands, the fathers, were afraid because, before taking our friends,
they had arrested us. Entering Plaza de Mayo was symbolic, and they said, ‘How long will this go
on? Watch out, they will disappear you” (as quoted in LeBon 2010, 96-97). Instead of becoming
detracted and discouraged, the Mothers and Grandmothers carried on with their mission. This is
not to say that the death of Azucena, as well as the other members, did not have a significant impact
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on the movements. A few of the mothers recalled the strength of Azucena and the impact of her
disappearance by stating:
Azucena was a truly admirable person. She had a kind of inner strength which you couldn’t
help but be affected by. She was always full of ideas. She was a great woman, a great
fighter. We owe her a lot, to her determination and courage. They thought that by kidnaping
her, by kidnaping the fourteen Mothers, they would destroy our movement. They didn’t
realize this would only strengthen our determination. We said no, they’re not going to
destroy us, we will continue, stronger than ever. They thought we would be too afraid to
go back to the square. It was difficult to go back, the kidnaping of Azucena was a terrible
blow but we went back…it was a hard time for us but we weren’t broken. They thought
there was only one Azucena, but there wasn’t just one. There were hundreds of us (as
quoted in Fisher 1989, 69-70).
The beatings and abductions did not stop with Azucena. Rather, many participants of the
movement were constantly followed and often times arrested. The perpetrators would often
approach the Mothers during their Thursday rallies, but would quickly retreat should they have
noticed any reporters around that could potentially take photographs of the abductions. The
Mothers instated a new leader, Hebe de Bonafini, and by 1978, they made their movement a global
endeavor. They continued to march every Thursday in the Plaza de Mayo chanting their infamous
slogan “They took them away alive; we want them returned alive,” which gained the attention of
the international media (McFarland 2018, 61). By 1977, several human rights organizations had
already received notice of the atrocities being committed by the junta regime and as such notable
teams such as that of Amnesty International sent members to Buenos Aires to investigate
(McFarland 2018). The Mothers and Grandmothers knew that the only way to attain their goals
was to make their movement transnational; they knew that international recognition was a key to
obtaining answers. As such, the women opted to speak to visitors from other countries, as well as
traveling abroad to attend conferences and meetings.
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Was it a Feminist Movement? While the movement of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo
as well as that of the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo is not viewed often as a feminist endeavor
by some scholars (see Taylor 1997; Feijoo 1989; Howe 2006), the movement arguably qualifies
as falling under a feminist umbrella as it manifested a new version of feminism, especially for
Latin America. Most important, the movement utilized a transnational feminist platform to not
only bridge communication with other countries to help assist in the recognition of their cause, but
to influence neighboring feminist movements in other Latin American countries. First, while the
Mothers and Grandmothers may have succumbed to the traditional maternal roles set through
historical norms, they may have utilized this role to their own advantage; for instance, as discussed
in the prior chapter, the military regime had always promoted these traditional roles for women
and they strongly believed that women had to fulfill their pre-ordained roles as mothers and wives
above all else – moreover, they were seen as flagbearers to morality (Howe 2006). As such, by
utilizing this image, the Mothers and Grandmothers could achieve a level of “impunity” and
“visibility” that other feminist movements of the time would not be able to attain (Howe 2006).
Secondly, and in interesting twist on the idea of maternal traditionalism, the Mothers
shifted the roles of mothers from the private sector to a public dimension – something that had not
been done so before in Argentina (Howe 2006; Taylor 1997; Jelin 1990; Feijoo and Gogna 1990).
The movement offered a “transformation in women’s consciousness and the female role” as
mothers were no longer confined to their homes, but rather found a new role in being political
activists (Feijoo and Gogna 1990, 90). As Heba de Bonafini had stated: “women like us lived in
an isolated world which finished at the front doors of our houses…when you live like this you
don’t know what rights you’ve got…we’ve fought to build the image of mothers who fight for all
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the country’s children. We’ve learned that there are more important things than washing, cooking,
and ironing” (as quoted in Fisher 1993, 107-8; 136).
Thirdly, it is critical to note that the Mothers have often rejected the term “feminist”
outright. For instance, Heba de Bonafini was quoted as saying “the mothers aren’t feminists, we
believe in equality between men and women. Feminists here are very radical” (Fisher 1997, 136).
However, Bonafini was more a critic of this class-form of feminism, specifically the “bourgeois”
variation which focused more on gender issues; this is not to say she was a proponent of feminism
as a whole. In fact, it can be argued that because different variations of feminism target varying
issues, that the concerns of the Mothers was a feminist attribute (Taylor 1997) and that the “work
of the Madres could be seen, to an extent, to have bridged the gap between the more bourgeois
feminist movements and popular, grassroots forms of action” (Howe 2006, 47). As discussed in
the prior chapter, feminism in Argentina took a shift from one that focused solely on gender issues
to one that incorporated this “motherist politics” element and the “demands that a mother be able
to assure the welfare of her children” (Miller 1991, 201). Under the Mothers and Grandmothers
movements we see a “willingness to support wider social reform, with women’s rights forming
part of a general project of human rights that has evolved directly from the women’s experiences
of the most extreme human rights violations…one of the key features to distinguish the Madres’
work from that of …bourgeois feminist groups is ….the emphasis on improvements in the private
realm of the home rather than on furthering women’s progress” (Howe 2006, 48). In one interview,
Bonafini elaborates on what is and isn’t a feminist to the Mothers:
We don’t consider ourselves feminists in the sense of a vindication of sex, as many
feminists stress today. We do believe in the vindication of women’s work and women’s
role in society. We want women to have space like men, not more than men: the same
space, the same salaries, the same possibilities in a break with all the impositions. We
Madres did just that: we defied what society told us to do. We’d like to see women of all
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countries, but especially this one, develop their consciousness as women…the individual
affirmation of each woman interests me.234
Finally, having considered these things it is clear that the Mothers movement was a feminist
endeavor, despite their reluctance in embracing the term. While the Mothers were not fighting for
the rights of women solely, they were fighting for the rights of their children through the
framework of a mother – which throughout Argentine feminist history, there have been feminists
that have wished to highlight the inadequacies women face, while simultaneously preaching the
importance of women in the domestic realms. In this case, the movement was utilizing this role to
their advantage. I argue that their form for feminism supports women that don’t want to break free
of domestic ties, but rather are humanitarian activists that highlight atrocities committed by their
country by utilizing their roles as women and mothers. Their form of feminism breaks free from
Western forms of feminism, and embraces more multicultural forms of feminism that don’t wish
to highlight inequalities women face, but rather inequalities all beings within their state face: in
this case, the disappeared.
Transforming to Transnational Feminism: What were the Goals and was it Successful?
The Mothers movements also exhibited varying elements of transnational feminism. Firstly, there
was a transnational feminist dynamic from the movement and its efforts to gain international
recognition. In 1978, Heba de Bonafini and several other members of the Mothers of the Plaza de
Mayo traveled to Washington D.C. in hopes of meeting with government officials to discuss the
disappearances. There, they were met with US senators and congressional representatives, where
they spoke of the plight of their children as well as their own members (McFarland 2018). Later,
they traveled to New York and spoke to several human rights groups. In December of 1978, the
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Mothers and Grandmothers caught the attention of the United Nations. In 1979 the Mothers
pursued the United Nations by requesting to meet with then Director of the United Nations of the
Human Rights Division, Theo Van Boven (McFarland 2018).
The Mothers had discussed the situation in their home country and the numerous
disappearances. They expressed their concerns about the whereabouts of their children and that
despite their unwavering efforts, they were unable to get answers from the government (McFarland
2018). As a result, on February 29, 1980, Van Boven created the Working Group on Enforced and
Involuntary Disappearances through the UN.235 This group was not solely created for the case of
Argentina, though initially its goals were to assist the Mothers in finding the disappeared, or at the
very least inquiring about the whereabouts of their children (McFarland 2018). In addition to this,
this commission would have “working groups” that would have a mandate of one year to “seek
and receive information from Governments, intergovernmental organizations, humanitarian
organizations, and other reliable sources.”236 In other instances, the Mothers as well as other
Argentine migrants, spoke to various members of Amnesty International in various parts of the
world, most notably throughout Europe; in turn, this resulted in Amnesty International disclosing
a report that listed the names of the disappeared, in addition to the dates of their disappearances
(Bouvard 2002). The Argentine migrants would disburse this information throughout various
outlets within their host countries in hopes of raising more awareness and attention.
Secondly, there was a transnational element through the influence of other countries in
aiding the Mothers and consequently condemning the junta. In 1977, relations between Sweden
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and Argentina became strained when Swedish-Argentine national, Dagmar Hagelin was mistaken
for another individual and murdered by Alfredo Astiz outside of her friend’s home (Bouvard
2002).
After the kidnapping Dagmar’s father went to visit the foreign minister with the Swedish
ambassador. A few weeks later the Swedish cabinet met and sent an outraged telegram to
the Argentine foreign minister protesting the act. Because of this incident SwedishArgentine relations deteriorated, rupturing completely in 1980 as Sweden became one of
the Mother’s strongest supporters (Bouvard 2002, 84).
Similarly, the Mothers gained support from women in Netherlands. The former wife of the Dutch
president of the Social Democratic Party’s, Liesbeth Uyl, was one of the leading proponents of the
Mothers of the Plaza de May (Mellibovsky 2006). She, along with the leading Dutch group, SAAM
or the Support Group for the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, raised money for the movement
(Bouvard 2002). In fact, the government in Netherlands donated the House of the Mothers, which
would be a meeting place for them (Agosin and Franzen 1987). In addition to this, SAAM was
responsible for raising funds, organizing solidarity protests, and sponsoring exhibits to help assist
the Mothers (Bouevard et al. 2002). SAAM’s leading members included women from all walks of
life including but not limited to “professionals, writers, executives, politicians, and housewives”
all of whom reached out to their respective governments to bring awareness to the Mothers’ cause
and to further bring pressure to the Argentine regime (Bourvard et al. 2002, 86-87). This in turn
resulted in additional recognition and assistance throughout Western Europe.
With respect to the United States, the involvement of the country was both slow and
tumultuous. Initially, as mentioned before, the Mothers approached members of Congress, but they
were met with very little action. It wasn’t until the Carter administration grew aware of the
circumstances in Argentina that investigations were done. In part, this may have reflected President
Carter’s goal to link human rights to U.S. foreign policy.
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Two members of the Carter

administration were key proponents to the Mothers’ cause: F. Allen “Tex” Harris and Patricia
Derian.
In 1977, Harris was initially assigned to oversee the nuclear proliferation investigation as
well as the Argentine involvement in the 1982-3 Falklands war. Eventually, he was given an
assignment with human rights division, which he accepted under the condition that Argentines
would be able to go to the US Embassy to submit their inquires and/or complaints of human rights
atrocities being committed (Schmidli 2013). During this time, Harris learned about the
disappearances since the onset of the Dirty War. He reached out to various divisions and groups,
most notably the Mothers. Harris learned that the Mothers would meet at the Plaza de Mayo every
Thursday and as such he arrived there with his business cards asking them to come to the Embassy
to give their testimonies (Schmidli 2013). Harris’ efforts were deemed successful as his office was
“…soon crowded each afternoon from two to four o’clock….Argentines waiting to offer testimony
on disappeared loved ones…within a few months, Harris was receiving dozens of reports”
(Schmidli 2013, 124-125). Harris would personally meet with each of the Mothers as well as with
each individual that wished to give a statement as to the disappearances and tortures.
Similarly, Patricia Derian, whom at the time serves as Assistance Secretary for Human
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs within the State Department, conducted a thorough investigation
into the disappearances. Derian did meet the Mothers during one of her visits to Argentina and
their devotion and efforts as well as the other information being funneled through the United States
caught her attention, as well as the Carter administration. Derian, by way of the State Department,
was sent to Argentine to investigate the allegations of human rights atrocities being committed.
Prior to her arrival in Argentina, she believed based off the information that was provided to her,
that the junta was protecting itself from the violent guerillas; she believed that while there were
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questionable approaches being conducted, that these members of the leftist wing were
troublesome, but nonetheless non-deserving of such methods.237
While in Argentina, Derian gathered information and took time to speak to the Mothers as
well victims that had survived the disappearances. The stories she heard from them made her fully
aware that the junta’s presentation of the situation was inaccurate and the left-wing activists were
victims of terror. In one instance, Derian described a story told by a Grandmother wherein she
states that:
Her granddaughter had disappeared and she got a phone call after some long period of time
saying that her granddaughter’s body was going to be delivered to her house. And they
came with a naked body and put this kid down and left her with this old lady. When she
called the funeral home they called up and told her that she had a rat sewn inside her vagina
which killed her by trying to eat its way out. It was so horrifying…there are so many
equally terrible stories. People were being tortured on bed frames and all of those.238

On numerous occasions, Derian met with various junta officials, most notably General Massera of
the Navy.239 In one occurrence, she met him at the ESMA, and was fully aware of the torture taking
place there. Derian confronted Messera about cases of abduction and torture, which he strongly
denied until she stated “I know people are being tortured right here under this roof. I have a map
of that floor….in fact somebody’s probably being tortured right under our feet right now.”240
Massera eluded to washing his hands of the whole ordeal. Derian became a voice for the Mothers
as well as the victims of the disappeared. Derian would later testify in the trials with regard to these
many occurrences as well as what she had seen and experienced while in Argentine. In response
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to this, Derian did receive a backlash from the US Military and members within the US Embassy
that felt she was misreporting the actual events.
In her reports to the State Department, Derian provided detailed accounts of the human
rights violations being committed on multiple levels. Her report was vital and key during the
proceedings and charges brought upon the junta regime. One such account detailed the following:
From the highest level the government knows what it is doing and it is deliberately and
systematically violating human rights. It believes that it is doing this in the name of human
rights. It believes there is no alternative….the government method is to pick people up and
take them to military installations. There the detainees are tortured…those thought to be
salvageable are sent to regular jails and prisons…those found to be incorrigible are
murdered and dumped on garbage heaps or street corners, but more often are given arms
with live ammunition, grenades, bombs, and put into automobiles and sent out of the
compound to be killed…the GOA “Human Rights” director told me the head had been
removed…when I asked what happened to the head, he replied that it had
“disappeared.”…The human rights situation in Argentina is ghastly. 241

While Derian’s efforts were not solely to aid the Mothers, she gathered many testimonies from
them as well as the Grandmothers. In turn, her findings mobilized the US into creating more firm
stances towards the junta regime. Carter’s administration cracked down heavily against the juntas
and made it clear that so long as they continued to conduct these horrific acts, the US would not
engage in diplomatic talks; this in turn placed substantial pressures on the junta, whom were
already suffering from financial disarray (Teubal 2004).
The Mothers were able to attract international attention from their public protests to their
unwavering efforts in meeting with government officials from Western Europe to North America.
While the Mothers’ main focus was to find the whereabouts of their missing children,
Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo were more dedicated towards finding their missing
241
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grandchildren and bringing justice to those that illegally adopted them and falsified their birth
certificates (Sanders 2008; Blaustein and Portillo 1985). They were both equally successful in
gaining public and international attention in these respects. In 1983, elections were held and the
junta regime lost to Raul Alfonsin. A few days after winning the presidency, Alfonsin overturned
a law242 passed by the junta that would effectively postpone any proceedings or investigations of
the disappearances (Di Paolantonio 1997). Alfonsin helped establish the National Commission on
the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP) which later wrote the Nunca Mas (Never Again)
Report.243 Videla, Massera, and a few others were charged, however unfortunately between 1986
and 1987, two laws were passed that would once again place a halt on charges and trials. It
wouldn’t be until 2005 and 2006 that the trials and cases would resume resulting in additional
imprisonments.
All in all, the movements conducted by the Mothers and Grandmothers were successful in
many ways. While there are still grandchildren that are not accounted for, as of April 2019, there
have been over 100 grandchildren reunited with their biological families. In addition to this, the
Mothers were able to successfully gain international attention and recognition, which played a
significant role in ensuring that the future trials would take place. Had the women opted to remain
silent, as many other mothers did, the situation unfolding in Argentina may not have received the
attention it got. In addition to this, the Mothers, by way of testimonies given during trials, were
able to uncover the whereabouts and untimely fates of their children. The movement conducted by
the Mothers and Grandmothers was not only a new phase of feminism, but was a humanitarian
endeavor. To date, the Mothers and Grandmothers continue with their endeavors have become a
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vocal point for human rights, while the Grandmothers have continued to work diligently in finding
missing grandchildren. As we will see in the following section, many of the mothers voiced their
support for a new avenue of women’s rights, that of the legalization of abortion.
National Campaign for the Right to Legal, Safe and Free Abortion
One of the prevalent issues in many societies is that of abortion. It is equally contentious
as it is important. According to statistics provided by the Center for Reproductive Rights, at least
five percent of women in the world still live in societies that ban abortion244 outright,245 the rest of
the women live in societies that permit abortion on one or more grounds, which include: abortion
to save a woman’s life246, abortion to preserve health247, abortion in circumstances of economical
and societal deprivation248, and lastly, what is considered to be the most liberal of these laws,
abortion upon request which typically allows termination up to twelve weeks after conception
unless it is specified otherwise249. Of these categories, 36 percent250 of women live in societies that
cater to abortion upon request, but often have limitations as to when this request may be made (i.e.
twelve to fourteen weeks).
Argentina falls into Category III with the statutory provision that abortion may be permitted
in instances of rape251. At first glance, one might have the impression that Argentina has one of
the more progressive abortion laws in comparison to other Latin American countries. First, the
claim that Argentina has relatively liberalized abortion policy is largely deceptive and to some
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extent inaccurate. In order to understand the current predicament of abortion rights in Argentina,
one must briefly examine the evolution of abortion rights in the country. In 1921 the Penal Code
permitted three exceptions to rape and they were: the cases where the health of the mother was in
danger, the cases where a woman was impregnated through rape, and lastly the cases where a
woman was deemed mentally incapacitated.252 During the duration of the Dirty War, these
provisions were amended to where the health concerns had to provide “grave danger to the
woman’s life” and abortion in the cases of rape became a criminal offense253. In 1984, after the
presidential win of Alfonsín, the Penal Code was reverted back to the 1921 version, however there
was an inclusion placed that significantly changed it. A closer look at the penal codes will show
that there are stipulations for the cases of rape, specifically Article 86 which states:
Abortion practiced by a licensed physician with the consent of the pregnant woman is not
punishable:
1º If it was carried out for the purpose of preventing danger to the life or health of the
mother and if this danger cannot be prevented by other means,
2º If the pregnancy arises from rape or indecent assault committed against a woman who
is an idiot or insane. In this case, the consent of her legal representative shall be required
for the abortion254.
As one can see, abortion after a rape is only justifiable if the victim is deemed mentally
incapacitated in some respect. Moreover, in cases of incest, economic depravity, domestic
violence, and requested terminations, abortions are completely banned and illegal to this date. It
was not until 2012, that the Supreme Court had a ruling255stating that abortions were accessible in
all instances of rape. One of the cases cited in issuing this ruling was that of a fifteen-year-old girl
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that had been raped by her step-father. The mother petitioned for an abortion, but was denied
numerous times in local and appellate courts. It was not until her case reached the Supreme Court
where her request was permitted and an abortion was carried out in March 2010.
However, an appeal was later filed against the mother on “behalf of the unborn child by
the Subrogating General Counsellor of the Province of Chubut” wherein he stated that regardless
of the abortion being approved and underwent, that in “interpreting article 86, paragraph 2 of the
Penal Code, the lower court had not restricted the viability of this authorization to the case of a
raped victim who is idiotic or demented, thus ignoring the constitutional-conventional plexus”256
He further cited various paragraphs within the UN Charter and the Convention on the Rights of
the Child to further his stances. In response, the Supreme Court cited the US case of Roe v. Wade
and went on to further state that “rape victims must be considered non-punishable abortions, and
more precisely, particular cases of the general hypothesis of danger to the health of the pregnant
women (Article 86, paragraph 1 of the Penal Code).257” In addition to this, the Supreme Court
made the argument that pregnancies from rape do place risk to a woman’s life or health, in
particular her mental health. Thus, the Supreme Court effectively made it legal and non-punishable
for a woman or girl to undergo abortion in all cases of rape. Ideally, this would make it more
feasible for women to obtain abortions in such cases, but as we will see, despite this ruling,
hospitals and medical officials didn’t abide by the decision.
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The Beginning of the Campaign and its Goals
In 1985, a group of Argentine women participated in the World Conference on Women,
which motivated them to create Encuentro Nacional de Mujeres or the National Meeting of
Women. In 1986, the movement held its first gathering in the heart of the capital of Argentina.
Thereafter, the movement conducted annual events that focused on wide array of women’s rights
issues ranging from domestic violence to religion to media to reproductive rights 258. In 2003
Encuentro held its annual gathering in Rosario (Sutton and Borland 2013). Similar to the symbolic
white scarf donned by the Mothers, members of Encuentro wore green handkerchiefs across their
necks and mouths that read their motto: “sex education to decide, contraceptives to not abort, legal
abortion to not die.”259 There they introduced a new movement entitled: National Campaign for
the Right to Legal, Safe and Free Abortion (NCRLSFA).260 This campaign has been dedicated to
passing a reform bill that would extend women the right to abortion without any restrictions.
According to the website dedicated to their movement, the goals of the NCRLSFA include
the following: 1) they want Argentina to make reproductive rights, basic human rights261; 2) make
abortion legal; 3) terminate the dangers and deaths associated with clandestine style abortions 262;
4) “expand democracy” to ensure that even patriarchal societies within Argentina adhere to the
desired reproductive rights263; 5) the state provide post-abortion care and providing “public health
services to women and girls that choose to have an abortion”264; 6) the state to provide adequate
contraception; 7) schools to provide sexual education courses; 8) “compliance with the
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commitment for the reduction of maternal mortality and the post-abortion humanitarian assistance
protocol”265; and 9) national adherence to the National Law 25.673 on the Creation of the National
Program on Sexual Health and Responsible Procreation.266
Abortion laws, as mentioned previously, are contentious issues in many countries. Often
times, abortion is not permissible due to religious beliefs. In the case of Latin American countries,
the strong role of the Catholic Church has played a significant role in promoting restrictive
attitudes on reproductive rights (Tuman, Roth-Johnson, and Jelen 2013; Cherif 2015: 116).
Argentina is no different in this respect, and while it allows for some permissible circumstances
for abortion, there have still been instances of death due to clandestine abortions and forced births
on impregnated minors out of cases of rape. In addition, women and young girls have faced
scrutiny, and, in some cases, abuse during post-abortion care. Statistics show that in Argentina,
roughly 30 mortalities occur in clandestine or “unsafe abortions” (Alanis and Nolley 2011). This
is equally alarming and important to Encuentros and as a result they have stressed on both issues.
Since the 2012 Supreme Court decision, there continues to be a lack of adherence to the
decision amongst medical physicians. As of recently in March of 2019, an 11-year-old girl was
raped and impregnated by her grandmother’s boyfriend. Her mother immediately requested an
abortion but the medical facility purposely delayed it in an effort to force her to carry to term. Due
to the delay, the young girl was unable to undergo a vaginal abortion and was forced to surgically
remove the fetus which resulted in “serious health problems; not to mention the psychological
trauma stemming from the entire episode” (Guevera-Rosas 2019, 1). Similarly, in January of
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2019, a 12-year-old girl that had been raped and impregnated was denied an abortion and as a
result was forced to undergo emergency C-section (Guevera-Rosas 2019, 1). In other cases,
women are forced to undergo clandestine abortions, which are deemed as unsafe abortions
(Branigan 2018). Unfortunately, the mandated abortion laws are not always adhered by doctors
that feel they’re facing a moral opposition. It is estimated that Argentina conducts anywhere from
300,000 to 600,000 abortions annually and many of these are conducted in unsafe conditions with
insufficient tools (Mcreynolds-Perez 2017; Ministerio de Salud 2010). Thus, in an effort to end
these issues and growing health concerns, Encuentro by way of the National Campaign, drafted a
bill to propose to Congress in hopes that it would reform the current abortion laws.
A Proposal: IVE Bill.
Encuentro proposed what they termed as the “Voluntary Interruption Law of Pregnancy”
which sought out to make Argentina a Stage V country, where women would be permitted to
request an abortion within fourteen weeks of pregnancy.267 In addition to this, the bill would ensure
that abortion would be permitted in cases where a woman’s life was at risk and in instances of
rape.268 Moreover, it highlighted the importance of healthcare professionals educating women with
respect to undergoing safe abortions and providing counseling for pre and abortion care, among
other things; in addition to this, schools would be required to provide such education on all
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levels.269 The overall purpose of the bill was to address problems that arise from unsafe abortion
practices ranging from infections to higher mortality rates of mothers.270
Domestic Support and Transnational Support: Success or Failure?
It should be noted that Encuentros and the Campaign have received a lot of domestic
recognition and support amongst many groups, predominantly female and male actors who have
used their international platforms to raise awareness of the abortion issues and the causes of the
Campaign. One of the more known supporters have been some of the Mothers’ movement,
previously discussed in this chapter. Most notably, their president Hebe de Bonafini stated that as
a mother “who bets on life to defend the life of women deprived of rights” she supported the right
to abortions (as quoted in Sutton and Borland 2013, 202). Another member of the Mothers, Nora
Cortinas also spoke in favor of reproductive rights, where “…she frames women’s right to decide
about their bodies in the context of a broader ‘struggle for freedom’ in which the Madres are
involved” (as quoted in Sutton and Borland 2013, 202). While the domestic support placed
significant pressure on the government to approve a reform to the current penal code, the greatest
influence came from the international support the movements received.
Encuentros and the Campaign drew world-wide attention, predominantly among
internationally renowned organizations such as the Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty
International, both of which have attempted to place pressure on the Argentine government
through different avenues. In a testimony to the Argentine Congress, one member of HRW
advocated for the complete legalization of abortion citing that it would “guarantee access to safe
269
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and legal abortion.”271 Similarly, Amnesty International has raised awareness to the proposed bill
as well as has provided petitions to show solidarity and support272 (Pinero 2018). In addition to
this, Amnesty International has highlighted the harsh ramifications women face should they choose
to undergo clandestine abortions or illegal abortions in the country, including but not limited to
imprisonment (Pinero 2018). In Denmark, there have been annual solidarity movements with the
Campaign and for abortion rights in Argentina. Similar to that of Encuentros, the women in
Denmark donned the green handkerchief and held signs that were written in both English and
Spanish in an effort to raise international awareness (Lawler 2018). Additionally, the movement
garnered support from various LGBT groups most notably ILGA (International Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association) by way of one of their former leading members, Lohana
Berkins (Hanssmann and D’Andrea 2018).
Ahead of the vote for the newly proposed bill, countless countries engaged in solidarity
marches including: Italy, Spain, Bolivia, Brazil, Ireland, United States, Germany, Australia, Japan,
and many others (Lawler 2018; Left Voice 2018). Moreover, the movements gained recognition
within their home countries and garnered support from their respective governments which echoed
back to Argentina. These actions undoubtedly placed pressure on the Argentine government, but
there was also strong resistance to the measure from the Catholic Church. In June of 2018, prior
to these protests, The House of Representatives in Argentina had passed the bill. Despite these
solidarity movements and countless international pleads, the Senate later rejected the bill in August
2018. This did not hinder Encuentros or the Campaign, both of which have continued to hold
protests even this year.
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In 2019, more solidarity protests took place globally, most notably by the Leeds Sisters
Uncut in the United Kingdom, and by Berlin Ireland Pro Choice Solidarity in Germany (Global
Voices 2019). On May 28, 2019, International Women’s Day, the Campaign presented the IVE
bill once more, only this time in an effort to include transgendered or non-gender specific
individuals, they withheld from narrowing the frame to pregnant women and shifted to pregnant
persons. A decision has yet to be made as to whether or not this newly presented bill will pass. It
is challenging to assess whether or not this movement is a success. In retrospect, if one observes
their goals and the current outcome, then it would not be deemed mainly unsuccessful. They have
not been able to implement most of the ideals laid out in their IVE bill; however, this may change
this year. Argentina has been placed under substantial, growing international pressure which may
sway their decision this year. The Campaign, having been relentless and steadfast, has definitely
worked to its own advantage as it has increased domestic and international support each year which
is a tremendous accomplishment in it of itself. One thing to note, in a highly Catholic society such
as that of Argentina and most Latin American countries, it is very challenging to pass pro-abortion
based laws for two reasons: 1) the involvement of the Catholic Church and other conservative
Christian groups, and the fear of a backlash makes it unwanted amongst government officials; and
2) there is a financial component in these movements. For instance, there have been instances
where financial support is funneled towards pro-life campaigns whereas little financial assistance
is provided to movements like the Campaign. Nonetheless, despite the setbacks it may have had,
one might be confident that given their perseverance and non-deterrence over the years, that the
Campaign will be able to succeed in promoting reform.
Currently, Argentina is amidst an upcoming presidential election that could change the
tides depending on who wins. One of the biggest proponents to Encuentros and its campaign and
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current presidential candidate, Juan Gómez Centurión, has vowed to place an end to domestic and
international efforts in legalizing abortion, should he win the presidency. In an interview,
Centurión stated “the principal system of fundamental values is superior to the values promoted
by government agencies. One of these values is the value of life of an unborn child. If Argentina
does not value the life of an unborn child, then there is no law and there is no republic”.273 He has
made the idea of family values to be the core of his campaign, going as far as to say that the second
most important value in Argentina, aside from that of life, is that of the family as “The family is
the principal social nucleus where a citizen is formed and which knows him; it protects him,
develops him, and is where he learns the first lessons of civility and basic values. What we have
is a perspective that focuses on the family, throughout our whole plan of government”.274 He has
also made controversial statements where he equated gender ideology to the “corruption of
minors”.275 Similar to the current president of the United States, Centurión has vowed to “make
Argentina great again” by reinforcing family values and the importance of the government; going
as far as stating that the government is incapable of committing acts of state terror – this statement
was in reference to the Dirty War which he has repeatedly denied was an act of government
orchestrated genocide.
Another emerging facet that may play a role in the passage of the bill is the influence that
Encuentros and its campaign has pushed forth to other Latin American countries. Recently, women
in Mexico have orchestrated their own subsect of the campaign and have taken to the streets of the
capital city demanding the legalization of abortion (Mellen 2019). Since the emergence of the
protests, lawmakers in Oaxaca have issued a vote that would ultimately legalize and decriminalize
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abortion (Mellen 2019; Agren 2019). The proposed law is set to “scrap restrictions on abortion
during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, despite vocal opposition from the Catholic church” (Agren
2019, 1).276 This momentous accomplishment for Mexico, may mean an equally great win for
Argentina in the near future. International pressure, domestic influence, and regional solidarity are
three factors that have placed substantial weight on Argentina’s government; only time will tell if
this is enough to create a change.
Similarly, a subsequent movement that has worked with the Campaign in efforts to help
extend universal abortion rights, as well as other prevalent issues in Argentine society, is that of
Ni Una Menos (Not One More). Aside from supporting the abortion bill, Ni Una Menos stemmed
from wanting to place an end to gender violence, specifically femicide which they believe to be
highly prevalent in Argentine society. Their movement, like the Campaign, has garnered much
international attention and recognition.
Ni Una Menos (Not One Less or Not One More)
Background and Emergence
On May 10, 2015 a 14-year-old girl, Chiara Paez, had gone to see her boyfriend, Manuel
Mansilla and his family. There, after what is believed to have been a confrontation regarding her
pregnancy, Paez was brutally murdered by her boyfriend in his backyard (Luengo 2017; La Nación
2018). Autopsy reports indicated that Paez had been beaten in various parts of her body, in addition
to her face and head (Reuters 2017). In addition to this, Paez appeared to have drugs induced into
her system that are typically used to cause an abortion (Reuters 2017). While this was not the first
case of gender violence, it was the final case needed for women to form a collective in hopes of
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ending gender-based violence. This led to the emergence of the Ni Una Menos or Not One Less
movement in hopes of gaining enough domestic and international attention that changes would be
made to benefit the rights and safety of women. Unfortunately, in October of the same year,
Claudia Arias was killed alongside her aunt and grandmother by her ex-boyfriend in what appears
to have been a paternity dispute (“Murder and Machismo” 2016). What was most haunting about
this case is that Claudia had attended the Ni Una Menos march days before her murder;
nonetheless, her death further highlighted the growing issue of gender violence within the country.
One of the leading members of Ni Una Menos, Ada Beatriz, has stated that it is:
A cultural issue. The aggressor feels a woman belongs to him and he can do what
he wants with her. We’re talking about machismo that sees a woman as an object,
as inferior and someone who has to obey. If she doesn’t, disobedience sis punished
with beatings and even death (Reuters 2017).
According to Ni Una Menos, these violent occurrences are byproducts of the machismo
culture prevalent within Argentine society (Goni 2016; La Nación 2015; Struminger 2016).
According the movement, “violence machista277 includes all acts, or omission towards unequal
power women’s life, dignity, liberty, physical integrity as well as, economic, psychological and
sexual integrity and finally just for the simple fact of being a woman” (Angelini 2018, 53). As
such, one of the main goals of the movement was to end gender-based violence against women
which they labeled as femicide.
The definition of femicide, similar to the case of genocide, is often left up to interpretation
as well as contestation. In some cases, individuals may wish to broaden the scope of the definition
by stating it is violence against women, girls, and transgender females, while in other cases it is
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narrowed to killing of women. To date, femicide

278

maybe be defined as the following:

“misogynist killing of women” (Russell 1992 as cited in Campbell and Runyan 1998, 347). The
difference between cases of homicide and cases of femicide is that in the latter, the targets are
deliberately killed solely because of their gender, whereas in the former the target may be anyone
for an unbeknownst reason (Caputi 1992; Radford-Russell 1992). The goal of femicide is simple:
“to take, keep or increase domination, control and ownership over them [them being women]
(Fernandez 2012, 43). There are three distinct types of femicide: the first is intimate femicide
which entails men that were in romantic relationships (husband, boyfriend, etc.) with the targeted
female; the second is non-intimate femicide which entails men that targeted women they did not
personally know; and third, linked femicides which entails a man killing the female children of a
woman as punishment and later murdering the woman as well (Fernandez 2012). Despite society
wanting to privatize the occurrences between a husband and wife, Ni Una Menos has argued that
in cases of abuse, violence, and murder – it is far from a private matter and that it is important to
publicize it to make such acts illegal and restricted within the country, rather than hidden279.
According to Ni Una Menos, between the years of 2008 to 2016 there was an estimated
1,808 cases of femicide in Argentina; with an estimated one woman being killed between every
thirty to forty hours.280 One prominent issue, which Ni Una Menos has repeatedly addressed, is
that the Argentine government fails to provide accurate statistics of mortality rates with regard to
femicides and gender based violence; this in turn makes it challenging to report accurate numbers
to properly address this issue. It appears that this may have shifted since the emergence of the
movement as there has been more data provided from various outlets. One example of this can be
In countries such as Mexico, Dominican Republic, Honduras and others – the term femicide is preferred. While
both are the same, Argentina and other countries opt for the term femicide instead.
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found with the data provided by Small Arms Survey which examines female deaths from acts of
domestic violence. In their data, they report that the Argentine government registered 423 deaths
per 100,000 in 2017 alone.281 Similarly, the Council on Hemispheric Affairs reported that between
2008 and 2017, there was anywhere from 2,500 to 3,000 cases of documented femicides. 282 La
Casa del Encuentro reports that there have been large numbers of femicides and linked femicides
within the last ten years; in fact, their data suggests that despite the presence of Ni Una Menos,
between the years of 2015 to 2017, there was a steady rise in both occurrences. 283 Figure 6.1
demonstrates the documented femicides from 2008 to 2018, as well as documented “linked
femicides.”
Figure 6.1: Femicides Documented in La Case del Encuentro
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One important thing to note is that while these statistics appear to be accurate, there may be cases
that went unreported or unregistered which are not accounted for in this data. Nonetheless, it
appears that because of the rise of Ni Una Menos, the government has begun to document these
incidents more diligently or perhaps the presence of the movement has heightened the prospects
for femicides to occur more frequently at higher rates.
Goals: A Closer Look at Domestic Protest and Transnational Efforts
The first and perhaps most obvious mission of the movement is to end machismo mindsets
and to cease gender violence from occurring; by machismo mindset I include cases where men
belittle women, abuse women, kill women, and instances where a woman is objectified and labeled
because of her sexuality, weight, education, and other attributes. Moreover, Ni Una Menos wished
to make sexuality and reproductive rights, the sole rights of those women.284 Secondly, the
movement believes that femicides should be seen and “treated as a security problem” and that it is
a national issue.285 In making it such, it is equally important to the movement that the government
provide actual statistics of the cases of femicide, create laws to prevent such violence, and create
networks where women can report abuse.
One of the main goals found within Ni Una Menos is to create steps that would ultimately
insure the protection of women; such steps include creating safe havens for women, monitoring of
perpetrators, creating “domestic violence offices” that assist women that feel they are victims of
domestic violence, providing training against sexual violence or gender based violence, and
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making sure that complaints submitted to police officials is handled efficiently and seriously. 286
Ni Una Menos also sought to promote the immediate and effective implementation of Law No.
26,485 which was intended to protect and eradicate violence exerted against women within
domestic relationships or interpersonal relationships; the law was also intended to punish
perpetrators and hold them accountable for committing acts against violence.287
The protests resulted in the creation of Argentina’s National Plan of Action for the
Prevention, Assistance and Eradication of Violence against Women which would create a threeyear plan beginning in 2017, with a budget of roughly $50 million, and the potential for
implementation in 2019288. On August 16, 2016, Fabiana Tuñez, the Chair of the NCW, presented
Argentina’s National Plan of Action for the Prevention, Assistance and Eradication of Violence
against Women to several members of various international organizations including: the UN,
UNICEF, WHO, and many others.289 On November 21, 2016, Dubravka Simonovic, a member of
the UN, issued a statement following her visit to Argentina in which she echoed the concerns raised
by Ni Una Menos and other similar movements, and further stated that the judicial imperfections
and inadequacies needed to be addressed.290 Additionally, she discussed what has been done so far
and what still needs to be done. During her visit to Argentina, Simonovic notes seeing newly
instated shelters that were created and stated that she “welcomed the plans of the National Council
of Women to construct 36 additional shelters” and further urged the government to increase the
amount of shelters throughout all communities.291 She further discussed the concerns with the lack
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of viable, statistical data on femicides and stressed the importance of gathering such information;
in an effort to assist in this matter Simonovic proposed creating a data lab or observatory strictly
dedicated to monitoring femicides within Argentina and that such data would include “women per
year, disaggregated by age and sex of the perpetrators, as well as the relationship between the
perpetrator and the victim(s).”292 In addition to this, she noted the importance of extending legal
aid throughout all communities and making them readily affordable to women. Lastly, she stressed
that there needs to be proper training and awareness as laid out by Ni Una Menos.
The UN is not the only international key player in this movement. World leaders have also
engaged in solidarity. One notable example of this is when former First Lady Michelle Obama
praised Ni Una Menos in her speech while visiting Buenos Aires (TV Publica Argentina, 2016).
Another world leader that extended her support was former President Michelle Bachelet of Chile,
as well as the former President of Argentina, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. Other examples of
international solidarity and transnationalism came in two forms: first, there were solidarity rallies
in Chile, Bolivia, Mexico, Uruguay, Paraguay, Ecuador, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Spain, Peru,
Guatemala, and many others (Friedman and Tabbush 2016); secondly, there were other countries
that created sister movements within their own countries such as Peru which created NiUnaMenos
Peru in July 2016 (La Republica 2016). Additionally, Ni Una Menos partook in the International
Women’s Strike which gained them further international recognition, especially within the United
States.
These efforts by Ni Una Menos, and the rallying of domestic and transnational feminist
support, undoubtedly has resulted in some successes. While there is no data to support an increase
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in the surplus of hotlines for victims of gender-based violence, there are reports that support an
increase of utilizing the hotlines even more so since the emergence of Ni Una Menos (Samuelson
2016). In 2016, one of the more notable national hotlines in Argentina, Linea 144, reported that
its calls had doubled from the prior year. Since then, the calls have progressively increased
annually which can be seen in Figure 6.2.
Figure 6.2: Linea 144 Annual Report of calls received
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Table 6.1 gives a detailed breakdown of the calls received, the purposes for the calls, and
the total calls per year which illustrates an increase of calls received by the hotline; one can infer
from this data that Ni Una Menos had a tremendous impact on raising awareness of the importance
of ending femicide, as well as speaking out against it and encouraging victims to report when a
crime is committed against them. Similarly, one can infer that there may be a rise in shelters that
are available for victims of domestic violence; again, there is no data to adequately support this
claim. In 2017, there were reports that the government had requested an additional three shelters
to be built after one of the members of Ni Una Menos, Micaela Garcia, was found slain by a man
that had recently been released from prison after having been convicted of rape nearly five years
prior; however, the government also proceeded to release the addresses for these shelters which
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placed the security and anonymity of the victims at risk, thereby defeating the purpose in having
the shelters in place (Zabludovsky 2017).

Table 6.1: Annual Reported Call Logs by Linea 144: 2015-2018
Other
Questions

Unknown293

Total
Calls
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Call Related
to
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on Gender
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36,969

31,168

N/A

116,468

33,312
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312,138

2017296
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Additionally, the movement pushed forth a pending bill that will extend many more
protections and rights to women in an effort of ending gender violence. Argentina’s National Plan
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of Action for the Prevention, Assistance and Eradication of Violence against Women has not yet
been decided on and it is unknown if it will be officially implemented, but it is due to be heard this
year. Nonetheless, this movement should be considered somewhat successful given that there was
rapid movement and response by the government upon the initial demonstration. Moreover, while
Argentina’s National Plan of Action for the Prevention, Assistance and Eradication of Violence
against Women has not been officially implemented, the mere fact that it was proposed and
accepted as a three-year plan is an astounding accomplishment for feminists in Argentina.
Moreover, Ni Una Menos took the proper steps in submitting a proposal through the United
Nations and having an open line of communication with the organization which created additional
global recognition.
Conclusion
From the efforts of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo to Ni Una Menos, Argentina has
experienced a wave of transnational feminism during the past five decades. The outcomes of the
three movements have varied on numerous levels. Looking back on the theoretical frameworks
introduced in Chapter 2, resource mobilization theory may be applied to all three movements. For
instance, the Mothers and Grandmothers utilized domestic and international resources throughout
their endeavors. In beginning of their movement, women activists utilized their access to
newspapers to publish the names of the disappeared which in turn sparked public awareness of
their movement and plight. Subsequently, they utilized money they gathered from church
donations in an effort to publish these pieces. Similarly, both Ni Una Menos and the National
Campaign for the Right to Legal, Safe & Free Abortion utilized access to social media and
international networks in hopes of garnering global recognition and solidarity, which they
achieved. Moreover, they successfully organized local marches and protests which utilized their
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access to newspapers and news agencies for further recognition on both a domestic and
international level.
In all three movements, international involvement occurred after the emergence of these
groups. While NGOs played a role in all three, only one of the groups has been the most successful
to date: The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo. The reason for their success, and the uncertainty of
outcome for the other two groups, is two-fold: first, the Mothers utilized international networks
including political elites and NGOs in hopes of achieving their two goals; second, the simultaneous
presence of an ongoing war played a significant factor, which encompasses the broad spectrum of
Political Process Theory that asserts that movements may utilize elite division within a regime to
their advantage. The latter reason is possibly the biggest factor in their success as the unfolding
news of human rights atrocities, genocide, and ongoing turmoil was reaching the ears of
international political elites, countries like the United States were already becoming involved with
the unfolding situation. This in turn made it more feasible for the Mothers to reach out to
international players and made it more plausible for them to be involved. As mentioned in Chapter
2, repression and insurgent consciousness may result in more favoring outcomes. In this case, the
Mothers emerged from political injustices being committed against their children. Additionally,
the US had already sent members of the State department to investigate these allegations of
atrocities, thus it was already aware of situation on ground. In contrast, the other two movements
have to raise awareness of their situation from scratch; in other words, they have to give the
international community a reason to care about a situation they are otherwise unaware of. This is
possibly one of the only areas where the accessibility to the diaspora community is critical. Just as
seen in the case of Iran, the diaspora community is knowledgeable about the issues in their home
country which gives them the platform to inform members of their host countries about them in
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such a way that raises international awareness. This is not to diminish the international solidarity
that has surfaced from these two movements, but their levels of success may have heightened if
there was a diaspora community present that could assist in educating their host countries of these
various issues.
As outlined in Chapter 2, a movement’s mode of contention may also yield more favorable
outcomes. In the case of all three movements, it appears that the mode of contention shifted from
contained to transgressive. All three movements began their efforts within the country and reached
out to the local governments to help enact change, but later reached out to international elites for
further assistance. Despite this similarity, the Mothers movement, as well as Ni Una Menos have
been more successful than the National Campaign for the Right to Legal, Safe & Free Abortion.
One could argue that the goals embarked on by the Mothers were not as contentious in
nature as that of the latter groups. In other words, wanting to know the whereabouts of one’s child
is not as controversial, as passing a bill that permits the termination of pregnancy in a
predominantly Catholic society. While the Mothers did face backlash from pro-government
individuals, they garnered more praise, admiration, and support from both within the country and
outside of it. Similarly, Ni Una Menos is less controversial than the National Campaign for the
Right to Legal, Safe & Free Abortion as it tackles the issue of gender-killings; an issue that is
heightening in numbers within the country and region. Its contained mode of contention was able
to place significant pressure on the Argentine government to implement, Argentina’s National Plan
of Action for the Prevention, Assistance and Eradication of Violence against Women and to push
them to increase the number of shelters. Moreover, the movement was able to promote active
action by victims of violent crimes by having them reach out to hotlines and have their cases
documented. Ni Una Menos became transgressive in an effort to gain international support to place
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additional pressure on the Argentine government and to ensure that it began collecting and
disbursing date to ensure accuracy regarding gender violence within the state; which one can infer
has been a success.
It is challenging to define success within these three movements because they all vary in
their objectives and goals. Undoubtedly, the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo is the most successful
of the three because it was able to accomplish its two main goals: 1) bringing the perpetrators to
justice and 2) finding the whereabouts of their disappeared children. Ni Una Menos has also been
relatively successful as it has achieved most of its overarching goals, particularly in having
femicides be seen as a security problem, and being treated as such. Moreover, recent evidence
appears to show more diligent documentation of gender violence and femicide occurrences. In
contrast, the National Campaign for the Right to Legal, Safe & Free Abortion has not been as
successful; in its defense it is still an ongoing endeavor and one that is far more challenging than
the other two to accomplish. This campaign not only has to achieve its goals, but it has to shift a
status quo that has been in play for centuries as well. Moreover, it faces an adversary that the other
two movements did not have: the Catholic Church. While the Mothers faced issues with the
Catholic Church aligning themselves with the Junta regime, they did not face demonization of
them by the Church – the Campaign has. The Catholic Church has even created movements against
the Campaign which have in large part gained a lot of support. The Church is not the only
challenger to the movement: medical physicians, religious community, and government officials
have all been equally contentious on the matter. This movement, despite its large international
recognition and support, has been unable to pass the IVE bill to date, predominately because of
this substantial opposition. However, given its regional influence and the success other Latin
American countries are seeing, there may be a shift to Argentina’s status quo soon. One thing this
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movement will need to improve upon is utilizing its resources more efficiently, like the other two
movements did. The other two movements approached human rights organizations and provided
outlines with respect to their goals. Given the challenges of the Catholic Church and religious
taboos attached to the idea of abortion, it is critical and advised that the movement project its goals
to international actors and NGOs; doing so, may place the right amount of pressure on the
government to force change.
In conclusion, it is clear that based off of the theoretical frameworks laid out in Chapter 2
and the outcomes for each movement, all but the National Campaign for the Right to Legal, Safe
& Free Abortion may be deemed as successful movements. It will be interesting to see if this
outcomes shifts in the next coming months with the election of a new candidate, as well as the
outcome of the newly proposed IVE bill. It will also be interesting to see if the transgressive mode
of contention comes into further play and results in more favorable outcomes. The successes
emerging from a regional perspective shift this movement to be a more successful one within the
next coming months.
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Chapter 7:
Conclusion

Transnational feminism, while not a new phenomenon, has played and continues to play a
crucial role by interconnecting feminists and activists across borders. In doing so, it has built
bridges between activists within home countries and the diaspora communities in other countries,
or in some case, as seen in this research, with NGOs, political elites, and activists that have no
connections to the subject countries at all. Both cases examined here are embedded with historical
efforts of changing the status quo of women and both have rooted efforts by feminist and
transnational groups in assisting with women’s rights endeavors.
One of the important factors demonstrated in both cases is the importance of the historical
framework with regard to feminist efforts and how they would later shape the emergence of
transnational feminist efforts in both countries. With the case of Iran, elements of transnational
and transnational feminist endeavors can be dated back to the beginning of the 20th century.
Women’s rights movements began emerging during the 19th century and heightened during the
20th century; such efforts were centered on suffrage, education, and employment. Table 7.1
illustrates that Iran’s history with feminist movements from the 19th century towards the middle of
the 20th century
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Table 7.1: Historical Context and Heritage of Prior Periods in Iran
Late 19th century to 1945:
Movements to improve women’s rights emerge in late 19th and early 20th century. Several elite-led efforts
initiated by Reza Shah (women’s education; unveiling). Transnational feminist influences are present in
early 20th century.
1945-1979:
Secular, left parties (Tudeh) influence attitudes toward women, and elite-led movements result in additional
changes (White Revolution). Influence of transnational feminism is present in 1970s, but emergence of some
division in Iran, and in the diaspora community in period immediately prior to Iranian Revolution (19741979).
Case Comparisons: Key Explanatory Variables
Movement
Name
IWSF

Outcome
Low – No change but did raise
awareness

Mode of
Contention
Transgressive

SSFC

Moderate to High. Stoning was
outlawed. Evidence of
enforcement

Mixed

OMSC

Low. No change in law; but
raised awareness.

Transgressive

Cohesion

Resources

Low. Division among
women in Iran, and division
in diaspora community
High. Moderate cohesion
among women in Iran;
diaspora and broader and
international community
Low. Division among
women in Iran, and in
diaspora community

Moderate

Moderate
to High

Moderate

Similarly in Argentina, the historical analysis illustrates that there were feminist
movements since the 19th century going into the 20th century. Unlike Iran, Argentina had a surge
of migration from predominantly Socialist countries. As a result, many feminist movements
emerged from the influences of the Socialist frameworks. Specifically, the movements focused on
issues centered on employment, labor issues, wages, education, and suffrage. Argentine women,
throughout history, have suffered the internal struggle of battling for equality with respect to these
matters, while subsequently maintaining the traditional status quo of women. Throughout the 19th
and 20th century, this struggle is ever present, even to this date. Despite this, history has suggested
elements of transnational feminism prior to its peak in the 20th century. This in turn set the path
for future transnational feminist movements that would later heighten in a post- Perón era. Table
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7.2 demonstrates the historical context and how prior efforts led into the transnational feminist
movements studied within this research.

Table 7.2: Historical Context and Heritage of Prior Periods in Argentina
1890s to 1970s:
Argentina experiences a surge of economic growth, developing labor movements, and heightened migration
from European countries. These migrations have a Socialist influence which created a surge of feminist
movements centered on issues regarding employment rights, wages, and suffrage. During the beginning of
the 19th century, Argentina sees elements of transnational feminism emerge through groups like the AAFT.
Under the Perón reign, you see endeavors for the progression of women’s rights, albeit highly politically
motivated. Several elite-led efforts led by Perón (suffrage, labor, economic, social, and political).
Case Comparisons: Key Explanatory Variables
Movement
Name
Mothers and
Grandmothers
of the Plaza de
Mayo
NCRLSFA

Ni Una Menos

Outcome
High – perpetrators
brought to justice.
Some grandchildren
found. Many
disappeared found
Low – IVE bill has not
completed passage;
current abortion laws
not reformed;
ongoing movement
Low to Moderate -

Mode of
Contention
Mixed

Cohesion

Resources

High; cohesion within
movement; cohesion
internationally and with
international actors

Moderate
to High

Mixed

High: cohesion within
movement; cohesion
internationally and with
international actors

Moderate

Mixed

High: cohesion within
movement; cohesion
internationally and with
international actors

Moderate
to High

This research has uncovered key findings pertaining to the likelihood of success, given
differing factors, within each of these movements. Defining success with respect to these
movements, is challenging because of their varying goals. However, for purposes of this research,
success has been defined as the following: a movement which has achieved most, if not all of its
goals; a movement that has access to resources and is able to readily utilize them; a movement that
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garners international support and recognition298; and a movement that is able to enact change
within the status quo. For purposes of this research, all four of these points would need to be met
in order for it to be termed successful. Underlying factors such as diaspora involvement, elite
divisiveness, modes of contention, regime type, and regime stability are components that may shift
the likelihood of success, but do not define it. Table 7.3 illustrates some of these components and
their presence, or lack thereof, within each of the movements.

Table 7.3: Additional Factors Influencing the Outcome

298

Note that by this I mean support and recognition by NGOs, political elites, and activists that have no connections
or bearings within the studied countries; in other words non-diaspora related.
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First, by examining one case that has diaspora involvement, whilst the other utilizing nonnational members, one is able to see the case that bears more favorable and successful outcomes.
In the case of Iran, the diaspora community has been heavily integrated into the movements, but
this has not always resulted in success. The diaspora community is at times ridden with contention
and division which in turn makes it challenging for a movement to be cohesive; a lack of
cohesiveness often results in the disintegration of a movement. This was seen best with the case
of the Iranian Women’s Study Foundation, which garnered international support and diaspora
integration. IWSF was consumed by division among the diaspora activists. Despite this limitation,
it was able to achieve its modest goal of raising international awareness and discussion on the
plight of women in Iran.
One of the outlier movements in Iran, the SSFC, did not utilize the diaspora community,
but rather leaned on the help of the international community for support. In doing so, they obtained
the necessary resources for spreading information and raising awareness of the growing issue of
stoning within the country; doing so sparked sister movements in other parts of the world.
Additionally, the SSFC worked closely with Islamic jurists, reformists, and members of the
judiciary in an effort to discredit any misinterpretations that present the Quran as an advocate for
honor killings. Doing so, the movement utilized a divided elite system to its advantage by being
able to gain the support of the broader elite within the regime. Subsequently, the movement opted
to create a movement that was gender inclusive which ultimately resulted in a higher outpour of
support among both the male and female populace. SSFC ensured that the abolishment of stoning
was an important endeavor for women and men alike, as both were equally impacted by it. This is
also seen with the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, where the movement was heavily gender
inclusive, especially given that many of the disappeared were both male and female. As such,
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SSFC was able to achieve its goals and subsequently shift the status quo to eliminate acts of stoning
which have not been reported to date since 2009.
In contrast, the OMSC heavily utilized the diaspora community and avoided any use of
the international community and was consequently a failure; this in part was also due to the fact
that many of the movements leading members were arrested. Nonetheless, the movement which
was a hailed success in Morocco, was unable to achieve all of its goals and disintegrated rapidly.
One can infer from this, that diaspora politics is not always useful for transnational feminist
movements; in fact, it appears they are more problematic in some cases. However, one should not
diminish the value of the diaspora community as they may be useful in some cases. For instance,
the National Campaign for the Right to Legal, Safe & Free Abortion would have been better served
to have the assistance of the diaspora community because in large part there is a lack of global
awareness with regard to these issues women face in Argentina. If a diaspora community is able
to spread information to the host country about an impending situation, then there may be more
international involvement.
Secondly, international involvement, rather than diaspora integration, appears to yield
more successful results; this is seen best within the cases of Argentina, as well as the SSFC in Iran.
In particular, involvement of international political elites is crucial to the success of a movement
because they have one of the highest platforms in disbursing information and rallying support. For
instance, the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo had the international support of human rights
campaigns and NGOs, as well as the intervention of the US government and state department. The
combination of these resulted in being able to bring legal ramifications upon the perpetrators and
locate the whereabouts of disappeared family members. This would not have been plausible in the
absence of the international community. The outlier case for Argentina in this respect is the
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National Campaign for the Right to Legal, Safe & Free Abortion because it has had high levels of
international support and recognition, but has not been able to achieve any of its goals nor enact
any change. This is in part due to the fact that it faces adversaries from the religious, legal, and
medical community making it challenging to shift the status quo. Nonetheless, the high levels of
international support have yet to yield favorable outcomes for this movement.
Thirdly, Chapter 2 highlights that the mode of contention is one of the key factors to
success of a movement; transgressive being the most successful. The movements studies within
both cases are either transgressive or mixed [movements that begin as contained but morph into
transgressive]. Despite scholarly support that suggests transgressive movements are more
successful, movements like the OMSC and the National Campaign for the Right to Legal, Safe
and Free Abortion were not; thus, I don’t believe the mode of contention should be seen as a sole
factor for success, but rather other underlying factors may also impact the outcome.
Lastly, the regime types for both of the examined countries were different. The cases
examined in Iran occur after the Islamic Revolution where the regime is considered to be a hybrid
regime consisting of an Islamic Theocracy with democracy, coupled with elements of
authoritarianism. As such, the movements examined here have faced limitations and repressions
that movements in Argentina did not face. In turn, this has significantly altered the likelihood of
success. A movement’s inability to utilize certain resources like social media or communication
outlets does hinder the outcome of their movements. With the cases of Argentina, there was little
government interference in inhibiting the movements or suppressing them; thus, they were able to
readily communicate and protest with little to no ramifications. The only movement in Argentina
that faced some suppression from the government, was the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo and that
was solely during the reign of the Junta regime. Regime stability also coincides with this point. In
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all of the movements, except for the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, there was some form of regime
stability present. As noted in Chapter 2, regime instability permeates movements to yield more
successful results by drawing support both domestically and internationally more easily. Similarly,
elite divisiveness yields more successful results as well as seen with IWSF, SSFC, the Mothers of
the Plaza de Mayo, and Ni Una Menos, all of which are deemed as successful movements.
Table 7.3 highlights my key findings having considered these factors. As one can see, the
movements that were deemed moderately successful to highly successful were the following:
IWSF, SSFC, The Mothers and Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, and Ni Una Menos. From
these findings one can infer that the diaspora community is not a necessary tool for success in a
transnational feminist endeavor; in fact, in most cases the international community is more
necessary. One should also consider that international intervention does not always yield positive
results, especially in cases where there is a lack of cohesiveness and understanding by the
international actor. That is why it is especially important, as illustrated by the movements studied
in this research, to create an outline of goals and provide substantive information regarding the
issues on hand. This was seen in the Mothers movements, as well as Ni Una Menos.
In the cases that did not yield successful movements, one can see that some of the key
problems were as follows: lack of cohesiveness between members and the diaspora community,
and lack of elite divisiveness. Moreover, the lack of international involvement was a key player in
success and the omission of this groups yielded more unsuccessful outcomes. It is important to
also note that while the National Campaign for the Right to Legal, Safe and Free Abortion is not
deemed a success for this research, it is still an ongoing endeavor and this may change in the future.
One inference made from this research is that some of the theories presented in Chapter 2
did not exhibit as high of an impact on the result as predicted. For instance, while the mode of
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contention may have a small effect, it certainly was not a determining factor for the outcome of
any of the movements discussed here.

Despite Tilly and Tarrow (2015) proclaiming that this

would be a significant underlying factor for a movement’s success, I find that other factors such
as international involvement have a far greater effect on outcome. Some theories such as elite
divisiveness and regime stability prove to have some pull with regard to outcome. The less stable
a government, the more elite divisiveness, the higher the chances for a movement’s success.
While this dissertation examined the phenomena of transnational feminist endeavors that
encompassed the diaspora community as well as non-diaspora members, it had some limitations.
While this study utilized a qualitative approach, it may have been further benefited through a mixed
study or quantitative study analysis. The small cases examined here may subject my results to
sample bias and/or inaccurate results; further, the larger the number of cases, the more accurate
the results. The lack of quantitative methodology also demonstrates a lack of generalizable results
in my findings. Secondly, while I have a breadth knowledge of both Farsi and Spanish, I was
forced to rely on some outside translation sources to assist me in some of the translations presented
in this research.
The case of Iran would have benefited from the use of data analysis to provide a larger
overview on the domestic opinions towards the issues tackled in the movements. However, due to
the significant limitations and restrictions placed by the Iranian government, such survey and/or
data is not available. In many cases, such surveys are not permissible and are strictly prohibited.
Moreover, some of the resources that are available are restricted to universities within Iran and
non-obtainable by non-residents. As such, this study was forced to rely upon the available primary
and secondary material that could be accessed. As a result of this, my awareness claims are not
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based on any survey material, rather on assessments from the utilized primary and secondary
sources and based inference on qualitative inference.
Future research could examine additional case studies in other regions to examine whether
the factors noted in this study still hold true. In particular, incorporating cases that fall under
varying regime types may serve useful. Additionally, future research may incorporate a more
quantitative approach that embodies a larger-N size which may bear differing or more accurate
results than the ones demonstrated here. Larger-N sizes may enable a researcher to capture the
reason for a phenomenon more readily without narrowing the focus to a small sample size. Future
research may also examine the divisions found within the diaspora communities. Specifically, it
would be useful to observe the wide array of infuences for this division and lack of cohesion; such
influences may include the waves of migration from the home country (i.e., the migrants’ cohort),
social-class and socioeconomic backgrounds, levels of education, and the regions the diaspora
communities migrate too. Additionally, if a country’s history is more contentious, future research
may want to examine how this influences the behavior and mentality of the diaspora, specifically
in regard to engaging in certain movements within the home country.
Further, as discussed in the end of Chapter 6, future research may want to embark on the
outcome of the National Campaign for the Right to Legal, Safe and Free Abortion and the IVE bill
since it is still an ongoing endeavor. To date, it has not been determined whether this recent draft
will be passed and the decision is highly dependent on the outcome of the upcoming elections. In
lieu with this, there have been additional movements rising within both cases presented here. One
of the more prominent cases that has emerged is in Iran when a young girl recently immolated
herself after being arrested for attending a soccer match. This has since sparked a global outcry
which resulted in the FIFA Federation placing substantial pressure on the Iranian government,
268

forcing it to lift the ban off of women with regard to attending soccer matches. Upon further
developments over the next few months, future research would be useful in examining if
transnational feminist efforts, as well as international efforts had any bearing on the outcome(s)
that arose from this case. It is also crucial to examine if these movements convey the same findings
presented in this research, or if there are other underlying factors that may have not been addressed
here that serve as explanations to this growing phenomenon.
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